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Diamonds are a Philosopher's Best Friends. The Knowability Paradox and Modal Epistemic Relevance Logic (Extended Abstract)
 Journal of Philosophical Logic
, 2002
"... Heinrich Wansing Dresden University of Technology The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the ..."
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Heinrich Wansing Dresden University of Technology The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is derived that all truths are, in fact, known. Nevertheless, the solution o#ered is in the spirit of the constructivist attitude usually maintained by defenders of the antirealist premise. In order to avoid the paradoxical reasoning, a paraconsistent constructive relevant modal epistemic logic with strong negation is defined semantically. The system is axiomatized and shown to be complete.
Multiple conclusions
 In 12th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
, 2005
"... Abstract: I argue for the following four theses. (1) Denial is not to be analysed as the assertion of a negation. (2) Given the concepts of assertion and denial, we have the resources to analyse logical consequence as relating arguments with multiple premises and multiple conclusions. Gentzen’s mult ..."
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Abstract: I argue for the following four theses. (1) Denial is not to be analysed as the assertion of a negation. (2) Given the concepts of assertion and denial, we have the resources to analyse logical consequence as relating arguments with multiple premises and multiple conclusions. Gentzen’s multiple conclusion calculus can be understood in a straightforward, motivated, nonquestionbegging way. (3) If a broadly antirealist or inferentialist justification of a logical system works, it works just as well for classical logic as it does for intuitionistic logic. The special case for an antirealist justification of intuitionistic logic over and above a justification of classical logic relies on an unjustified assumption about the shape of proofs. Finally, (4) this picture of logical consequence provides a relatively neutral shared vocabulary which can help us understand and adjudicate debates between proponents of classical and nonclassical logics. Our topic is the notion of logical consequence: the link between premises and conclusions, the glue that holds together deductively valid argument. How can we understand this relation between premises and conclusions? It seems that any account begs questions. Painting with very broad brushtrokes, we can sketch the landscape
Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant. Analysis 62
 New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot: Ashgate
"... truth as knowability. He ponders Fitch’s paradox of knowability, 1 which threatens any such conception. Dummett maintains that the antirealist’s error is to offer a blanket characterization of truth, expressed by the following knowability principle: any statement A is true if and only if it is poss ..."
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truth as knowability. He ponders Fitch’s paradox of knowability, 1 which threatens any such conception. Dummett maintains that the antirealist’s error is to offer a blanket characterization of truth, expressed by the following knowability principle: any statement A is true if and only if it is possible to know A. Formally, Tr(A) iff ‡K(A) To remedy the error, Dummett’s proposes the following inductive characterization of truth: (i) Tr(A) iff ‡K(A), if A is a basic statement; (ii) Tr(A and B) iff Tr(A) & Tr(B); (iii) Tr(A or B) iff Tr(A) v Tr(B); (iv) Tr(if A, then B) iff (Tr(A) Æ Tr(B)); (v) Tr(it is not the case that A) iff ¬Tr(A), where the logical constant on the righthand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of intuitionistic logic. 2 The only other principle in play in Dummett’s discussion is
Validity concepts in prooftheoretic semantics
 ProofTheoretic Semantics. Special issue of Synthese
"... Abstract. The standard approach to what I call “prooftheoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of prooftheoretic semantics, this paper investigates in det ..."
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Abstract. The standard approach to what I call “prooftheoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of prooftheoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of prooftheoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It is argued that these two sorts of concepts must be kept strictly apart. 1. Introduction: Prooftheoretic
doi:10.1111/j.17552567.2011.01119.x Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is Truetheo_1119 1..22
, 2012
"... Abstract: Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Mooresentences is that not all propositions are known af ..."
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Abstract: Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Mooresentences is that not all propositions are known after their announcement, i.e., not every proposition is successful. Fitch’s and Moore’s results are related, as they equally apply to standard notions of knowledge and belief (S 5 and KD45, respectively). If we interpret ‘successful ’ as ‘known after its announcement ’ and ‘knowable ’ as ‘known after some announcement’, successful implies knowable. Knowable does not imply successful: there is a proposition j that is not known after its announcement but there is another announcement after which j is known. We show that all propositions are knowable in the more general sense that for each proposition, it can become known or its negation can become known. We can get to know whether it is true: �(Kj ⁄ K¬j). This result comes at a price. We cannot get to know whether the proposition was true. This restricts the philosophical relevance of interpreting ‘knowable ’ as ‘known after an announcement’. Keywords: modal logic, knowability, Fitch’s paradox, dynamic epistemics, public announcements 1. Successful – the Historical Record
Revamping the Restriction Strategy by
, 2007
"... This study continues the antirealist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the antirealist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore ✸Kϕ ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the r ..."
