Abstract. Generalized stationary points of the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) are studied to better describe the limit points produced by interior point methods for MPEC. A primal-dual interior-point method is then proposed, which solves a sequence of relaxed barrier problems derived from MPEC. Global convergence results are deduced without assuming strict complementarity or the linear independence constraint qualification for MPEC (MPEC-LICQ). Under certain general assumptions, the algorithm can always find some point with strong or weak stationarity. In particular, it is shown that every limit point of the generated sequence is a strong stationary point of MPEC if the penalty parameter of the merit function is bounded. Otherwise, a certain point with weak stationarity can be obtained. Preliminary numerical results are reported, which include a case analyzed by Leyffer for which the penalty interior-point algorithm failed to find a stationary point. Key words: Global convergence, interior-point methods, mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints, stationary point

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitively in both markets. Since there is no explicit representation of the best-reply function for each follower, this Stackelberg game is formulated as a large-scale mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The best-reply functions are implicitly represented by a set of nonlinear complementarity conditions. Analysis of the computed solution for the Pennsylvania- New Jersey- Maryland electricity market shows that the leader can gain substantial profits by withholding allowances and driving up NOx allowance costs for rival producers. The allowances price is higher than the corresponding price in the Nash-Cournot case, although the electricity prices are essentially the same. 1

This paper presents a parameter-free integer-programming based algorithm for the global resolution of a linear program with linear complementarity constraints (LPEC). The cornerstone of the algorithm is a minimax integer program formulation that characterizes and provides certificates for the three outcomes—infeasibility, unboundedness, or solvability—of an LPEC. An extreme point/ray generation scheme in the spirit of Benders decomposition is developed, from which valid inequalities in the form of satisfiability constraints are obtained. The feasibility problem of these inequalities and the carefully guided linear programming relaxations of the LPEC are the workhorse of the algorithm, which also employs a specialized procedure for the sparsification of the satifiability cuts. We establish the finite termination of the algorithm and report computational results using the algorithm for solving randomly generated LPECs of reasonable sizes. The results establish that the algorithm can handle infeasible, unbounded, and solvable LPECs effectively.

We propose a new approach to convex nonlinear multiobjective optimization that captures the geometry of the Pareto set by generating a discrete set of Pareto points optimally. We show that the problem of finding an optimal representation of the Pareto surface can be formulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints. The complementarity constraints arise from modeling the set of Pareto points, and the objective maximizes some quality measure of this discrete set. We present encouraging numerical experience on a range of test problem collected from the literature.

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