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Diamonds are a Philosopher's Best Friends. The Knowability Paradox and Modal Epistemic Relevance Logic (Extended Abstract)
 Journal of Philosophical Logic
, 2002
"... Heinrich Wansing Dresden University of Technology The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the ..."
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Heinrich Wansing Dresden University of Technology The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is derived that all truths are, in fact, known. Nevertheless, the solution o#ered is in the spirit of the constructivist attitude usually maintained by defenders of the antirealist premise. In order to avoid the paradoxical reasoning, a paraconsistent constructive relevant modal epistemic logic with strong negation is defined semantically. The system is axiomatized and shown to be complete.
AN INDUCTIVE MODAL APPROACH FOR THE LOGIC OF EPISTEMIC INCONSISTENCY 1
"... The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we want to extent a specific paranormal modal logic in such a way as obtain a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic able to formalize the notions of plausibility and certainty. With this logic at hand, and this is our second purpose, we shall us ..."
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The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we want to extent a specific paranormal modal logic in such a way as obtain a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic able to formalize the notions of plausibility and certainty. With this logic at hand, and this is our second purpose, we shall use a modified version of Reiter‘s default logic to build a sort of inductive logic of plausibility and certainty able to represent some basic principles of epistemic inductive reasoning, such as a negative autoepistemic principle, an ‗errorprone feature of induction ‘ principle and a confirmation by enumeration principle. Some things make the combination of modal logic and paraconsistent logic (da Costa 1974)