A theory of emergent or open-ended evolution that is consistent with the epistemological foundations of physical theory and the logic of self-reference requires complementary descriptions of the material and symbolic aspects of events. The matter-symbol complementarity is explained in terms of the logic of self-replication, and physical distinction of laws and initial conditions. Physical laws and natural selection are complementary models of events. Physical laws describe those invariant events over which organisms have no control. Evolution by natural selection is a theory of how organisms increase their control over events. A necessary semantic closure relation is defined relating the material and symbolic aspects of organisms capable of open-ended evolution.

This paper argues for an explanation of the mechanistic (computational) basis of consciousness that is based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation, the ideas of which have been put forth in the connectionist literature. A model is developed to substantiate and test this approach. The paper also explores the issue of the functional roles of consciousness, in relation to the proposed mechanistic explanation of consciousness. The model, embodying the representational difference, is able to account for the functional role of consciousness, in the form of the synergy between the conscious and the unconscious. The fit between the model and various cognitive phenomena and data (documented in the psychological literatures) is discussed to accentuate the plausibility of the model and its explanation of consciousness. Comparisons with existing models of consciousness are made in the end.

Does Nature permit the implementation of behaviours that cannot be simulated computationally? We consider the meaning of physical computationality in some detail, and present arguments in favour of physical hypercomputation: for example, modern scientific method does not allow the specification of any experiment capable of refuting hypercomputation. We consider the implications of relativistic algorithms capable of solving the (Turing) Halting Problem. We also reject as a fallacy the argument that hypercomputation has no relevance because non-computable values are indistinguishable from sufficiently close computable approximations. In addition to

Accelerated Turing machines are Turing machines that perform tasks commonly regarded as impossible, such as computing the halting function. The existence of these notional machines has obvious implications concerning the theoretical limits of computability. 2 1. Introduction Neither Turing nor Post, in their descriptions of the devices we now call Turing machines, made much mention of time (Turing 1936, Post 1936). 1 They listed the primitive operations that their devices perform - read a square of the tape, write a single symbol on a square of the tape (first deleting any symbol already present), move one square to the right, and so forth - but they made no mention of the duration of each primitive operation. The crucial concept is that of whether or not the machine halts after a finite number of operations. Temporal considerations are not relevant to the functioning of the devices as described, nor - so we are clearly supposed to believe - to the soundness of the proofs that Turi...

Evolutionary simulation modelling is presented as a methodology involving the application of modelling techniques developed within the artificial sciences to evolutionary problems. Although modelling work employing this methodology has a long and interesting history, it has remained, until recently, a relatively underdeveloped practice, lacking a unifying theoretical framework.

In this work, which is intended to form a very general backdrop for considering the semantics of generic sentences, we are going to examine some basic assumptions about how work on generics is to proceed, and what basic, empirical issues need to be accounted for by any adequate theory of generic meaning. There are two generally opposed perspectives on how generic sentences can be true or false. One view takes induction as its primary model and attempts to understand generics in terms of the inductive process. The other perspective takes rules and regulations (e.g. of games or legally-regulated activity) as its primary model, and seeks to understand generics in those terms. Our present purposes are to review the primary features of the opposition, to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each, and to discuss reasons for choosing one over the other. The discussion will be cast in terms of a general opposition, though one must eventually allow for mixed or intermediate positions. Work on the semantics of generics, however, tends to take one point of view or the other as its guiding feature, and so considering the opposition in this unqualified form has some merit. Before proceeding, though, I'd first like to get a couple of matters out of the way. First, I will take it for granted that I know what a generic sentence is--any sentence expressing a

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The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerati...

Paul Churchland argues that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism is so strong that if it defeated physicalism it would, at the same time, defeat ‘substance dualism’. The purpose of this paper is to articulate this ‘parity of reasons ’ objection. In the first part of the paper, I discus Churchland’s argument. I demonstrate that although his formulation of the objection is not wholly satisfactory, it may be revised so that the Knowledge Argument would defeat a certain form of dualism. In the second part, I apply the parity of reasons objection to David Chalmers ’ dualism. Chalmers rejects physicalism on the basis of the Knowledge Argument and introduces two possible forms of dualism. I show that of those two forms of dualism, Chalmers has to endorse the one that he does not prefer because the other is vulnerable to the parity of reasons objection.