This paper proposes a new theory of the relationship between the sentence processing mechanism and the available computational resources. This theory -- the Syntactic Prediction Locality Theory (SPLT) -- has two components: an integration cost component and a component for the memory cost associated with keeping track of obligatory syntactic requirements. Memory cost is

Naturally occurring speech contains only a limited amount of complex recursive structure, and this is reflected in the empirically documented difficulties that people experience when processing such structures. We present a connectionist model of human performance in processing recursive language structures. The model is trained on simple artificial languages. We find that the qualitative performance profile of the model matches human behavior, both on the relative difficulty of center-embedded and cross-dependency, and between the processing of these complex recursive structures and right-branching recursive constructions. We analyze how these differences in performance are reflected in the internal representations of the model by performing discriminant analyses on these representation both before and after training. Furthermore, we show how a network trained to process recursive structures can also generate such structures in a probabilistic fashion. This work suggests a novel expla...

Many theorists have dismissed a priori the idea that distributional information could play a significant role in syntactic category acquisition. We demonstrate empirically that such information provides a powerful cue to syntactic category membership, which can be exploited by a variety of simple, psychologically plausible mechanisms. We present a range of results using a large corpus of child-directed speech and explore their psychological implications. While our results show that a considerable amount of information concerning the syntac-tic categories can be obtained from distributional information alone, we stress that many other sources of information may also be potential contributors to the identification of syntactic classes.

Introduction Despite considerable diversity among theories about how humans process language, there are a number of fundamental assumptions which are shared by most such theories. This consensus extends to the very basic question about what counts as a cognitive process. So although many cognitive scientists are fond of referring to the brain as a `mental organ' (e.g., Chomsky, 1975)---implying a similarity to other organs such as the liver or kidneys---it is also assumed that the brain is an organ with special properties which set it apart. Brains `carry out computation' (it is argued)

This thesis explores a perspective for explaining the origins of linguistic structure that is based on considerations beyond the constraints of the language acquisition device. In contrast to the theory of Universal Grammar proposed by Chomsky, this perspective considers how the processes of language acquisition and use create a dynamical system that is capable of adapting linguistic structure to the inductive biases of learners. In this view it is possible to conceive of language adapting to aid its own survival: those languages that are more reliably and easily acquired will tend to persist for longer than their less easily learned counterparts. Thus, linguistic structures are seen as emergent, adaptive phenomena rather than preordained features of language.

. We develop a new framework for studying the biases that recurrent neural networks bring to language processing tasks. A semantic concept represented by a point in Euclidian space is translated into a symbol sequence by an encoder network. This sequence is then fed to a decoder network which attempts to translate it back to the original concept. We show how a pair of recurrent networks acting as encoder and decoder can develop their own symbolic language that is serially transmitted between them either forwards or backwards. The encoder and decoder bring different constraints to the task, and these early results indicate that the conflicting nature of these constraints may be reflected in the language that ultimately emerges, providing important clues to the structure of human languages. 1 Introduction The study of automata and the languages they can process has a history dating back to Turing [9] and beyond. Entwined with this story is the study of natural languages and of the human...

Although for many years a sharp distinction has been made in language research between rules and words—with primary interest on rules—this distinction is now blurred in many theories. If anything, the focus of attention has shifted in recent years in favor of words. Results from many different areas of language research suggest that the lexicon is representationally rich, that it is the source of much productive behavior, and that lexically specific information plays a critical and early role in the interpretation of grammatical structure. But how much information can or should be placed in the lexicon? This is the question I address here. I review a set of studies whose results indicate that event knowledge plays a significant role in early stages of sentence processing and structural analysis. This poses a conundrum for traditional views of the lexicon. Either the lexicon must be expanded to include factors that do not plausibly seem to belong there; or else virtually all information about word meaning is removed, leaving the lexicon impoverished. I suggest a third alternative, which provides a way to account for lexical knowledge without a mental lexicon.

Traditionally, research has been defined as being about development if it focuses on behaviors that occur during development, without reference either to what precedes or follows, or -- more importantly -- the mechanisms that drive change. This perspective has been challenged by two new approaches: dynamical systems, and connectionism, both of which have as core goals the explanation of change. Interestingly, these approaches have also been seen by many as being at odds with one another, for reasons that are in part valid, and in part superficial. Recent developments in both approaches suggest that a convergence is occurring, although much remains to be done before a true unification can take place.

In this chapter, we review computer models of cognition that have focused on the use of neural networks. These architectures were inspired by research into how computation works in the brain and subsequent work has produced models of cognition with a distinctive flavor. Processing is characterized by patterns of

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