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Consciousness and its Place in Nature
- in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
, 2002
"... Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a pla ..."
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Cited by 20 (3 self)
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Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
- Philosophical Review
, 2001
"... Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker ..."
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Cited by 16 (3 self)
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Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999).
Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality
- Philosophical Perspectives
, 2007
"... How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, invol ..."
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How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving
Rational Procedures -- A neo Fregean Perspective on Thought and Judgment Summary
, 2007
"... In this paper I shall deal with the role of "understanding a thought " in the debate on the definition of the content of an assertion. I shall present a well known tension in Frege's writings, between a cognitive and semantic notion of sense. This tension is at the source of some of the major contem ..."
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In this paper I shall deal with the role of "understanding a thought " in the debate on the definition of the content of an assertion. I shall present a well known tension in Frege's writings, between a cognitive and semantic notion of sense. This tension is at the source of some of the major contemporary discussions, mainly because of the negative influence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which did not give in-depth consideration to the tension found in Frege. However many contemporary authors, after the first attempt by Carnap himself, have tried to make room both for a cognitive and semantic aspect of meaning. I claim that at least some of these attempts (Dummett, Perry and Chalmers) are seriously flawed, mainly due to the difficulty in making a proper connection between the two different conceptions of sense. I shall outline an alternative project, which takes into consideration Frege's requirements on antipsychologism and of the objectivity of thought, while maintaining a close connection between the two aspects of sense. The hints which may come from Frege's tension suggest some constructivist solutions, solving the tension within a framework of contemporary logic of uncertain reasoning.
The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience
, 2010
"... Abstract I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experi ..."
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Abstract I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
An Externalist’s Guide to Inner Experience * BENJ HELLIE
"... The aim of John M. Hinton’s Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities is set out in its introduction as follows: Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself, ‘How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external wo ..."
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The aim of John M. Hinton’s Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities is set out in its introduction as follows: Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself, ‘How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them? ’ He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. Drawing a breath of fresh air is still a very common experience in
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
"... The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege’s puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties that one’s c ..."
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The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege’s puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties that one’s credence is directed at. I go on to develop a nonreferential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios. 1
The Subsumption of Reference ∗ Abstract
"... How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibl ..."
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How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood not as showing that a term in the original theory fails to refer, but rather that a scientific hypothesis encapsulated by the further theory is mistaken. 1.
Matrices and Modalities: On the Logic of Two-Dimensional Semantics MSc Thesis (Afstudeerscriptie)
, 2011
"... philosophy of language that provides an account of meaning which is sensitive to the distinction between necessity and apriority. Usually, this theory is presented in an informal manner. In this thesis, I take first steps in formalizing it, and use the formalization to present some considerations in ..."
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philosophy of language that provides an account of meaning which is sensitive to the distinction between necessity and apriority. Usually, this theory is presented in an informal manner. In this thesis, I take first steps in formalizing it, and use the formalization to present some considerations in favor of two-dimensional semantics. To do so, I define a semantics for a propositional modal logic with operators for the modalities of necessity, actuality, and apriority that captures the relevant ideas of two-dimensional semantics. I use this to show that some criticisms of twodimensional semantics that claim that the theory is incoherent are not justified. I also axiomatize the logic, and compare it to the most important proposals in the literature that define similar logics. To indicate that two-dimensional semantics is a plausible semantic theory, I give an argument that shows that all theorems of the logic can be philosophically justified independently of two-dimensional semantics. Acknowledgements I thank my supervisors Paul Dekker and Yde Venema for their help and encouragement

