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Beyond Turing Machines
"... In this paper we describe and analyze models of problem solving and computation going beyond Turing Machines. Three principles of extending the Turing Machine's expressiveness are identified, namely, by interaction, evolution and infinity. Several models utilizing the above principles are pr ..."
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Cited by 34 (4 self)
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In this paper we describe and analyze models of problem solving and computation going beyond Turing Machines. Three principles of extending the Turing Machine's expressiveness are identified, namely, by interaction, evolution and infinity. Several models utilizing the above principles are presented. Other
Even Turing Machines Can Compute Uncomputable Functions
 Unconventional Models of Computation
, 1998
"... Accelerated Turing machines are Turing machines that perform tasks commonly regarded as impossible, such as computing the halting function. The existence of these notional machines has obvious implications concerning the theoretical limits of computability. 2 1. Introduction Neither Turing nor Post ..."
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Cited by 17 (3 self)
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Accelerated Turing machines are Turing machines that perform tasks commonly regarded as impossible, such as computing the halting function. The existence of these notional machines has obvious implications concerning the theoretical limits of computability. 2 1. Introduction Neither Turing nor Post, in their descriptions of the devices we now call Turing machines, made much mention of time (Turing 1936, Post 1936). 1 They listed the primitive operations that their devices perform  read a square of the tape, write a single symbol on a square of the tape (first deleting any symbol already present), move one square to the right, and so forth  but they made no mention of the duration of each primitive operation. The crucial concept is that of whether or not the machine halts after a finite number of operations. Temporal considerations are not relevant to the functioning of the devices as described, nor  so we are clearly supposed to believe  to the soundness of the proofs that Turi...
The tractable cognition thesis
 Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal
, 2008
"... The recognition that human minds/brains are finite systems with limited resources for computation has led some researchers to advance the Tractable Cognition thesis: Human cognitive capacities are constrained by computational tractability. This thesis, if true, serves cognitive psychology by constra ..."
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Cited by 16 (2 self)
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The recognition that human minds/brains are finite systems with limited resources for computation has led some researchers to advance the Tractable Cognition thesis: Human cognitive capacities are constrained by computational tractability. This thesis, if true, serves cognitive psychology by constraining the space of computationallevel theories of cognition. To utilize this constraint, a precise and workable definition of “computational tractability ” is needed. Following computer science tradition, many cognitive scientists and psychologists define computational tractability as polynomialtime computability, leading to the PCognition thesis. This article explains how and why the PCognition thesis may be overly restrictive, risking the exclusion of veridical computationallevel theories from scientific investigation. An argument is made to replace the PCognition thesis by the FPTCognition thesis as an alternative formalization of the Tractable Cognition thesis (here, FPT stands for fixedparameter tractable). Possible objections to the Tractable Cognition thesis, and its proposed formalization, are discussed, and existing misconceptions are clarified.
The many forms of hypercomputation
 Applied Mathematics and Computation
, 2006
"... This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess. ..."
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Cited by 16 (0 self)
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This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess.
THE MYTH OF UNIVERSAL COMPUTATION
, 2005
"... It is shown that the concept of a Universal Computer cannot be realized. Specifically, instances of a computable function F are exhibited that cannot be computed on any machine U that is capable of only a finite and fixed number of operations per step. This remains true even if the machine U is endo ..."
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Cited by 6 (4 self)
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It is shown that the concept of a Universal Computer cannot be realized. Specifically, instances of a computable function F are exhibited that cannot be computed on any machine U that is capable of only a finite and fixed number of operations per step. This remains true even if the machine U is endowed with an infinite memory and the ability to communicate with the outside world while it is attempting to compute F. It also remains true if, in addition, U is given an indefinite amount of time to compute F. This result applies not only to idealized models of computation, such as the Turing Machine and the like, but also to all known generalpurpose computers, including existing conventional computers, as well as contemplated ones such as quantum computers.
The concept of computability
, 2004
"... I explore the conceptual foundations of Alan Turing’s analysis of computability, which still dominates thinking about computability today. I argue that Turing’s account represents a last vestige of a famous but unsuccessful program in pure mathematics, viz., Hilbert’s formalist program. It is my con ..."
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I explore the conceptual foundations of Alan Turing’s analysis of computability, which still dominates thinking about computability today. I argue that Turing’s account represents a last vestige of a famous but unsuccessful program in pure mathematics, viz., Hilbert’s formalist program. It is my contention that the plausibility of Turing’s account as an analysis of the computational capacities of physical machines rests upon a number of highly problematic assumptions whose plausibility in turn is grounded in the formalist stance towards mathematics. More specifically, the Turing account con ates concepts that are crucial for understanding the computational capacities of physical machines. These concepts include the idea of an “operation” or “action” that is “formal,” “mechanical,” “welldefined, ” and “precisely described,” and the idea of a “symbol” that is “formal,” “uninterpreted,” and “shaped”. When these concepts are disentangled, the intuitive appeal of Turing’s account is significantly undermined. This opens the way for exploring models of hypercomputability that are fundamentally different from those currently entertained in the literature.