A component-based generic agent architecture for multi-attribute (integrative) negotiation is introduced and its application is described in a prototype system for negotiation about cars, developed in co-operation with, among others, Dutch Telecom KPN. The approach can be characterised as co-operative one-toone multi-criteria negotiation in which the privacy of both parties is protected as much as possible. 1

This paper presents a model for integrative, one-to-one negotiation in which the values across multiple attributes are negotiated simultaneously. We model a mechanism in which agents are able to use any amount of incomplete preference information revealed by the negotiation partner in order to improve the efficiency of the reached agreements. Moreover, we show that the outcome of such a negotiation can be further improved by incorporating a "guessing" heuristic, by which an agent uses the history of the opponent's bids to predict his preferences. Experimental evaluation shows that the combination of these two strategies leads to agreement points close to or on the Pareto-efficient frontier. The main original contribution of this paper is that it shows that it is possible for parties in a cooperative negotiation to reveal only a limited amount of preference information to each other, but still obtain significant joint gains in the outcome.

Abstract. This paper presents a System for Analysis of Multi-Issue Negotiation (SAMIN). The agents in this system conduct one-to-one negotiations, in which the values across multiple issues are negotiated on simultaneously. It is demonstrated how the system supports both automated negotiation (i.e., conducted by a software agent) and human negotiation (where humans specify their bids). To analyse such negotiation processes, the user can enter any formal property deemed useful into the system and use the system to automatically check this property in given negotiation traces. Furthermore, it is shown how, compared to fully closed negotiation, the efficiency of the reached agreements may be improved, either by using incomplete preference information revealed by the negotiation partner or by incorporating a heuristic, through which an agent uses the history of the opponent's bids in order to guess his preferences. 1.