Abduction in Logic Programming started in the late 80s, early 90s, in an attempt to extend logic programming into a framework suitable for a variety of problems in Artificial Intelligence and other areas of Computer Science. This paper aims to chart out the main developments of the field over the last ten years and to take a critical view of these developments from several perspectives: logical, epistemological, computational and suitability to application. The paper attempts to expose some of the challenges and prospects for the further development of the field.

This paper presents a simple framework for Horn-clause abduction, with probabilities associated with hypotheses. The framework incorporates assumptions about the rule base and independence assumptions amongst hypotheses. It is shown how any probabilistic knowledge representable in a discrete Bayesian belief network can be represented in this framework. The main contribution is in finding a relationship between logical and probabilistic notions of evidential reasoning. This provides a useful representation language in its own right, providing a compromise between heuristic and epistemic adequacy. It also shows how Bayesian networks can be extended beyond a propositional language. This paper also shows how a language with only (unconditionally) independent hypotheses can represent any probabilistic knowledge, and argues that it is better to invent new hypotheses to explain dependence rather than having to worry about dependence in the language. Scholar, Canadian Institute for Advanced...

In this paper, we review recent work aimed at the application of declarative logic programming to knowledge representation in artificial intelligence. We consider exten- sions of the language of definite logic programs by classical (strong) negation, disjunc- tion, and some modal operators and show how each of the added features extends the representational power of the language.

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We present a general framework for defining nonmonotonic systems based on the notion of preferred maximal consistent subsets of the premises. This framework subsumes David Poole's THEORIST approach to default reasoning as a particular instance. A disadvantage of THEORIST is that it does not allow to represent priorities between defaults adequately (as distinct from blocking defaults in specific situations). We therefore propose two generalizations of Poole's system: in the first generalization several layers of possible hypotheses representing different degrees of reliability are introduced. In a second further generalization a partial ordering between premises is used to distinguish between more and less reliable formulas. In both approaches a formula is provable from a theory if it is possible to construct a consistent argument for it based on the most reliable hypotheses. This allows for a simple representation of priorities between defaults. 1

Abduction is an important form of nonmonotonic reasoning allowing one to find explanations for certain symptoms or manifestations. When the application domain is described by a logical theory, we speak about logic-based abduction. Candidates for abductive explanations are usually subjected to minimality criteria such as subsetminimality, minimal cardinality, minimal weight, or minimality under prioritization of individual hypotheses. This paper presents a comprehensive complexity analysis of relevant decision and search problems related to abduction on propositional theories. Our results indicate that abduction is harder than deduction. In particular, we show that with the most basic forms of abduction the relevant decision problems are complete for complexity classes at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, while the use of prioritization raises the complexity to the third level in certain cases.

This paper presents an approach to temporal reasoning in which prediction is deduction but explanation is abduction. It is argued that all causal laws should be expressed in the natural form effect if cause. Any given set of laws expressed in this way can be used for both forwards projection (prediction) and backwards projection (explanation), but abduction must be used for explanation whilst deduction is used for prediction. The approach described uses a shortened form of Kowalski and Sergot's Event Calculus and incorporates the assumption that properties known to hold must have explanations in terms of events. Using abduction to implement this assumption results in a form of default persistence which correctly handles problems which have troubled other formulations. A straightforward extension to SLD resolution is described which implements the abductive approach to explanation, and which complements the well-understood deductive methods for prediction. Introduction Temporal reason...

We present an abstract framework for default reasoning, which includes Theorist, default logic, logic programming, autoepistemic logic, non-monotonic modal logics, and certain instances of circumscription as special cases. The framework can be understood as a generalisation of Theorist. The generalisation allows any theory formulated in a monotonic logic to be extended by a defeasible set of assumptions. An assumption can be defeated (or "attacked") if its "contrary" can be proved, possibly with the aid of other conflicting assumptions. We show that, given such a framework, the standard semantics of most logics for default reasoning can be understood as sanctioning a set of assumptions, as an extension of a given theory, if and only if the set of assumptions is conflict-free (in the sense that it does not attack itself) and it attacks every assumption not in the set. We propose a more liberal, argumentation-theoretic semantics, based upon the notion of admissible extension in logic pro...

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In this paper, we address the issue of how Gelfond and Lifschitz's answer set semantics for extended logic programs can be suitably modified to handle prioritized programs. In such programs an ordering on the program rules is used to express preferences. We show how this ordering can be used to define preferred answer sets and thus to increase the set of consequences of a program. We define a strong and a weak notion of preferred answer sets. The first takes preferences more seriously, while the second guarantees the existence of a preferred answer set for programs possessing at least one answer set. Adding priorities