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93
Mobile Values, New Names, and Secure Communication
, 2001
"... We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (first-order) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts. Specifically, we intro ..."
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Cited by 372 (17 self)
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We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (first-order) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts. Specifically, we introduce a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value passing, primitive functions, and equations among terms. We develop semantics and proof techniques for this extended language and apply them in reasoning about some security protocols.
Protocol insecurity with finite number of sessions is NP-complete
- Theoretical Computer Science
, 2001
"... We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-at ..."
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Cited by 185 (12 self)
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We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as dags.
Constraint Solving for Bounded-Process Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
- CCS'01
, 2001
"... The reachability problem for cryptographic protocols with nonatomic keys can be solved via a simple constraint satisfaction procedure. ..."
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Cited by 176 (3 self)
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The reachability problem for cryptographic protocols with nonatomic keys can be solved via a simple constraint satisfaction procedure.
An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR
- THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 2005
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Symbolic Trace Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
"... A cryptographic protocol can be described as a system of concurrent processes, and analysis ..."
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Cited by 99 (9 self)
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A cryptographic protocol can be described as a system of concurrent processes, and analysis
Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or
, 2003
"... We present decidability results for the verification of cryptographic protocols in the presence of equational theories corresponding to xor and Abelian groups. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebraic properties such as xor, we exte ..."
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Cited by 90 (12 self)
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We present decidability results for the verification of cryptographic protocols in the presence of equational theories corresponding to xor and Abelian groups. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebraic properties such as xor, we extend the conventional Dolev-Yao model by permitting the intruder to exploit these properties. We show that the ground reachability problem in NP for the extended intruder theories in the cases of xor and Abelian groups. This result follows from a normal proof theorem. Then, we show how to lift this result in the xor case: we consider a symbolic constraint system expressing the reachability (e.g., secrecy) problem for a finite number of sessions. We prove that such constraint system is decidable, relying in particular on an extension of combination algorithms for unification procedures. As a corollary, this enables automatic symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols employing xor for a fixed number of sessions.
Formal Methods for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis: Emerging Issues and Trends
, 2003
"... The history of the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis spans over 20 years and recently has been showing signs of new maturity and consolidation. Not only have a number of specialized tools been developed, and generalpurpose ones been adapted, but people have begun apply ..."
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Cited by 78 (0 self)
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The history of the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis spans over 20 years and recently has been showing signs of new maturity and consolidation. Not only have a number of specialized tools been developed, and generalpurpose ones been adapted, but people have begun applying these tools to realistic protocols, in many cases supplying feedback to designers that can be used to improve the protocol’s security. In this paper, we will describe some of the ongoing work in this area, as well as describe some of the new challenges and the ways in which they are being met.
Multiset Rewriting and the Complexity of Bounded Security Protocols
- Journal of Computer Security
, 2002
"... We formalize the Dolev-Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multi-set rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model using this notation, and to analyze the ..."
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Cited by 76 (10 self)
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We formalize the Dolev-Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multi-set rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model using this notation, and to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions. We prove that, even for the case where we restrict the size of messages and the depth of message encryption, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of new nonces. We also identify several decidable classes, including a dexp-complete class when the number of nonces is restricted, and an np-complete class when both the number of nonces and the number of roles is restricted. We point out a remaining open complexity problem, and discuss the implications these results have on the general topic of protocol analysis.
An On-The-Fly Model-Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
- In Proceedings of Esorics’03, LNCS 2808
, 2003
"... www.infsec.ethz.ch/~{basin,moedersheim,vigano} ..."
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