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79
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
 In Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of selfinterested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions — the Nash equilibria — may look quite differ ..."
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Cited by 209 (26 self)
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Abstract. Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of selfinterested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions — the Nash equilibria — may look quite different from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the quality of the best Nash equilibrium, and refer to the ratio of its cost to the optimum network cost as the price of stability. The best Nash equilibrium solution has a natural meaning of stability in this context — it is the optimal solution that can be proposed from which no user will defect. We consider the price of stability for network design with respect to one of the most widelystudied protocols for network cost allocation, in which the cost of each edge is divided equally between users whose connections make use of it; this fairdivision scheme can be derived from the Shapley value, and has a number of basic economic motivations. We show that the price of stability for network design with respect to this fair cost allocation is O(log k), where k is the number of users, and that a good Nash equilibrium can be achieved via bestresponse dynamics in which users iteratively defect from a starting solution. This establishes that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism for inducing strategic behavior to form nearoptimal equilibria. We discuss connections to the class of potential games defined by Monderer and Shapley, and extend our results to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network, with stronger results when the network has only delays and no construction costs. We also present bounds on the convergence time of bestresponse dynamics, and discuss extensions to a weighted game.
On a network creation game
 in Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
, 2003
"... christos @ cs.berkeley.edu ..."
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES
, 2002
"... We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to ..."
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Cited by 175 (16 self)
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We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimumlatency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times, also called the total latency. The outcome of selfish routing—a Nash equilibrium—does not in general minimize the total latency; hence, selfish behavior carries the cost of decreased network performance. We quantify this degradation in network performance via the price of anarchy, the worstpossible ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of an optimal routing of the traffic. We show the price of anarchy is determined only by the simplest of networks. Specifically, we prove that under weak hypotheses on the class of allowable edge latency functions, the worstcase ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of a minimumlatency routing for any multicommodity flow network is achieved by a singlecommodity
Tight bounds for worstcase equilibria
 Proc. 13th SODA
, 2002
"... We study the problem of traffic routing in noncooperative networks. In such networks, users may follow selfish strategies to optimize their own performance measure and therefore their behavior does not have to lead to optimal performance of the entire network. In this paper we investigate the worst ..."
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Cited by 159 (6 self)
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We study the problem of traffic routing in noncooperative networks. In such networks, users may follow selfish strategies to optimize their own performance measure and therefore their behavior does not have to lead to optimal performance of the entire network. In this paper we investigate the worstcase coordination ratio, which is a game theoretic measure aiming to reflect the price of selfish routing. Following a line of previous work, we focus on the most basic networks consisting of parallel links with linear latency functions. Our main result is that the worstcase coordination ratio on m parallel links of possibly different speeds is logm Θ log log logm In fact, we are able to give an exact description of the worstcase coordination ratio depending on the number of links and the ratio of the speed of the fastest link over the speed of the slowest link. For example, for the special case in which all m parallel links have the same speed, we can prove that the worstcase coordination ratio is Γ (−1) (m) + Θ(1) with Γ denoting the Gamma (factorial) function. Our bounds entirely resolve an open problem posed recently by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [KP99].
Nearoptimal network design with selfish agents
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING (STOC
, 2003
"... We introduce a simple network design game that models how independent selfish agents can build or maintain a large network. In our game every agent has a specific connectivity requirement, i.e. each agent has a set of terminals and wants to build a network in which his terminals are connected. Possi ..."
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Cited by 123 (20 self)
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We introduce a simple network design game that models how independent selfish agents can build or maintain a large network. In our game every agent has a specific connectivity requirement, i.e. each agent has a set of terminals and wants to build a network in which his terminals are connected. Possible edges in the network have costs and each agent’s goal is to pay as little as possible. Determining whether or not a Nash equilibrium exists in this game is NPcomplete. However, when the goal of each player is to connect a terminal to a common source, we prove that there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the optimal network, and give a polynomial time algorithm to find a (1 + ε)approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more. For the general connection game we prove that there is a 3approximate Nash equilibrium that is as cheap as the optimal network, and give an algorithm to find a (4.65 + ε)approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more.
The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games
 In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... Abstract We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linearlatency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is \Theta (p N),where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games andfor both max ..."
