This paper addresses the relationship between social intelligence and narrative intelligence, with a particular emphasis on 1) the phylogenetic origins of primate (narrative) intelligence, and 2) the ontogenetic origin of autobiographical stories. The `Narrative Intelligence Hypothesis` (NIH) is introduced according to which the evolutionary origin of stories and narrativity was correlated with increasing social dynamics in primate societies, in particular the need to communicate about third-party relationships. Requirements for artificial socially intelligent story-tellers are outlined, and the issue of testing social intelligence is discussed.

This paper argues that the Turing test implicitly rests on a `naive psychology,' a naturally evolved psychological faculty which is used to predict and understand the behaviour of others in complex societies. This natural faculty is an important and implicit bias in the observer's tendency to ascribe mentality to the system in the test. The paper analyses the effects of this naive psychology on the Turing test, both from the side of the system and the side of the observer, and then proposes and justifies an inverted version of the test which allows the processes of ascription to be analysed more directly than in the standard version. Keywords: naive psychology, the Turing test, the `other minds' problem, false belief tests, folk psychology, theory of mind. I. Introduction 1. In 1950 Alan Turing considered the question `Can machines think?' but almost immediately threw it away as "too meaningless to deserve discussion" and proposed to replace it with a more empirical test ---...

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It is widely assumed in the developmental literature that certain classes of modal expression appear later in language acquisition than others; specifically, epistemic interpretations lag behind non-epistemic (or root) interpretations. An explanation for these findings is proposed in terms of the child's developing theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute to oneself and others mental representations, and to reason inferentially about them. It is hypothesized that epistemic modality crucially implicates theory-of-mind abilities and is therefore expected to depend on prior developments in the child's ability to handle representations of mental representations. In support of this hypothesis, it is shown that autistic individuals (who arguably possess a deficient theory-of-mind mechanism) have difficulty with epistemics.

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The issue of whether Chimpanzees have a Theory of Mind is still not settled. In this paper, I look at the reasons why and make a proposal for an experimental paradigm, inspired by work on autistic children, that could settle the issue.

One of the strengths of scientific inquiry is that it can progress with any mixture of empiricism, intuition, and formal theory that suits the convenience of the investigator. Many sciences develop for a time as exercises in description and empirical generalization. Only later

ABSTRACT The cognitive neuroscience of central pmccssca is currently a mystery. The brain u a vast and complex collec-tion offitnctionally integrated circuits. Recognizing that nat-ural selection engineen a fit between saucnur and kction is the key to isolating thew circuits. Neural circuits were designed to solve adaptive problemr If one caa define an adaptive problem doody enough, one can see which circuits have a structural design that ia capable of solving that problan. Evdutiony bidagiur have developed a saia of sophiaticatcd mod & of adaptive probiems. Some d there models analyze coarrtrabta on the evolution of the cognitive procasa that gwcrn social behavior: cooperation, threat, courtship, kindirected asairtance, and so on. The fonns of social behavior are generated by complex computational machinery. To discover the functional architecture of this machinery, cognitive neuroscientists will need the powerful inferential tooh that evolutionary biology provides, indud-ing its welldefined theonca of adaptive function. The cognitive scicnccs have bem conducted as if D d n never lived. Their goal k to isolate functionally integrated subunits of the brain ad determine how they work. Yet mat cognitive scicntiats punue that goal without any clear ~mtion of what "function" means in biolagy. When a neural circuit is discovered, very few researchers ask what its adaptive function is. Even fewer use theories of adaptive function as tools for discovering heretofore unknown neural systems. In-

Humans are often considered to be so distinct a species that they are placed outside of the natural order entirely, to be approached and analyzed independently of the rest of the living world. However, all species have unusual or differentiating characteristics and it is the task of an evolutionarily informed natural science to provide a causal account of the nature, organization, origin, and function, if any, of such characteristics without exaggerating, mystifying, or minimizing them. Yet, even when placed within the context of the extraordinary diversity of the living world, humans continue to stand out, exhibiting a remarkable array of strange and unprecedented behaviors- from space travel to theology- that are not found in other species. What is at the core of these differences? Arguably, one central and distinguishing innovation in human evolution has been the dramatic increase in the use of contingent information for the regulation of improvised behavior that is successfully tailored to local conditions- an adaptive mode that has

2. Strategic thinking 6