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Metatheory and Reflection in Theorem Proving: A Survey and Critique
, 1995
"... One way to ensure correctness of the inference performed by computer theorem provers is to force all proofs to be done step by step in a simple, more or less traditional, deductive system. Using techniques pioneered in Edinburgh LCF, this can be made palatable. However, some believe such an appro ..."
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Cited by 69 (2 self)
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One way to ensure correctness of the inference performed by computer theorem provers is to force all proofs to be done step by step in a simple, more or less traditional, deductive system. Using techniques pioneered in Edinburgh LCF, this can be made palatable. However, some believe such an approach will never be efficient enough for large, complex proofs. One alternative, commonly called reflection, is to analyze proofs using a second layer of logic, a metalogic, and so justify abbreviating or simplifying proofs, making the kinds of shortcuts humans often do or appealing to specialized decision algorithms. In this paper we contrast the fullyexpansive LCF approach with the use of reflection. We put forward arguments to suggest that the inadequacy of the LCF approach has not been adequately demonstrated, and neither has the practical utility of reflection (notwithstanding its undoubted intellectual interest). The LCF system with which we are most concerned is the HOL proof ...
Does Mathematics Need New Axioms?
 American Mathematical Monthly
, 1999
"... this article I will be looking at the leading question from the point of view of the logician, and for a substantial part of that, from the perspective of one supremely important logician: Kurt Godel. From the time of his stunning incompleteness results in 1931 to the end of his life, Godel called f ..."
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this article I will be looking at the leading question from the point of view of the logician, and for a substantial part of that, from the perspective of one supremely important logician: Kurt Godel. From the time of his stunning incompleteness results in 1931 to the end of his life, Godel called for the pursuit of new axioms to settle undecided arithmetical problems. And from 1947 on, with the publication of his unusual article, "What is Cantor's continuum problem?" [11], he called in addition for the pursuit of new axioms to settle Cantor's famous conjecture about the cardinal number of the continuum. In both cases, he pointed primarily to schemes of higher infinity in set theory as the direction in which to seek these new principles. Logicians have learned a great deal in recent years that is relevant to Godel's program, but there is considerable disagreement about what conclusions to draw from their results. I'm far from unbiased in this respect, and you'll see how I come out on these matters by the end of this essay, but I will try to give you a fair presentation of other positions along the way so you can decide for yourself which you favor.
Gödel's program for new axioms: Why, where, how and what?
 IN GODEL '96
, 1996
"... From 1931 until late in his life (at least 1970) Gödel called for the pursuit of new axioms for mathematics to settle both undecided numbertheoretical propositions (of the form obtained in his incompleteness results) and undecided settheoretical propositions (in particular CH). As to the nature of ..."
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Cited by 16 (7 self)
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From 1931 until late in his life (at least 1970) Gödel called for the pursuit of new axioms for mathematics to settle both undecided numbertheoretical propositions (of the form obtained in his incompleteness results) and undecided settheoretical propositions (in particular CH). As to the nature of these, Gödel made a variety of suggestions, but most frequently he emphasized the route of introducing ever higher axioms of in nity. In particular, he speculated (in his 1946 Princeton remarks) that there might be a uniform (though nondecidable) rationale for the choice of the latter. Despite the intense exploration of the "higher infinite" in the last 30odd years, no single rationale of that character has emerged. Moreover, CH still remains undecided by such axioms, though they have been demonstrated to have many other interesting settheoretical consequences. In this paper, I present a new very general notion of the "unfolding" closure of schematically axiomatized formal systems S which provides a uniform systematic means of expanding in an essential way both the language and axioms (and hence theorems) of such systems S. Reporting joint work with T. Strahm, a characterization is given in more familiar terms in the case that S is a basic
Absolute Infinity ∗
, 2012
"... This article is concerned with reflection principles in the context of Cantor’s conception of the set theoretic universe. We argue that within a Cantorian conception of the set theoretic universe reflection principles can be formulated that confer intrinsic plausibility to strong axioms of infinity. ..."
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This article is concerned with reflection principles in the context of Cantor’s conception of the set theoretic universe. We argue that within a Cantorian conception of the set theoretic universe reflection principles can be formulated that confer intrinsic plausibility to strong axioms of infinity. How can I talk to you, I have no words... Virgin Prunes, I am God 1
Abstract Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 140 (2006) 233–252 Levy and set theory
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Global Reflection Principles
, 2012
"... Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such princi ..."
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Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia, Woodin’s ΩLogic. 1 To say that the universe of all sets is an unfinished totality does not mean objective undeterminateness, but merely a subjective inability to finish it. Gödel, in Wang, [17] 1 Reflection Principles in Set Theory Historically reflection principles are associated with attempts to say that no one notion, idea, or statement can capture our whole view of the universe of sets V = ⋃ α∈On Vα where On is the class of all ordinals. That no one idea can pin down the universe of all sets has firm historical roots (see the quotation from Cantor later or the following): The Universe of sets cannot be uniquely characterized (i.e. distinguished from all its initial segments) by any internal structural property of the membership relation in it, which is expressible in any logic of finite or transfinite type, including infinitary logics of any cardinal number. Gödel: Wang ibid. Indeed once set theory was formalized by the (first order version of) the axioms and schemata of Zermelo with the additions of Skolem and Fraenkel, it was seen that reflection of first order formulae ϕ(v0, , vn) in the language of set theory L∈ ˙ could actually be proven: