The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical basis for research into the interaction of organizations and information technology. Recent work in social theory departs from prior traditions in proposing that social phenomena can be understood as comprising both subjective and objective elements. We apply this premise of duality to understanding the relationship between information technology and organizations. We construct a theoretical framework in which the development and deployment of information technology in organizations is a social phenomenon, and in which the organizational consequences of technology are products of both material and social dimensions. The framework is based on Giddens ' theory of structuration, and it allows us to progress beyond several of the false dichotomies (subjective vs objective, socially constructed vs material, macro vs micro, and qualitative vs quantitative) that persist in investigations of the interaction between organizations and information technology. The framework can be used to guide studies in two main areas of information systems research-- systems development and the organizational consequences of using information technology.

ly on the accuracy of the prediction; errors in predicting feelings are measured in units of divorce, dropout, career burnout and consumer dissatisfaction. The accuracy of people's predictions of their own feelings is important not only for individual well-being but, increasingly, also for public policy. Recent decades have seen an expansion of 1 attempts to base public policies on measurements of public values. The best-known of such efforts is Oregon's experiment in health-care rationing, but attempts to base public policy on public values have been made in diverse areas, such as transportation safety and environmental policy Measurement of public values typically involves surveys in which respondents are asked 2 to predict how they would feel if they were in health conditions or environmental states different from the ones they are in. The meaningfulness of the measured values, and the optimality of the policies based on them, therefore, depend, in

Our physical bodies play a central role in shaping human experience in the world, understanding of the world, and interactions in the world. This paper draws on theories of embodiment — from psychology, sociology, and philosophy — synthesizing five themes we believe are particularly salient for interaction design: thinking through doing, performance, visibility, risk, and thick practice. We introduce aspects of human embodied engagement in the world with the goal of inspiring new interaction design approaches and evaluations that better integrate the physical and computational worlds. Author Keywords Embodiment, bodies, embodied interaction, ubiquitous

similarities may be useful for some purposes (see Frost & King, 2001 [chapter 1]), but abstractions may present problems in actually accomplishing collaborative work. Second, the natural tendency to establish local territories may interfere with co-workers' identification with the larger collective, such as the distributed project group. Ambiguity of membership reduces group identity (Brown & Wade, 1987; see also Armstrong and Cole, 2001 [chapter 7]). Effects of Spontaneous Communication Distances between offices and work locations possibly have their highest impact on group functioning through their effect on informal, spontaneous communication opportunities (Brockner & Swap, 1976; Ebbesen, Kjos, & Konecni, 1976, Hays, 1985; Kraut & Streeter, 1995; Newcomb, 1981). That is, people who work in proximate offices run into one another at the water cooler, coffee machine, and copier. They see one another come and go to meetings. They meet in the lunch room. These casual encounters increase ...

The experience of willing an act arises from interpreting one's thought as the cause of the act. Conscious will is thus experienced as a function of the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action. The thought must occur before the action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes. An experiment illustrating the role of priority found that people can arrive at the mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just before its occurrence. Conscious will is a pervasive human experience. We all have the sense that we do things, that we cause our acts, that we are agents. As William James (1890) observed, "the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life... depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago " (p. 453). And yet, the very notion of the will seems to contradict the core assumption of psychological science. After all, psychology examines how behavior is caused by mechanisms—the rattling off of genetic, unconscious, neural, cognitive, emotional, social, and yet other chains that lead, dully or not, to the things people do. If the things we do are caused by such mechanisms, how is it that we nonetheless experience willfully doing them? Our approach to this problem is to look for yet another chain—to examine the mechanisms that produce the experience of conscious will itself. In this article, we do this by exploring the possibility that the experience of will is a result of the same mental processes that people use in the perception of causality more generally. Quite simply, it may be that people experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action. This idea means that people can experience conscious will quite independent of any actual causal connection between

accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake. " An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. The accuracy of human social judgment is a topic of obvious

We presented subjects with pairs of hypothetical scenarios. The action in each scenario harmed some people in order to aid others. In one member of the pair, the harm was a direct result of the action. In the other member, it was an indirect byproduct. Subjects preferred the indirect harm to the direct harm. This result could not be fully explained in terms of di#erences in judgments about which option was more active, more intentional, more likely to cause harm, or more subject to the disapproval of others. Taken together, these findings provide evidence for a new bias in judgment, a tendency to favor indirectly harmful options over directly harmful alternatives, irrespective of the associated outcomes, intentions, or self-presentational concerns. We speculate that this bias could originate from the use of a typical but somewhat unreliable property of harmful acts, their directness, as a cue to moral evaluation. We discuss the implications of the bias for a range of social issues, including the distinction between passive and active euthanasia, legal deterrence, and the rhetoric of a#rmative action.

This paper explores using wearable computing devices to perform "sousveillance" (inverse surveillance) as a counter to organizational surveillance.

There has been much research on the design of Groupware, its potential benefits and the methods used to develop systems to support groups. However, in many real life cases, identifying tangible benefits and demonstrating improvements in the quality of decision making after introducing such systems has proven difficult. In this paper, we present the case study of a newspaper firm in order to analyse the impact of a recently introduced collaborative computer system, implemented to support the information search, storage, organisation and dissemination activities of organisational actors. We found that the implementation of the new groupware systems has revolutionised the process of creation of the newspapers and given more time and greater control to the Editorial team. We conclude that when collaborative systems are designed that are closely matched to the needs of the group they serve, tangible benefits should be clearly observable. However, the development of these systems may take much time as the idiosyncratic manner in which specialised groups operate can be very difficult to properly and completely analyse.

Moral rationalization is an individual’s ability to reinterpret his or her immoral actions as, in fact, moral. It arises out of a conflict of motivations and a need to see the self as moral. This article presents a model of evil behavior demonstrating how situational factors that obscure moral relevance can interact with moral rationalization and lead to a violation of moral principles. Concepts such as cognitive dissonance and selfaffirmation are used to explain the processes underlying moral rationalization, and different possible methods of moral rationalization are described. Also, research on moral rationalization and its prevention is reviewed. Religious scholars, philosophers, and laypeople alike have been puzzled for centuries over the problem of evil. When horrendous atrocities such as the Holocaust occur, people scramble for explanations, but they seem to raise more questions than answers. How could a group like the Nazis get away with such extreme