Although computational models of cognitive agents that incorpo-rate a wide range of cognitive functionalities have been developed in cognitive science, most of the work in social simulation still assumes rudimentary cognition on the part of the agents. In contrast, in this work, the interaction of cognition and social structures/processes is ex-plored, through simulating survival strategies of tribal societies. The results of the simulation demonstrate interactions between cognitive and social factors. For example, we show that cognitive capabilities and tendencies may be relevant to what social institutions may be adopted. This work points to a cognitively based approach towards social simu-lation, as well as a new area of research —exploring the cognitive-social interaction through cognitively based social simulation.

Social cognition is the scientific study of the cognitive events underlying social thought and attitudes. Currently, the field’s prevailing theoretical perspectives are the traditional schema view and embodied cognition theories. Despite important differences, these perspectives share the seemingly uncontroversial notion that people interpret and evaluate a given social stimulus using knowledge about similar stimuli. However, research in cognitive linguistics (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) suggests that people construe the world in large part through conceptual metaphors, which enable them to understand abstract concepts using knowledge of superficially dissimilar, typically more concrete concepts. Drawing on these perspectives, we propose that social cognition can and should be enriched by an explicit recognition that conceptual metaphor is a unique cognitive mechanism that shapes social thought and attitudes. To advance this metaphor-enriched perspective, we introduce the metaphoric transfer strategy as a means of empirically assessing whether metaphors influence social information processing in ways that are distinct from the operation of schemas alone. We then distinguish conceptual metaphor from embodied simulation—the mechanism posited by embodied cognition theories—and introduce the alternate source strategy as a means of empirically teasing apart these mechanisms. Throughout, we buttress our claims with empirical evidence of the influence of metaphors on a wide range of social psychological phenomena. We outline directions for future research on the strength and direction of metaphor use in social information processing. Finally, we mention specific benefits of a metaphor-enriched perspective for integrating and generating social cognitive research and for bridging social cognition with neighboring fields.

ABSTRACT—Is morally motivated decision making different from other kinds of decision making? There is evidence that when people have sacred or protected values (PVs), they reject trade-offs for secular values (e.g., ‘‘You can’t put a price on a human life’’) and tend to employ deontological rather than consequentialist decision principles. People motivated by PVs appear to show quantity insensitivity. That is, in trade-off situations, they are less sensitive to the consequences of their choices than are people without PVs. The current study examined the relation between PVs and quantity insensitivity using two methods of preference assessment: In one design, previous results were replicated; in a second, PVs were related to increased quantity sensitivity. These and other findings call into question important presumed properties of PVs, suggesting that how PVs affect willingness to make tradeoffs depends on where attention is focused, a factor that varies substantially across contexts. If one wants to comprehend people’s commonplace and extraordinary actions, one must understand the values that inspire them. ‘‘Extreme’ ’ actions (e.g., selfless heroism, suicide terrorism) show that strong values may motivate behavior, and some researchers suggest that ‘‘all attitudinal and behavioral decisions should be traceable to personal value priorities’ ’ (Rohan, 2000, p. 270). Recently, researchers have begun to examine morally motivated decision making, and it appears to have a number of distinctive properties. Our focus is on decisions involving protected values (PVs). According to the PV framework developed by Baron and his

Democracy as a political form of social organization offers humanity its best prospect for freedom and peace. Today, it faces deliberate threats from totalitarian movements that rely on terrorist tactics. Democracy also faces threats from its own leaders because of the consequential nature of their judgment and decision making. This article examines how threats to democracy are perceived and managed. It is proposed that perception and management of threats to democracy represent a case of judgment and decision making under uncertainty. Relevant factors that influence policy decision making as it pertains to safeguarding democracies from threat are highlighted. There is a lot of talk these days about democracy, including the need to protect it from terrorists, to protect it from government policies that erode its fundamental commitments to civil liberties, humanitarian principles, and the rule of law, and to promote (or “spread”) it—even by use of force—to areas of the world where it currently does not exist. Indeed, foreign policy thinkers across the political spectrum share in common a penchant for promoting and protecting democracy,

