Results 1 
2 of
2
Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant. Analysis 62
 New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot: Ashgate
"... truth as knowability. He ponders Fitch’s paradox of knowability, 1 which threatens any such conception. Dummett maintains that the antirealist’s error is to offer a blanket characterization of truth, expressed by the following knowability principle: any statement A is true if and only if it is poss ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
truth as knowability. He ponders Fitch’s paradox of knowability, 1 which threatens any such conception. Dummett maintains that the antirealist’s error is to offer a blanket characterization of truth, expressed by the following knowability principle: any statement A is true if and only if it is possible to know A. Formally, Tr(A) iff ‡K(A) To remedy the error, Dummett’s proposes the following inductive characterization of truth: (i) Tr(A) iff ‡K(A), if A is a basic statement; (ii) Tr(A and B) iff Tr(A) & Tr(B); (iii) Tr(A or B) iff Tr(A) v Tr(B); (iv) Tr(if A, then B) iff (Tr(A) Æ Tr(B)); (v) Tr(it is not the case that A) iff ¬Tr(A), where the logical constant on the righthand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of intuitionistic logic. 2 The only other principle in play in Dummett’s discussion is
(to appear in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press) Tennant’s Troubles
"... First, some reminiscences. In the years 197380, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of antirealism. It end ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
First, some reminiscences. In the years 197380, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of antirealism. It endorsed something like the replacement of truthconditional semantics by verificationconditional semantics and of classical logic by intuitionistic logic, and the principle that all truths are knowable. It did not endorse the principle that all truths are known. Nor did it mention the now celebrated argument, first published by Frederic Fitch (1963), that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. Even in 1970s Oxford, intuitionistic antirealism was a strictly minority view, but many others regarded it as a live theoretical option in a way that now seems very distant. As the extreme verificationist commitments of the view have combined with accumulating decades of failure to reply convincingly to criticisms of the arguments in its favour or to carry out the programme of generalizing intuitionistic semantics for 1 mathematics to empirical discourse, even in toy examples, the impression has been