Over the first year of life, infants gain conceptual skills which allow them to construe semantically related items as similar, even when they have few if any directly-perceived attributes in common. Moreover, this skill first encompasses only broad semantic categories, and only later extends to more subtle distinctions, when conceptual and perceptual similarity relations do not coincide. In this paper we suggest that a new mechanism must be added to the mix of possible bases for this observed developmental change. In agreement with many others, we suggest that infants’ earliest conceptual representations are organised with respect to certain especially useful or salient properties, regardless of whether such properties can be directly observed. However we suggest that in many cases this salience may itself be acquired, through domain-general learning mechanisms that are sensitive to the high-order coherent covariation of directly-observed stimulus properties across a breadth of experience. To support this argument we will describe simulations with a simple PDP model of semantic memory. When trained with backpropagation to complete queries about the properties of different objects, the model’s internal representations differentiate in a coarse-to-fine manner. As a consequence, different sets of properties come to be especially “salient” to the

Previous studies indicate that English-learning children acquire the distinction between singular and plural nouns between 22 and 24 months of age. Also, their use of the distinction is correlated with the capacity to distinguish nonlinguistically between singular and plural sets in a manual search paradigm (D. Barner, D. Thalwitz, J. Wood, S. Yang, & S. Carey, 2007). The authors used 3 experiments to explore the causal relation between these 2 capacities. Relative to English, Japanese and Mandarin had impoverished singular–plural marking. Using the manual search task, in Experiment 1 the authors found that by around 22 months of age, Japanese children also distinguished between singular and plural sets. Experiments 2 and 3 extended this finding to Mandarin-learning toddlers. Mandarin learners who were 20–24 months of age did not yet comprehend Mandarin singular–plural marking (i.e., yige vs. yixie, or –men), yet they did distinguish between singular and plural sets in manual search. These experiments suggest that knowledge of singular–plural morphology is not necessary for deploying the nonlinguistic distinction between singular and plural sets.

Disentangling bottom-up and top-down processing in adult category learning is notoriously difficult. Studying category learning in infancy provides a simple way of exploring category learning while minimizing the contribution of top-down information. Three- to 4-month-old infants presented with cat or dog images will form a perceptual category representation for cat that excludes dogs and for dog that includes cats. The authors argue that an inclusion relationship in the distribution of features in the images explains the asymmetry. Using computational modeling and behavioral testing, the authors show that the asymmetry can be reversed or removed by using stimulus images that reverse or remove the inclusion relationship. The findings suggest that categorization of nonhuman animal images by young infants is essentially a bottom-up process. Few in cognitive science would dispute the argument that both bottom-up (i.e., perceptually driven) and top-down (i.e., conceptually driven) processes are involved in adult categorization. Numerous studies have discussed the relationship between these two mechanisms of categorization (e.g., French, 1995; Murphy & Kaplan, 2000; Schyns, Goldstone, & Thibaut, 1998). However, in adults, perceptual and conceptual processes are deeply intertwined, making them difficult to isolate and study independently (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998).