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Set Theory and Physics
 FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS, VOL. 25, NO. 11
, 1995
"... Inasmuch as physical theories are formalizable, set theory provides a framework for theoretical physics. Four speculations about the relevance of set theoretical modeling for physics are presented: the role of transcendental set theory (i) hr chaos theory, (ii) for paradoxical decompositions of soli ..."
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Cited by 8 (7 self)
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Inasmuch as physical theories are formalizable, set theory provides a framework for theoretical physics. Four speculations about the relevance of set theoretical modeling for physics are presented: the role of transcendental set theory (i) hr chaos theory, (ii) for paradoxical decompositions of solid threedimensional objects, (iii) in the theory of effective computability (ChurchTurhrg thesis) related to the possible "solution of supertasks," and (iv) for weak solutions. Several approaches to set theory and their advantages and disadvatages for" physical applications are discussed: Cantorian "naive" (i.e., nonaxiomatic) set theory, contructivism, and operationalism, hr the arrthor's ophrion, an attitude of "suspended attention" (a term borrowed from psychoanalysis) seems most promising for progress. Physical and set theoretical entities must be operationalized wherever possible. At the same thne, physicists shouM be open to "bizarre" or "mindboggling" new formalisms, which treed not be operationalizable or testable at the thne of their " creation, but which may successfully lead to novel fields of phenomenology and technology.
Strong Determinism vs. Computability
 The Foundational Debate, Complexity and Constructivity in Mathematics and
, 1995
"... Are minds subject to laws of physics? Are the laws of physics computable? Are conscious thought processes computable? Currently there is little agreement as to what are the right answers to these questions. Penrose ([41], p. 644) goes one step further and asserts that: a radical new theory is indeed ..."
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Cited by 3 (1 self)
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Are minds subject to laws of physics? Are the laws of physics computable? Are conscious thought processes computable? Currently there is little agreement as to what are the right answers to these questions. Penrose ([41], p. 644) goes one step further and asserts that: a radical new theory is indeed needed, and I am suggesting, moreover, that this theory, when it is found, will be of an essentially noncomputational character. The aim of this paper is three fold: 1) to examine the incompatibility between the hypothesis of strong determinism and computability, 2) to give new examples of uncomputable physical laws, and 3) to discuss the relevance of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in refuting the claim that an algorithmic theory—like strong AI—can provide an adequate theory of mind. Finally, we question the adequacy of the theory of computation to discuss physical laws and thought processes. 1
Constructive Mathematics and Quantum Physics
, 1999
"... This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Gottfried T. Ru ttimann ..."
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This paper is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Gottfried T. Ru ttimann
Contents
, 2008
"... Different types of physical unknowables are discussed. Provable unknowables are derived from reduction to problems which are known to be recursively unsolvable. Recent series solutions to the nbody problem and related to it, chaotic systems, may have no computable radius of convergence. Quantum unk ..."
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Different types of physical unknowables are discussed. Provable unknowables are derived from reduction to problems which are known to be recursively unsolvable. Recent series solutions to the nbody problem and related to it, chaotic systems, may have no computable radius of convergence. Quantum unknowables include the random occurrence of single events, complementarity and value indefiniteness.