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Cryptographic Hash Functions: A Survey
, 1995
"... This paper gives a survey on cryptographic hash functions. It gives an overview of all types of hash functions and reviews design principals and possible methods of attacks. It also focuses on keyed hash functions and provides the applications, requirements, and constructions of keyed hash functions ..."
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Cited by 35 (7 self)
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This paper gives a survey on cryptographic hash functions. It gives an overview of all types of hash functions and reviews design principals and possible methods of attacks. It also focuses on keyed hash functions and provides the applications, requirements, and constructions of keyed hash functions.
Some Plausible Constructions of DoubleBlockLength Hash Functions
 FSE’06, LNCS 4047
, 2006
"... Abstract. In this article, it is discussed how to construct a compression function with 2nbit output using a component function with nbit output. The component function is either a smaller compression function or a block cipher. Some constructions are presented which compose collisionresistant ha ..."
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Cited by 35 (0 self)
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Abstract. In this article, it is discussed how to construct a compression function with 2nbit output using a component function with nbit output. The component function is either a smaller compression function or a block cipher. Some constructions are presented which compose collisionresistant hash functions: Any collisionfinding attack on them is at most as efficient as a birthday attack in the random oracle model or in the ideal cipher model. A new security notion is also introduced, which we call indistinguishability in the iteration, with a construction satisfying the notion.
Towards Provably Secure Efficient Electronic Cash (Extended Abstract)
, 1992
"... An "electronic coin scheme" as defined by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor [5] is a collection of protocols to achieve untraceable, unforgeable coins with offline purchasing; this is the minimum set of properties to make electronic money useful. We give a new electronic coin scheme that is simple and practical ..."
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Cited by 28 (4 self)
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An "electronic coin scheme" as defined by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor [5] is a collection of protocols to achieve untraceable, unforgeable coins with offline purchasing; this is the minimum set of properties to make electronic money useful. We give a new electronic coin scheme that is simple and practical. Withdrawal requires only two rounds of interaction, while purchase and deposit are noninteractive; all previous efficient cash schemes require interaction (cutandchoose) for purchases. Moreover, messages during purchase and deposit contain only a few encrypted values, independent of the tolerable probability of cheating. We present a security model for electronic coins, and prove the security of our scheme relative to certain specific cryptographic assumptions (hardness of Discrete Log and possibility of secure blind signature). TR CUCS01892 Partially supported by an AT&T Bell Laboratories Scholarship 1 Introduction Six desirable properties of electronic money are stated by Okamo...
Strongly unforgeable signatures based on computational diffiehellman
 In Public Key Cryptography
, 2006
"... Abstract. A signature system is said to be strongly unforgeable if the signature is existentially unforgeable and, given signatures on some message m, the adversary cannot produce a new signature on m. Strongly unforgeable signatures are used for constructing chosenciphertext secure systems and gro ..."
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Cited by 25 (0 self)
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Abstract. A signature system is said to be strongly unforgeable if the signature is existentially unforgeable and, given signatures on some message m, the adversary cannot produce a new signature on m. Strongly unforgeable signatures are used for constructing chosenciphertext secure systems and group signatures. Current efficient constructions in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles) depend on relatively strong assumptions such as StrongRSA or StrongDiffieHellman. We construct an efficient strongly unforgeable signature system based on the standard Computational DiffieHellman problem in bilinear groups. 1
The Classification of Hash Functions
, 1993
"... When we ask what makes a hash function `good', we usually get an answer which includes collision freedom as the main (if not sole) desideratum. However, we show here that given any collisionfree function, we can derive others which are also collisionfree, but cryptographically useless. This explai ..."
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Cited by 24 (3 self)
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When we ask what makes a hash function `good', we usually get an answer which includes collision freedom as the main (if not sole) desideratum. However, we show here that given any collisionfree function, we can derive others which are also collisionfree, but cryptographically useless. This explains why researchers have not managed to find many interesting consequences of this property. We also prove Okamoto's conjecture that correlation freedom is strictly stronger than collision freedom. We go on to show that there are actually rather many properties which hash functions may need. Hash functions for use with RSA must be multiplication free, in the sense that one cannot find X , Y and Z such that h(X)h(Y ) = h(Z); and more complex requirements hold for other signature schemes. Universal principles can be proposed from which all the freedom properties follow, but like most theoretical principles, they do not seem to give much value to a designer; at the practical level, the main imp...