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Cited by 118 (6 self)
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Abstract We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linearlatency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is \Theta (p N),where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games andfor both maximum and average social cost, the price of anarchy is 5 /2. We extend the results tolatency functions that are polynomials of bounded degree. We also extend some of the results to mixed Nash equilibria.
The price of routing unsplittable flow
 In Proc. 37th Symp. Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination. The splittable version of this problem is when demand can be satisfied by many paths, namely a flow from source to d ..."
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Cited by 102 (3 self)
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The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination. The splittable version of this problem is when demand can be satisfied by many paths, namely a flow from source to destination. The unsplittable, or discrete version of the problem is more realistic yet is more complex from the algorithmic point of view; in some settings optimizing such unsplittable traffic flow is computationally intractable. In this paper, we assume this more realistic unsplittable model, and investigate the ”price of anarchy”, or deterioration of network performance measured in total traffic latency under the selfish user behavior. We show that for linear edge latency functions the price of anarchy is exactly 2.618 for weighted demand and exactly 2.5 for unweighted demand. These results are easily extended to (weighted or unweighted) atomic ”congestion games”, where paths are replaced by general subsets. We also show that for polynomials of degree d edge latency functions the price of anarchy is dΘ(d). Our results hold also for mixed strategies. Previous results of Roughgarden and Tardos showed that for linear edge latency functions the price of anarchy is exactly 4 3 under the assumption that each user controls only a negligible fraction of the overall traffic (this result also holds for the splittable case). Note that under the assumption of negligible traffic pure and mixed strategies are equivalent and also splittable and unsplittable models are equivalent. 1
On Nash equilibria for a network creation game
 In Proc. of SODA
, 2006
"... We study a network creation game recently proposed by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker. In this game, each player (vertex) can create links (edges) to other players at a cost of α per edge. The goal of every player is to minimize the sum consisting of (a) the cost of the links he ..."
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Cited by 68 (7 self)
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We study a network creation game recently proposed by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker. In this game, each player (vertex) can create links (edges) to other players at a cost of α per edge. The goal of every player is to minimize the sum consisting of (a) the cost of the links he has created and (b) the sum of the distances to all other players. Fabrikant et al. conjectured that there exists a constant A such that, for any α> A, all nontransient Nash equilibria graphs are trees. They showed that if a Nash equilibrium is a tree, the price of anarchy is constant. In this paper we disprove the tree conjecture. More precisely, we show that for any positive integer n0, there exists a graph built by n ≥ n0 players which contains cycles and forms a nontransient
Selfish Unsplittable Flows
 Theoretical Computer Science
, 2004
"... What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routed selfishly in general networks with loaddependent edge delays? Motivated by this question we generalize the model of [14] to the case of weighted congestion games. We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the nature o ..."
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Cited by 65 (7 self)
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What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routed selfishly in general networks with loaddependent edge delays? Motivated by this question we generalize the model of [14] to the case of weighted congestion games. We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the nature of these games, which are no longer isomorphic to exact potential games, even for very simple instances. Indeed we construct examples where even a singlecommodity (weighted) network congestion game may have no pure Nash equilibrium.
On spectrum sharing games
 In proc. of PODC 2004
, 2004
"... Each access point (AP) in a WiFi network must be assigned a channel for it to service users. There are only finitely many possible channels that can be assigned. Moreover, neighboring access points must use different channels so as to avoid interference. Currently these channels are assigned by admi ..."
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Cited by 58 (3 self)
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Each access point (AP) in a WiFi network must be assigned a channel for it to service users. There are only finitely many possible channels that can be assigned. Moreover, neighboring access points must use different channels so as to avoid interference. Currently these channels are assigned by administrators who carefully consider channel conflicts and network loads. Channel conflicts among APs operated by different entities are currently resolved in an ad hoc manner or not resolved at all. We view the channel assignment problem as a game, where the players are the service providers and APs are acquired sequentially. We consider the price of anarchy of this game, which is the ratio between the total coverage of the APs in the worst Nash equilibrium of the game and what the total coverage of the APs would be if the channel assignment were done by a central authority. We provide bounds on the price of anarchy depending on assumptions on the underlying network and the type of bargaining allowed between service providers. The key tool in the analysis is the identification of the Nash equilibria with the solutions to a maximal coloring problem in an appropriate graph. We relate the price of anarchy of these games to the approximation factor of local optimization algorithms for the maximum�colorable subgraph problem. We also study the speed of convergence in these games.