Evil is a difficult topic to explore from an analytic, let alone scientific, perspective because the concept of evil is primarily emotive and moralistic. Like the perception of risk (Sandman, 1989; Slovic, 1987), the perception of evil is often accompanied by feelings of outrage and dread, or even terror. Alford (1997) found that people tend to describe evil mainly in terms of a sense of impending doom, suggesting that the phenomenology of evil is closely tied to emotional responses to perceived actors and events—namely, to people’s “gut feelings.” Evil, though, is also clearly related to attributions of extreme moral wrongdoing (Darley, 1992), suggesting that its phenomenology (again like risk perception) may be one we would characterize as “hot cognition”, linking to the layperson’s prosecutorial and perhaps also theologian mindsets (Tetlock, 2002). “Organizational evil ” poses even greater challenges for discussion since one must decide whether the term refers to the organizational side of evil, as it were—that is, how organizational or social processes support the production of evil (e.g., Darley, 1992)—or whether it refers to evil wrought by organizations;

Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) A problem that strikes one in the study of history, regardless of period, is why man makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom... is less operative and more frustrated than it should be.- Barbara W. Tuchman (Tuchman, 1980) 1. Definitions and Examples Wisdom in public policy is good judgment about important matters, especially embodying a genuine commitment to the well-being of individuals and to society as a whole. In international politics wisdom is the core of statesmanship, extending a commitment to the well-being of peoples of other nations, and often restructuring the international system to work better for future generations. If political wisdom can be engaged there is a growing potential to create a better world. The rapid advance of the physical sciences and the growing wealth, levels of education, and democracy in advanced countries and some UDCs provide new resources that well-intentioned people can use to mitigate scarcities and human-caused evils and create solutions to meet basic human needs of all people. The post Cold War period, like earlier victories in world politics, provides new opportunities for statesmanlike thinking and

contributed equally to this work; order of authorship is alphabetical. Target-specific affect management 2 In this paper we study the regulation of affect attributed to a target object, which we label targetspecific affect management (TSAM). Although TSAM and affect regulation are complementary phenomena with an identical goal—reduction of negative affect—in some situations they impel different behaviors. We investigate TSAM by examining the behavioral consequences of combining negative affect with the positive affect inherent in financial windfalls, as in cases where a negative circumstance is linked to the money. We show that people have mixed feelings about windfalls in these situations and that they attempt to reduce the negative affect component of such “ambivalent windfalls ” by “laundering ” the money through relatively virtuous consumption. Alternatively, when only a hedonic option is available, people avoid consuming the windfall. Target-specific affect management 3 Target-Specific Affect Management: The Case of Love-hate Relationships with Financial Windfalls People’s proclivity to manage their affect by engaging in actions aimed at altering or

How do ordinary citizens react to new policy-relevant findings that they learn about from media mentions or word of mouth? We conducted an experiment embedded in a randomdigit-dial (RDD) telephone survey of 1,050 California adults. Respondents heard a description of a hypothetical study on one of four politicized topics or a politically neutral topic (nutrition) and were asked to describe their reactions to the study’s main finding. As in prior research, citizens were more skeptical when the findings contradicted their prior beliefs about the topic. But, we also found effects of partisanship and ideology even after controlling for specific issue attitudes. Citizens, especially those holding conservative beliefs, tended to attribute studies with liberal findings to the liberalism of the researcher, but citizens were less likely to attribute conservative findings to the conservatism of the researcher. KEY WORDS: Public opinion, Biased judgment, Partisanship, Ideology, Belief updating Controversial policy disputes involve a complex mix of ideological conflicts and empirical uncertainties. Social scientists seek to inform these debates by clarifying the empirical issues, but it is rare for empirical research to bring about consensus in the short run. One reason is that research is rarely conclusive. But citizens may be especially reluctant to accept research evidence when it conflicts with previously held beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; MacCoun, 1998). Traditional norms of science like disinterestedness and organized skepticism are designed to make the identity of the researcher irrelevant (Merton, 1973). Even when policy researchers perceive themselves to be neutral, the public may perceive us as adversarial advocates for positions we prefer.

In a democratic society, the desirability of openness and transparency in government decision making would seem nearly self-evident. The average newspaper reader has consumed a steady diet of examples of deception, bigotry, cronyism, and corruption by public officials, providing obvious arguments in favor of greater transparency. But my goal for this essay is to illustrate ways in which the complexity of cognition and motivation make transparency difficult to achieve, even with the full cooperation of well-intentioned government actors. The claim is not that particular judgments themselves are complex; indeed many seeming

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