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... been useful in security (e.g., [30]). In recent years, they have played a significant role in understanding security protocols. They have given rise to programming calculi for these protocols (e.g., =-=[5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 26, 28, 34]-=-). They have also suggested several approaches for reasoning about protocols, leading to theories as well as tools for formal protocol analysis. We describe some of these approaches below. Although se...

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...e latter an extension of the -calculus [18]. In this setting, Abadi and Gordon advocate the use of observational equivalences to formalize and verify protocol properties [2, 7]. Here, in the vein of [=-=3, 4, 12, 13, 16, 20, 22], we-=- analyze the sequences of actions (traces) that a given process may execute. As an example, a secrecy property like \protocol P never leaks the datum d", might be veried by adding to the descript...

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...primitives with equational properties corresponding to xor and arbitrary Abelian groups. While the reachability problem for cryptographic protocols has received a lot of attention, in most approaches =-=[2, 16, 4, 13] the under-=-lying cryptographic primitives are modeled, following the so called "Dolev-Yao" model [7], as abstract data types without any algebraic properties. This simplification may be realistic for i...

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... and performance, and that it scales well to industrial-strength protocols. 1 Introduction A wide variety of model-checking approaches have recently been applied to analyzing security protocols, e.g. =-=[1, 7, 13, 22, 23, 25, 26]-=-. The key challenge they face is that the general security problem is undecidable [14], and even semi-algorithms, focused on falsification, must come to terms with the enormous branching factor in the...