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Loss of vision: How mathematics turned blind while it learned to see more clearly
 In B. Löwe and T. Müller (Eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics: Sociological Aspects and Mathematical Practice
, 2010
"... The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for the discussion of mathematical ontology that is rooted in actual mathematical practice, i.e., the way in which mathematicians have introduced and dealt with mathematical ..."
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The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for the discussion of mathematical ontology that is rooted in actual mathematical practice, i.e., the way in which mathematicians have introduced and dealt with mathematical
NonStandard Models of Arithmetic: a Philosophical and Historical perspective
, 2010
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ARISTOTELIAN REALISM
"... Aristotelian, or nonPlatonist, realism holds that mathematics is a science of the real world, just as much as biology or sociology are. Where biology studies living things and sociology studies human social relations, mathematics studies the quantitative or structural aspects of things, such as rat ..."
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Aristotelian, or nonPlatonist, realism holds that mathematics is a science of the real world, just as much as biology or sociology are. Where biology studies living things and sociology studies human social relations, mathematics studies the quantitative or structural aspects of things, such as ratios, or patterns, or complexity,
Mathematical concepts and investigative practice
, 2011
"... In this paper I investigate two notions of concepts that have played a dominant role in 20th century philosophy of mathematics. According to the first, concepts are definite and fixed; in contrast, according to the second notion concepts are open and subject to modifications. The motivations behind ..."
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In this paper I investigate two notions of concepts that have played a dominant role in 20th century philosophy of mathematics. According to the first, concepts are definite and fixed; in contrast, according to the second notion concepts are open and subject to modifications. The motivations behind these two incompatible notions and how they can be used to account for conceptual change are presented and discussed. On the basis of historical developments in mathematics I argue that both notions of concepts capture important aspects of mathematical and scientific reasoning, and, consequently, that a pluralistic approach that allows for representing both of these aspects is most useful for an adequate account of
THE CENTRAL INSIGHT OF CATEGORICAL MATHEMATICS
, 2008
"... ``The central insight of categorical mathematics,'' ..."