The proliferation of web-based social networks has lead to new innovations in social networking, particularly by allowing users to describe their relationships beyond a basic connection. In this dissertation, I look specifically at trust in web-based social networks, how it can be computed, and how it can be used in applications. I begin with a definition of trust and a description of several properties that affect how it is used in algorithms. This is complemented by a survey of web-based social networks to gain an understanding of their scope, the types of relationship information available, and the current state of trust. The computational problem of trust is to determine how much one person in the network should trust another person to whom they are not connected. I present two sets of algorithms for calculating these trust inferences: one for networks with binary trust ratings, and one for continuous ratings. For each rating scheme, the algorithms are built upon the defined notions of trust. Each is then analyzed theoretically and with respect to simulated and actual trust networks to determine how accurately they calculate the opinions of people in the system. I show that in both rating schemes the algorithms

The allocation of resources within a system of autonomous agents, that not only have preferences over alternative allocations of resources but also actively participate in computing an allocation, is an exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Economics. This paper is a survey of some of the most salient issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation. In particular, we review various languages to represent the preferences of agents over alternative allocations of resources as well as different measures of social welfare to assess the overall quality of an allocation. We also discuss pertinent issues regarding allocation procedures and present important complexity results. Our presentation of theoretical issues is complemented by a discussion of software packages for the simulation of agent-based market places. We also introduce four major application areas for Multiagent Resource Allocation, namely industrial procurement, sharing of satellite resources, manufacturing control, and grid computing.

Many AI tasks, such as product configuration, decision support, and the construction of autonomous agents, involve a process of constrained optimization, that is, optimization of behavior or choices subject to given constraints. In this paper we present an approach for constrained optimization based on a set of hard constraints and a preference ordering represented using a CP-network - a graphical model for representing qualitative preference information. This approach offers both pragmatic and computational advantages. First, it provides a convenient and intuitive tool for specifying the problem, and in particular, the decision maker's preferences. Second, it provides an algorithm for finding the most preferred feasible outcomes that has the following anytime property: the set of preferred feasible outcomes are enumerated without backtracking. In particular, the first feasible solution generated by this algorithm is optimal.

As people increasingly rely on interactive decision support systems to choose products and make decisions, building effective interfaces for these systems becomes more and more challenging due to the explosion of on-line information, the initial incomplete user preference and user’s cognitive and emotional limitations of information processing. How to accurately elicit user’s preference thereby becomes the main concern of current decision support systems. This paper is a survey of the typical preference elicitation methods proposed by related research works, starting from the traditional utility function elicitation and analytic hierarchy process methods, to computer aided elicitation approaches which include example critiquing, needs-oriented interaction, comparison matrix, CP-network, preferences clustering & matching and collaborative filtering.

Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a profile of partial orders and a candidate c, two important questions arise: first, is c guaranteed to win, and second, is it still possible for c to win? These are the necessary winner and possible winner problems, respectively. We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We prove that for Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the possible winner problem is NP-complete; also, we give a sufficient condition on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be NP-complete (Borda satisfies this condition). We also prove that for Copeland and ranked pairs, the necessary winner problem is coNP-complete. All the hardness results hold even when the number of undetermined pairs in each vote is no more than a constant. We also present polynomial-time algorithms for the necessary winner problem for scoring rules, maximin, and Bucklin.

Reasoning about agent preferences on a set of alternatives, and the aggregation of such preferences into some social ranking is a fundamental issue in reasoning about multi-agent systems. When the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide, we get the ranking systems setting. A famous type of ranking systems are page ranking systems in the context of search engines. In this paper we present an extensive axiomatic study of ranking systems. In particular, we consider two fundamental axioms: Transitivity, and Ranked Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Surprisingly, we find that there is no general social ranking rule that satisfies both requirements. Furthermore, we show that our impossibility result holds under various restrictions on the class of ranking problems considered. However, when transitivity is weakened, an interesting possibility result is obtained. In addition, we show a complete axiomatization of approval voting using ranked IIA. 1

We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter α that describes how ties in head-to-head contests are valued. We show that the thus obtained problem of manipulation for unweighted Copeland α elections is NP-complete even if the size of the manipulating coalition is limited to two. Our result holds for all rational values of α such that 0 < α < 1 except for α = 1. Since it is 2 well known that manipulation via a single voter is easy for Copeland, our result is the first one where an election system originally known to be vulnerable to manipulation via a single voter is shown to be resistant to manipulation via a coalition of a constant number of voters. We also study the complexity of manipulation for Copeland α for the case of a constant number of candidates. We show that here the exact complexity of manipulation often depends closely on the α: Depending on whether we try to make our favorite candidate a winner or a unique winner and whether α is 0, 1 or between these values, the problem of weighted manipulation for Copeland α with three candidates is either in P or is NP-complete. Our results show that ways in which ties are treated in an election system, here Copeland voting, can be crucial to establishing complexity results for this system.

We investigate the computational complexity of testing dominance and consistency in CP-nets. Previously, the complexity of dominance has been determined for restricted classes in which the dependency graph of the CP-net is acyclic. However, there are preferences of interest that define cyclic dependency graphs; these are modeled with general CP-nets. In our main results, we show here that both dominance and consistency for general CP-nets are PSPACE-complete. We then consider the concept of strong dominance, dominance equivalence and dominance incomparability, and several notions of optimality, and identify the complexity of the corresponding decision problems. The reductions used in the proofs are from STRIPS planning, and thus reinforce the earlier established connections between both areas. 1.

We consider interactive tools that help users search for their most preferred item in a large collection of options. In particular, we examine example-critiquing, a technique for enabling users to incrementally construct preference models by critiquing example options that are presented to them. We present novel techniques for improving the example-critiquing technology by adding suggestions to its displayed options. Such suggestions are calculated based on an analysis of users’ current preference model and their potential hidden preferences. We evaluate the performance of our model-based suggestion techniques with both synthetic and real users. Results show that such suggestions are highly attractive to users and can stimulate them to express more preferences to improve the chance of identifying their most preferred item by up to 78%. 1.

Preference learning is an emerging topic that appears in different guises in the recent literature. This work focuses on a particular learning scenario called label ranking, where the problem is to learn a mapping from instances to rankings over a finite number of labels. Our approach for learning such a mapping, called ranking by pairwise comparison (RPC), first induces a binary preference relation from suitable training data using a natural extension of pairwise classification. A ranking is then derived from the preference relation thus obtained by means of a ranking procedure, whereby different ranking methods can be used for minimizing different loss functions. In particular, we show that a simple (weighted) voting strategy minimizes risk with respect to the well-known Spearman rank correlation. We compare RPC to existing label ranking methods, which are based on scoring individual labels instead of comparing pairs of labels. Both empirically and theoretically, it is shown that RPC is superior in terms of computational efficiency, and at least competitive in terms of accuracy.