Results 1  10
of
82
Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
 AI, IN MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 4, MELTZER AND MICHIE (EDS
, 1969
"... ..."
On the Complexity of Propositional Knowledge Base Revision, Updates, and Counterfactuals
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
, 1992
"... We study the complexity of several recently proposed methods for updating or revising propositional knowledge bases. In particular, we derive complexity results for the following problem: given a knowledge base T , an update p, and a formula q, decide whether q is derivable from T p, the updated (or ..."
Abstract

Cited by 215 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study the complexity of several recently proposed methods for updating or revising propositional knowledge bases. In particular, we derive complexity results for the following problem: given a knowledge base T , an update p, and a formula q, decide whether q is derivable from T p, the updated (or revised) knowledge base. This problem amounts to evaluating the counterfactual p > q over T . Besides the general case, also subcases are considered, in particular where T is a conjunction of Horn clauses, or where the size of p is bounded by a constant.
Logical Models of Argument
 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS
, 2000
"... Logical models of argument formalize commonsense reasoning while taking process and computation seriously. This survey discusses the main ideas which characterize different logical models of argument. It presents the formal features of a few main approaches to the modeling of argumentation. We trace ..."
Abstract

Cited by 183 (36 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Logical models of argument formalize commonsense reasoning while taking process and computation seriously. This survey discusses the main ideas which characterize different logical models of argument. It presents the formal features of a few main approaches to the modeling of argumentation. We trace the
Process And Policy: ResourceBounded NonDemonstrative Reasoning
, 1993
"... This paper investigates the appropriateness of formal dialectics as a basis for nonmonotonic reasoning and defeasible reasoning that takes computational limits seriously. Rules that can come into conflict should be regarded as policies, which are inputs to deliberative processes. Dialectical protoc ..."
Abstract

Cited by 95 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper investigates the appropriateness of formal dialectics as a basis for nonmonotonic reasoning and defeasible reasoning that takes computational limits seriously. Rules that can come into conflict should be regarded as policies, which are inputs to deliberative processes. Dialectical protocols are appropriate for such deliberations when resources are bounded and search is serial. AI, it is claimed here, is now perfectly positioned to correct many misconceptions about reasoning that have resulted from mathematical logic's enormous success in this century: among them, (1) that all reasons are demonstrative, (2) that rational belief is constrained, not constructed, (3) that process and disputation are not essential to reasoning. AI mainly provides new impetus to formalize the alternative (but older) conception of reasoning, and AI provides mechanisms with which to create compelling formalism that describes the control of processes. The technical contributions here are: the partial justification of dialectic based on controlling search; the observation that nonmonotonic reasoning can be subsumed under certain kinds of dialectics; the portrayal of inference in knowledge bases as policy reasoning; the review of logics of dialogue and proposed extensions; and the preformal and initial formal discussion of aspects and variations of dialectical systems with nondemonstrative reasons. 1. ARGUMENTS AND DEMONSTRATION
How Hard is it to Revise a Belief Base?
, 1996
"... If a new piece of information contradicts our previously held beliefs, we have to revise our beliefs. This problem of belief revision arises in a number of areas in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, e.g., in updating logical database, in hypothetical reasoning, and in machine learning. M ..."
Abstract

Cited by 42 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
If a new piece of information contradicts our previously held beliefs, we have to revise our beliefs. This problem of belief revision arises in a number of areas in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, e.g., in updating logical database, in hypothetical reasoning, and in machine learning. Most of the research in this area is influenced by work in philosophical logic, in particular by Gardenfors and his colleagues, who developed the theory of belief revision. Here we will focus on the computational aspects of this theory, surveying results that address the issue of the computational complexity of belief revision.
DefLog: on the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions
 Journal of Logic and Computation
"... Assumptions are often not considered to be definitely true, but only as prima facie justified. When an assumption is prima facie justified, there can for instance be a reason against it, by which the assumption is not actually justified. The assumption is then said to be defeated. This requires a re ..."
Abstract

Cited by 33 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Assumptions are often not considered to be definitely true, but only as prima facie justified. When an assumption is prima facie justified, there can for instance be a reason against it, by which the assumption is not actually justified. The assumption is then said to be defeated. This requires a revision of the standard conception of logical interpretation of sets of assumptions in terms of their models. Whereas in the models of a set of assumptions, all assumptions are taken to be true, an interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions must distinguish between the assumptions that are actually justified in the interpretation and those that are defeated. In the present paper, the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions is investigated. The central notion is that of a dialectical interpretation of a set of assumptions. The basic idea is that a prima facie justified assumption is not actually justified, but defeated when its socalled dialectical negation is justified. The properties of dialectical interpretation are analysed by considering partial dialectical interpretations, or stages, and by establishing the notion of dialectical justification. The latter leads to a characterization of the existence and multiplicity of the dialectical interpretations of a set of assumptions. Since dialectical interpretations are a variant of stable semantics, the results are relevant for existing work on nonmonotonic logic and defeasible reasoning, on which the present work builds. Instead of focusing on defeasible rules or arguments, the present approach is sentencebased. A particular innovation is the use of a conditional that is prima facie justified (just like other assumptions) instead of an inconclusive conditional.