The 802.11 standard for wireless networks includes a Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol, used to protect link-layer communications from eavesdropping and other attacks. We have discovered several serious security flaws in the protocol, stemming from misapplication of cryptographic primitives. The flaws lead to a number of practical attacks that demonstrate that WEP fails to achieve its security goals. In this paper, we discuss in detail each of the flaws, the underlying security principle violations, and the ensuing attacks. 1.

Recently many link layer security protocols have been developed and deployed to protect the wireless communications in local area networks. However, cryptanalysis has revealed lots of insecurities and vulnerabilities of the link layer protocols. In this paper we study a multi-layer alternative. Compared to a link layer approach, the multi-layer architecture provides better services, in particular efficient cross-domain mobility and effective security protection, to wireless communications across heterogeneously managed network domains. We implement a layer-independent point-to-point security model and a differentiated policy management model to realize the multi-layer architecture. Our implementation and experiments confirm the efficiency and effectiveness of our design. I.

Current mobile telecommunications providers conceal the records gathered about their subscribers from other subscribers and non-subscribers but not from the mobile telecommunications providers themselves. Thanks to the availability of these records, mobile telecommunications providers ....