Time underlies many interesting human behaviors. Thus, the question of how to represent time in connectionist models is very important. One approach is to represent time implicitly by its effects on processing rather than explicitly (as in a spatial representation). The current report develops a proposal along these lines first described by Jordan (1986) which involves the use of recurrent links in order to provide networks with a dynamic memory. In this approach, hidden unit patterns are fed back to themselves; the internal representations which develop thus reflect task demands in the context of prior internal states. A set of simulations is reported which range from relatively simple problems (temporal version of XOR) to discovering syntactic/semantic features for words. The networks are able to learn interesting internal representations which incorporate task demands with memory demands; indeed, in this approach the notion of memory is inextricably bound up with task processing. These representations reveal a rich structure, which allows them to be highly context-dependent while also expressing generalizations across classes of items. These representations suggest a method for representing lexical categories and the type/token distinction.

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This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive architecture and the sorts of models that have traditionally been assumed in cognitive science. We claim that the major distinction is that, while both Connectionist and Classical architectures postulate representational mental states, the latter but not the former are committed to a symbol-level of representation, or to a `language of thought': i.e., to representational states that have combinatorial syntactic and semantic structure. Several arguments for combinatorial structure in mental representations are then reviewed. These include arguments based on the `systematicity' of mental representation: i.e., on the fact that cognitive capacities always exhibit certain symmetries, so that the ability to entertain a given thought implies the ability to entertain thoughts with semantically related contents. We claim that such arguments make a powerful case that mind/brain architecture is not Connectionist at the cognitive level. We then consider the possibility that Connectionism may provide an account of the neural (or `abstract neurological') structures in which Classical cognitive architecture is implemented. We survey a number of the standard arguments that have been offered in favor of Connectionism, and conclude that they are coherent only on this interpretation. Connectionist or PDP models are catching on. There are conferences and new books nearly every day, and the popular science press hails this new wave of theorizing as a breakthrough in understanding the mind (a typical example is the article in the May issue of Science 86, called "How we think: A new theory"). There are also, inevitably, descriptions of the emergence of --------------------- 1. This paper is base...

We demonstrate that an unlexicalized PCFG can parse much more accurately than previously shown, by making use of simple, linguistically motivated state splits, which break down false independence assumptions latent in a vanilla treebank grammar. Indeed, its

Does knowledge of language consist of mentally-represented rules? Rumelhart and McClelland have described a connectionist (parallel distributed processing) model of the acquisition of the past tense in English which successfully maps many stems onto their past tense forms, both regular (walk/walked) and irregular (go/went), and which mimics some of the errors and sequences of development of children. Yet the model contains no explicit rules, only a set of neuron-style units which stand for trigrams of phonetic features of the stem, a set of units which stand for trigrams of phonetic features of the past form, and an array of connections between the two sets of units whose strengths are modified during learning. Rumelhart and McClelland conclude that linguistic rules may be merely convenient approximate fictions and that the real causal processes in language use and acquisition must be characterized as the transfer of activation levels among units and the modification of the weights of their connections. We analyze both the linguistic and the developmental assumptions of the model in detail and discover that (1) it cannot represent certain words, (2) it cannot learn many rules, (3) it can learn rules found in no human language, (4) it cannot explain morphological and phonological regularities, (5) it cannot explain the differences between irregular and regular forms, (6) it fails at its assigned task of mastering the past tense of English, (7) it gives an incorrect explanation for two developmental phenomena: stages of overregularization of irregular forms such as bringed, and the appearance of doubly-marked forms such as ated, and (8) it gives accounts of two others (infrequent overregularization of verbs ending in t/d, and the order of acquisition of different irregula...

Selectional constraints are limitations on the applicability of predicates to arguments. For example, the statement “The number two is blue” may be syntactically well formed, but at some level it is anomalous — BLUE is not a predicate that can be applied to numbers. According to the influential theory of (Katz and Fodor, 1964), a predicate associates a set of defining features with each argument, expressed within a restricted semantic vocabulary. Despite the persistence of this theory, however, there is widespread agreement about its empirical shortcomings (McCawley, 1968; Fodor, 1977). As an alternative, some critics of the Katz-Fodor theory (e.g. (Johnson-Laird, 1983)) have abandoned the treatment of selectional constraints as semantic, instead treating them as indistinguishable from inferences made on the basis of factual knowledge. This provides a better match for the empirical phenomena, but it opens up a different problem: if selectional constraints are the same as inferences in general, then accounting for them will require a much more complete understanding of knowledge representation and inference than we have at present. The problem, then, is this: how can a theory of selectional constraints be elaborated without first having either an empirically adequate theory of defining features or a comprehensive theory of inference? In this dissertation, I suggest that an answer to this question lies in the representation of conceptual

In this article we show how Optimality Theory yields a highly general Constraint Demotion principle for grammar learning. The resulting learning procedure specifically exploits the grammatical structure of Optimality Theory, independent of the content of substantive constraints defining any given grammatical module. We decompose the learning problem and present formal results for a central subproblem, deducing the constraint ranking particular to a target language, given structural descriptions of positive examples. The structure imposed on the space of possible grammars by Optimality Theory allows efficient convergence to a correct grammar. We discuss implications for learning from overt data only, as well as other learning issues. We argue that Optimality Theory promotes confluence of the demands of more effective learnability and deeper linguistic explanation.

A higher order recurrent neural network architecture learns to recognize and generate languages after being "trained " on categorized exemplars. Studying these networks from the perspective of dynamical systems yields two interesting discoveries: First, a longitudinal examination of the learning process illustrates a new form of mechanical inference: Induction by phase transition. A small weight adjustment causes a "bifurcation" in the limit behavior of the network. This phase transition corresponds to the onset of the network’s capacity for generalizing to arbitrary-length strings. Second, a study of the automata resulting from the acquisition of previously published training sets indicates that while the architecture is not guaranteed to find a minimal finite automaton consistent with the given exemplars, which is an NP-Hard problem, the architecture does appear capable of generating non-regular languages by exploiting fractal and chaotic dynamics. I end the paper with a hypothesis relating linguistic generative capacity to the behavioral regimes of non-linear dynamical systems.

Pinker, S. & Bloom, P. (1990). Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13

The wealth of information on the web makes it an attractive resource for seeking quick answers to simple, factual questions such as "who was the first American in space?" or "what is the second tallest mountain in the world?" Yet today's most advanced web search services (e.g., Google and AskJeeves) make it surprisingly tedious to locate answers to such questions. In this paper, we extend question-answering techniques, first studied in the information retrieval literature, to the web and experimentally evaluate their performance. First we introduce MULDER, which we believe to be the first general-purpose, fully-automated question-answering system available on the web. Second, we describe MULDER's architecture, which relies on multiple search-engine queries, natural-language parsing, and a novel voting procedure to yield reliable answers coupled with high recall. Finally, we compare MULDER's performance to that of Google and AskJeeves on questions drawn from the TREC-8 question track. We find that MULDER's recall is more than a factor of three higher than that of AskJeeves. In addition, we find that Google requires 6.6 times as much user effort to achieve the same level of recall as MULDER. 1.