Formal topology aims at developing general topology in intuitionistic and predicative mathematics. Many classical results of general topology have been already brought into the realm of constructive mathematics by using formal topology and also new light on basic topological notions was gained with this approach which allows distinction which are not sensible in classical topology. Here we give a systematic exposition of one of the main tools in formal topology: inductive generation. In fact, many formal topologies can be presented in a predicative way by an inductive generation and thus their properties can be proved inductively. We show however that some natural complete Heyting algebra cannot be inductively defined. Contents 1 The notion of formal topology 3 1.1 Concrete topological spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 Formal topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 Three problems and their solution 7 2.1 Formal topologies wi...

This paper gives an introduction to type theory, focusing on its recent use as a logical framework for proofs and programs. The first two sections give a background to type theory intended for the reader who is new to the subject. The following presents Martin-Lof's monomorphic type theory and an implementation, ALF, of this theory. Finally, a few small tutorial examples in ALF are given.

The word idempotency signifies the study of semirings in which the addition operation is idempotent: a+ a = a. The best-known example is the max-plus

The first paper in this thesis presents a machine checked formalisation, in Martin-Löf's type theory, of pointfree topology with applications to domain theory. In the other papers pointfree topology is used in an approach to constructive analysis. The continuum is defined as a formal space from a base of rational intervals. Then the closed rational interval [a, b] is defined as a formal space, in terms of the continuum, and the Heine-Borel covering theorem is proved constructively. The basic definitions for a pointfree approach to functional analysis are given in such a way that the linear functionals from a seminormed linear space to the reals are points of a particular formal space, and in this setting the Alaoglu and the Hahn-Banach theorems are proved in an entirely constructive way. The proofs have been carried out in intensional Martin-Löf type theory with one universe and finitary inductive definitions, and the proofs have also been mechanically checked in an implementation of that system. ...

This work explores the interconnections between a number of different perspectives on the formalisation of space. We begin with an informal discussion of the intuitions that motivate these formal representations.

Brouwer’s pioneering results in topology, e.g. invariance of dimension, were developed within a classical framework of mathematics. Some years later he explained

A pattern of interaction that arises again and again in programming, is a “handshake”, in which two agents exchange data. The exchange is thought of as provision of a service. Each interaction is initiated by a specific agent —the client or Angel, and concluded by the other —the server or Demon. We present a category in which the objects —called interaction structures in the paper — serve as descriptions of services provided across such handshaken interfaces. The morphisms —called (general) simulations— model components that provide one such service, relying on another. The morphisms are relations between the underlying sets of the interaction structures. The proof that a relation is a simulation can serve (in principle) as an executable program, whose specification is that it provides the service described by its domain, given an implementation of the service described by its codomain.

Abstract. Paul Cohen's method of forcing, together with Saul Kripke's related semantics for modal and intuitionistic logic, has had profound effects on a number of branches of mathematical logic, from set theory and model theory to constructive and categorical logic. Here, I argue that forcing also has a place in traditional Hilbert-style proof theory, where the goal is to formalize portions of ordinary mathematics in restricted axiomatic theories, and study those theories in constructive or syntactic terms. I will discuss the aspects of forcing that are useful in this respect, and some sample applications. The latter include ways of obtaining conservation results for classical and intuitionistic theories, interpreting classical theories in constructive ones, and constructivizing model-theoretic arguments.?1. Introduction. In 1963, Paul Cohen introduced the method of forcing to prove the independence of both the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. It was not long before Saul Kripke noted a connection between forcing and his semantics for modal and

It took two millennia after Euclid and until in the early 1880s, when we went beyond the ancient axiom of parallels, and inaugurated geometries of curved spaces. In less than one more century, General Relativity followed. At present, physical thinking is still beheld by the yet deeper and equally ancient Archimedean assumption which entraps us into the limited view of ”only one walkable world”. In view of that, it is argued with some rather easily accessible mathematical support that Theoretical Physics may at last venture into the Non-Archimedean realms. 1. A Deep Expression of a Need for Reconsideration String Theory has for the last nearly three decades known a special status within Theoretical Physics in the pursuit of the grand unification between General Relativity and Quantum Theory. Recently however, it has become the object of a considerable criticism due to

The very nature of topology and its close relation to how humans perceive space and time make mereotopology an indispensable part of any comprehensive framework for qualitative spatial and temporal reasoning (QSTR). Within QSTR, it has by far the longest history, dating back to descriptions of phenomenological processes in nature (Husserl, 1913; Whitehead, 1920, 1929) – what we call today ‘commonsensical ’ in Artificial Intelligence. There have been plenty of other motivations to