Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The “analytic system ” uses algorithms and normative rules, such as the probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The “experiential system ” is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it’s safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of

The following study is the result of the ongoing guidance, support and encouragement provided by a group of people that unwittingly allowed me to recognize a scholarly passion that I have envisioned for many years, but only surfaced and gained momentum in the recent past. To my mentor, Dr. Amanda Spink, I offer both praise and gratitude for instilling in me the need for scholarly aggressiveness, fortitude and understanding necessary to compete in an arena filled with the academic accomplishments and sometimes contrary ideas of others. As a champion of my abilities, she never wavered in challenging my thinking, my reasoning and my way of expressing ideas in order to get the best results out of my work. Her personal interest and constant encouragement provided the focus necessary for this current investigation. I enthusiastically thank Dr. Brian O’Connor, as my committee co-chair, for acting in the capacity of wise counsel, ego-builder, scholarly logician, editor, and all-around advocate for my ideas. His continued confidence and inspiration added significant impetus to the timely completion of this work. Also, I extend my appreciation to Dr.

This study investigates how users ’ cognitive and affective characteristics influence the navigational and search behaviors on the Web among experienced Web users. Sixty-seven undergraduate students participated in the study. Two standardized tests and a questionnaire were used to collect information on the participants’ cognitive style, problem-solving style, and demographics. Factor analysis was performed on the scores from the two standardized tests (Group Embedded Figures Test and Problem Solving Inventory), and extracted two user factors (Focus Control and Emotion Control). The Focus Control factor seemed to influence users’ navigational behaviors, such as the use of links and back buttons, whereas the Emotion Control factor affected search behaviors including keyword searching, and also search performance measured by precision and recall.

This paper examines whether the expected utility theory of war explains international conflict equally well across all regions and time-periods as a way of examining whether instrumental rationality is a universal phenomenon. In the rational choice literature, scholars typically assume that decision-makers are purposive egoistic decision-makers with common preferences across various outcomes. However, critics of the assumption have suggested that preferences and decision structures vary as a function of polity type, culture and learning among state leaders. However, there have been few attempts to directly examine this assumption and evaluate whether it seems empirically justified. In this paper we attempt to test the assumption of instrumental rationality, examining several competing hypotheses about the nature of decision making in international relations and expectations about where and when instrumental rationality should be most readily observable. In particular, we want to explor...

SelectCare is a computerized decision support system for psychotherapists who decide how to treat their depressed patients. This paper descibes the decision making model that is implemented in SelectCare and the decision elements it uses to give advice to its users. The system itself is then presented, as well as data on the evaluation of its use. Treatment decisions- 2 - Psychotherapy treatment decisions supported by SelectCare SelectCare is a computer program that supports psychotherapists in their difficult task of deciding which treatment method is most suitable for their depressed patients. The program addresses treatment planning, not the preceding process of diagnosis. It is assumed that a 'depressive disorder' has been diagnosed. SelectCare supports the task of deciding what type of treatment will be proposed to a particular depressed patient, with her or his specific complaints, taking into account the patient's as well as the therapist's own circumstances (compare Paul, ...

Abstract not found

Abstract not found

Given earlier polling reports, it was predicted that (a) a majority of Canadian subjects would support the U.S. military intervention in the Gulf crisis and (b), following Tetlock's (1983) accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis, these subjects would display lower levels of integrative complexity in reasoning about the causes of the Gulf War than subjects who indicated opposition to the U.S action. As expected, a significantly greater proportion of subjects (70%) indicated support for the U.S. action, and these subjects did in fact have significantly lower integrative complexity levels than subjects who indicated opposition to the U.S. action. Relations between attitudes toward U.S. military involvement, confidence in attributions about the primary cause of the war, and internality-externality of attributions about either Saddam Hussein, George Bush, Iraq, or the U.S. were also explored. Implications for theory and for future research are discussed.

This paper examines whether the expected utility theory of war explains international conflict equally well across all regions and time-periods as a way of examining whether instrumental rationality is a universal phenomenon. In the rational choice literature, scholars typically assume that decision-makers are purposive egoistic decision-makers with common preferences across various outcomes. However, critics of the assumption have suggested that preferences and decision structures vary as a function of polity type, culture and learning among state leaders. However, there have been few attempts to directly examine this assumption and evaluate whether it seems empirically justified. In this paper we attempt to test the assumption of instrumental rationality, examining several competing hypotheses about the nature of decision making in international relations and expectations about where and when instrumental rationality should be most readily observable. In particular, we want to explore the effects of regional learning to discover if there is a difference by region and over time in the outbreak of war and the predictions of the expected utility model. We find important differences both over regions and over time in how the predictions of expected utility theory fit actual conflict occurrence.

In a choice between any two options, decision makers can be divided into three segments: those who strongly prefer the first option, those who strongly prefer the second option, and those who might choose either option depending on the particular conditions (“switchers”). In any reference state, such as the experimental control, most switchers are likely to favor one of the two options. Thus, the growth potential of the option favored by switchers in the reference state creates “effect propensity ” in the opposite direction, whereby any condition or manipulation applied to the reference state is more likely to increase the share of the other option. We test this proposition in a series of studies in the context of choices between “action ” (e.g., a gamble or a higher-price/quality) and “inaction ” (e.g., a sure gain or a lower-price/quality) alternatives. The results indicate that a large majority of conceptually unrelated manipulations tend to increase the choice share of “action ” alternatives. This effect propensity can be reversed when the “action” alternative is the status quo option in the reference (control) state. We discuss the implications of effect propensity for the interpretation of research findings and theory tests.