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Algorithmic randomness, quantum physics, and incompleteness
 Proceedings of the Conference “Machines, Computations and Universality” (MCU’2004), number 3354 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2006
"... When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is almost certainly wrong. Arthur C. Clarke ..."
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Cited by 11 (2 self)
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When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is almost certainly wrong. Arthur C. Clarke
Is Complexity a Source of Incompleteness?
 IS COMPLEXITY A SOURCE OF INCOMPLETENESS
, 2004
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Worlds To Die For
, 1995
"... We survey the background and challenges of a number of open problems in the theory of relativization. Among the topics covered are pseudorandom generators, time hierarchies, the potential collapse of the polynomial hierarchy, and the existence of complete sets. Relativization (i.e., oracle) theory h ..."
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Cited by 5 (2 self)
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We survey the background and challenges of a number of open problems in the theory of relativization. Among the topics covered are pseudorandom generators, time hierarchies, the potential collapse of the polynomial hierarchy, and the existence of complete sets. Relativization (i.e., oracle) theory has seen its share of ups and downs. Extensive surveys of current knowledge [Ver94] and debates as to relativization theory's merits [Har85,All90, HCC + 92,For94] can be found in the literature. However, in a nutshell, one could rather fairly say that as ups and downs go, relativization theory is on the mat. Still, that is not to say that relativization theory has no interesting open issues left with which to challenge theoretical computer scientists. It does, and here are a few such issues. Problem 1: Show that with probability one, the polynomial hierarchy is proper. The above statement is, to say the least, elliptic. However, the problem is wellknown in this formulation. The underlying...
Strong Determinism vs. Computability
 The Foundational Debate, Complexity and Constructivity in Mathematics and
, 1995
"... Are minds subject to laws of physics? Are the laws of physics computable? Are conscious thought processes computable? Currently there is little agreement as to what are the right answers to these questions. Penrose ([41], p. 644) goes one step further and asserts that: a radical new theory is indeed ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Are minds subject to laws of physics? Are the laws of physics computable? Are conscious thought processes computable? Currently there is little agreement as to what are the right answers to these questions. Penrose ([41], p. 644) goes one step further and asserts that: a radical new theory is indeed needed, and I am suggesting, moreover, that this theory, when it is found, will be of an essentially noncomputational character. The aim of this paper is three fold: 1) to examine the incompatibility between the hypothesis of strong determinism and computability, 2) to give new examples of uncomputable physical laws, and 3) to discuss the relevance of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in refuting the claim that an algorithmic theory—like strong AI—can provide an adequate theory of mind. Finally, we question the adequacy of the theory of computation to discuss physical laws and thought processes. 1
Undecidability Everywhere?
, 1996
"... We discuss the question of if and how undecidability might be translatable into physics, in particular with respect to prediction and description, as well as to complementarity games. 1 1 Physics after the incompleteness theorems There is incompleteness in mathematics [22, 63, 65, 13, 9, 12, 51 ..."
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We discuss the question of if and how undecidability might be translatable into physics, in particular with respect to prediction and description, as well as to complementarity games. 1 1 Physics after the incompleteness theorems There is incompleteness in mathematics [22, 63, 65, 13, 9, 12, 51]. That means that there does not exist any reasonable (consistent) finite formal system from which all mathematical truth is derivable. And there exists a "huge" number [11] of mathematical assertions (e.g., the continuum hypothesis, the axiom of choice) which are independent of any particular formal system. That is, they as well as their negations are compatible with the formal system. Can such formal incompleteness be translated into physics or the natural sciences in general? Is there some question about the nature of things which is provable unknowable for rational thought? Is it conceivable that the natural phenomena, even if they occur deterministically, do not allow their complete d...
Effective category and measure in abstract complexity theory. Theoretical Computer Science 154
, 1996
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École Normale Supérieure de Lyon, France Fundamental Computer Science Master, First Year Acceptable Complexity Measures of Theorems
, 2008
"... In 1930, Gödel [7] presented in Königsberg his famous Incompleteness Theorem, stating that some true mathematical statements are unprovable. Yet, this result gives us no idea about those independent (that is, true and unprovable) statements, about their frequency, the reason they are unprovable, and ..."
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In 1930, Gödel [7] presented in Königsberg his famous Incompleteness Theorem, stating that some true mathematical statements are unprovable. Yet, this result gives us no idea about those independent (that is, true and unprovable) statements, about their frequency, the reason they are unprovable, and so on. Calude and Jürgensen [4] proved in 2005 Chaitin's heuristic principle for an appropriate measure: the theorems of a nitelyspeci ed theory cannot be signi cantly more complex than the theory itself (see [5]). In this work, we investigate the existence of other measures, di erent from the original one, which satisfy this heuristic principle. At this end, we introduce the de nition of acceptable complexity measure of theorems. Résumé En 1930, Gödel [7] présente à Königsberg son célèbre Théorème d'Incomplétude, spéci ant que certaines a rmations mathématiques sont indémontrables. Cependant, ce résultat ne nous donne aucune indication à propos de ces a rmations indépendantes (c'estàdire vraies mais indémontrables), sur leur fréquence, les raisons de leur indémontrabilité, etc. Calude and Jürgensen [4] ont prouvé en 2005 le principe heuristique de Chaitin pour une mesure de complexité appropriée: les théorèmes d'une théorie niment axiomatisable ne peuvent être signi cativement plus complexes que la théorie ellemême (cf [5]). Dans ce rapport, nous étudions l'existence d'autres mesures, di érentes de la mesure originale utilisée dans [4], qui satisfassent ce principe heuristique. A cette n, nous introduisons la dé nition de mesure acceptable de complexité des théorèmes.
www.elsevier.com/locate/yaama Is complexity a source of incompleteness?
, 2004
"... In this paper we prove Chaitin’s “heuristic principle, ” the theorems of a finitelyspecified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is invariant under the change of the Gödel numbering. For this measure, ..."
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In this paper we prove Chaitin’s “heuristic principle, ” the theorems of a finitelyspecified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is invariant under the change of the Gödel numbering. For this measure, the theorems of a finitelyspecified, sound, consistent theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic which is arithmetically sound (like Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with choice or Peano Arithmetic) have bounded complexity, hence every sentence of the theory which is significantly more complex than the theory is unprovable. Previous results showing that incompleteness is not accidental, but ubiquitous are here reinforced in probabilistic terms: the probability that a true sentence of length n is provable in the theory tends to zero when n tends to infinity, while the probability that a sentence of length n is true is strictly positive. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1.