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This study continues the antirealist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the antirealist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore ✸Kϕ ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of ϕ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before applying the proposed restriction. A similar restriction is proposed for the converse inference, the socalled Rule of Factiveness ‘✸Kϕ therefore ϕ’. The proposed restriction appears to block another Fitchstyle derivation that uses the KKthesis in order to get around the Cartesian restriction on applications of the knowability principle. ∗ To appear in Joseph Salerno, ed., All Truths are Known: New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press. This paper would not have been written without the stimulation, encouragement and criticism that I have enjoyed from Joseph Salerno, Salvatore Florio, Christina Moisa, Nicholaos Jones, and Patrick Reeder.
Natural Logicism via the Logic of Orderly Pairing by
, 2008
"... Schumm, Timothy Smiley and Matthias Wille. Comments by two anonymous referees have also led to significant improvements. The aim here is to describe how to complete the constructive logicist program, in the author’s book AntiRealism and Logic, of deriving all the PeanoDedekind postulates for arith ..."
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Schumm, Timothy Smiley and Matthias Wille. Comments by two anonymous referees have also led to significant improvements. The aim here is to describe how to complete the constructive logicist program, in the author’s book AntiRealism and Logic, of deriving all the PeanoDedekind postulates for arithmetic within a theory of natural numbers that also accounts for their applicability in counting finite collections of objects. The axioms still to be derived are those for addition and multiplication. Frege did not derive them in a fully explicit, conceptually illuminating way. Nor has any neoFregean done so. These outstanding axioms need to be derived in a way fully in keeping with the spirit and the letter of Frege’s logicism and his doctrine of definition. To that end this study develops a logic, in the GentzenPrawitz style of natural deduction, for the operation of orderly pairing. The logic is an extension of free firstorder logic with identity. Orderly pairing is treated as a primitive. No notion of set is presupposed, nor any settheoretic notion of membership. The formation of ordered pairs, and the two projection operations yielding their left and right coordinates, form a coeval family of logical notions. The challenge is to furnish them with introduction and elimination rules that capture their exact meanings, and no more. Orderly pairing as a logical primitive is then used in order to introduce addition and multiplication in a conceptually satisfying way within a constructive logicist theory of the natural numbers. Because of its reliance, throughout, on senseconstituting rules of natural deduction, the completed account can be described as ‘natural logicism’. 2 1 Introduction: historical
J. SALERNO ⋆ REVISING THE LOGIC OF LOGICAL REVISION
"... Michael Dummett’s realism debate is a semantic dispute about the kind of truth conditions had by a given class of sentences. According to his semantic realist, the truth conditions are potentially verificationtranscendent in that they may obtain (or not) despite ..."
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Michael Dummett’s realism debate is a semantic dispute about the kind of truth conditions had by a given class of sentences. According to his semantic realist, the truth conditions are potentially verificationtranscendent in that they may obtain (or not) despite
(to appear in J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press) Tennant’s Troubles
"... First, some reminiscences. In the years 197380, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of antirealism. It end ..."
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First, some reminiscences. In the years 197380, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of antirealism. It endorsed something like the replacement of truthconditional semantics by verificationconditional semantics and of classical logic by intuitionistic logic, and the principle that all truths are knowable. It did not endorse the principle that all truths are known. Nor did it mention the now celebrated argument, first published by Frederic Fitch (1963), that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. Even in 1970s Oxford, intuitionistic antirealism was a strictly minority view, but many others regarded it as a live theoretical option in a way that now seems very distant. As the extreme verificationist commitments of the view have combined with accumulating decades of failure to reply convincingly to criticisms of the arguments in its favour or to carry out the programme of generalizing intuitionistic semantics for 1 mathematics to empirical discourse, even in toy examples, the impression has been
Knowability from a Logical Point of View
, 2010
"... The wellknown ChurchFitch paradox shows that the verificationist knowability principle all truths are knowable, yields an unacceptable omniscience property. Our semantic analysis establishes that the knowability principle fails because it misses the stability assumption ‘the proposition in questio ..."
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The wellknown ChurchFitch paradox shows that the verificationist knowability principle all truths are knowable, yields an unacceptable omniscience property. Our semantic analysis establishes that the knowability principle fails because it misses the stability assumption ‘the proposition in question does not change from true to false in the process of discovery, ’ hidden in the verificationist approach. Once stability is made explicit, the resulting stable knowability principle accurately represents verificationist knowability, does not yield the omniscience property, and can be offered as a resolution of the knowability paradox. Two more principles are considered: total knowability stating that it is possible to know whether a proposition holds or not, and monotonic knowability stemming from the intrinsically intuitionistic reading of knowability. The study of these four principles yields a “knowability diamond ” describing their logical strength. These results are obtained within a logical framework which opens the door to the systematic study of knowability from a logical point of view. 1