Reducing complexity assumptions for statisticallyhiding commitment
 In EUROCRYPT
, 2005
"... We revisit the following question: what are the minimal assumptions needed to construct statisticallyhiding commitment schemes? Naor et al. show how to construct such schemes based on any oneway permutation. We improve upon this by showing a construction based on any approximable preimagesize one ..."
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Cited by 24 (8 self)
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We revisit the following question: what are the minimal assumptions needed to construct statisticallyhiding commitment schemes? Naor et al. show how to construct such schemes based on any oneway permutation. We improve upon this by showing a construction based on any approximable preimagesize oneway function. These are oneway functions for which it is possible to efficiently approximate the number of preimages of a given output. A special case is the class of regular oneway functions where all points in the image of the function have the same number of preimages. We also prove two additional results related to statisticallyhiding commitment. First, we prove a (folklore) parallel composition theorem showing, roughly speaking, that the statistical hiding property of any such commitment scheme is amplified exponentially when multiple independent parallel executions of the scheme are carried out. Second, we show a compiler which transforms any commitment scheme which is statistically hiding against an honestbutcurious receiver into one which is statistically hiding even against a malicious receiver. 1
The Foundations of Modern Cryptography
, 1998
"... In our opinion, the Foundations of Cryptography are the paradigms, approaches and techniques used to conceptualize, define and provide solutions to natural cryptographic problems. In this essay, we survey some of these paradigms, approaches and techniques as well as some of the fundamental result ..."
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Cited by 24 (0 self)
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In our opinion, the Foundations of Cryptography are the paradigms, approaches and techniques used to conceptualize, define and provide solutions to natural cryptographic problems. In this essay, we survey some of these paradigms, approaches and techniques as well as some of the fundamental results obtained using them. Special effort is made in attempt to dissolve common misconceptions regarding these paradigms and results. c flCopyright 1998 by Oded Goldreich. Permission to make copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that new copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Abstracting with credit is permitted. A preliminary version of this essay has appeared in the proceedings of Crypto97 (Springer's Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1294). 0 Contents 1 Introduction 2 I Basic Tools 6 2 Central Paradigms 6 2.1 Computati...
Formalizing human ignorance: Collisionresistant hashing without the keys
 In Proc. Vietcrypt ’06
, 2006
"... Abstract. There is a foundational problem involving collisionresistant hashfunctions: common constructions are keyless, but formal definitions are keyed. The discrepancy stems from the fact that a function H: {0, 1} ∗ → {0, 1} n always admits an efficient collisionfinding algorithm, it’s just t ..."
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Cited by 22 (0 self)
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Abstract. There is a foundational problem involving collisionresistant hashfunctions: common constructions are keyless, but formal definitions are keyed. The discrepancy stems from the fact that a function H: {0, 1} ∗ → {0, 1} n always admits an efficient collisionfinding algorithm, it’s just that us human beings might be unable to write the program down. We explain a simple way to sidestep this difficulty that avoids having to key our hash functions. The idea is to state theorems in a way that prescribes an explicitlygiven reduction, normally a blackbox one. We illustrate this approach using wellknown examples involving digital signatures, pseudorandom functions, and the MerkleDamg˚ard construction. Key words. Collisionfree hash function, Collisionintractable hash function, Collisionresistant hash function, Cryptographic hash function, Provable security. 1
Statistical ZeroKnowledge Arguments for NP from Any OneWay
 ELECTRONIC COLLOQUIUM ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
, 2006
"... We show that every language in NP has a statistical zeroknowledge argument system under the (minimal) complexity assumption that oneway functions exist. In such protocols, even a computationally unbounded verifier cannot learn anything other than the fact that the assertion being proven is true, w ..."
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Cited by 20 (2 self)
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We show that every language in NP has a statistical zeroknowledge argument system under the (minimal) complexity assumption that oneway functions exist. In such protocols, even a computationally unbounded verifier cannot learn anything other than the fact that the assertion being proven is true, whereas a polynomialtime prover cannot convince the verifier to accept a false assertion except with negligible probability. This resolves an open question posed by Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and Yung (CRYPTO ‘92, J. Cryptology ‘98). Departing from previous works on this problem, we do not construct standard statistically hiding commitments from any oneway function. Instead, we construct a relaxed variant of commitment schemes called “1outof2binding commitments,” recently introduced by Nguyen and Vadhan (STOC ‘06).