What was noted by E. J. hanger (1978) remains true today: that much of contemporary psychological research is based on the assumption that people are consciously and systematically processing incoming information in order to construe and interpret their world and to plan and engage in courses of action. As did E. J. hanger, the authors question this assumption. First, they review evidence that the ability to exercise such conscious, intentional control is actually quite limited, so that most of moment-to-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all. The authors then describe the different possible mechanisms that produce automatic, environmental control over these various phenomena and review evidence establishing both the existence of these mechanisms as well as their consequences for judgments, emotions, and

Emotion is a fundamental component of being human. Joy, hate, anger, and pride, among the plethora of other emotions, motivate action and add meaning and richness to virtually all human experience. Traditionally, human-computer interaction has been viewed as the “ultimate ” exception: Users must discard their emotional selves to work efficiently and rationality with computers, the quintessentially unemotional artifact. Emotion seemed at best marginally relevant to human-computer interaction―and at worst oxymoronic. Recent research in psychology and technology suggests a very different view of the relationship between humans, computers, and emotion. After a long period of dormancy and confusion, there has been an explosion of research on the psychology of emotion (Gross, 1999). Emotion is no longer seen as limited to the occasional outburst of fury when a computer crashes inexplicably, excitement when a videogame character leaps past an obstacle, or frustration at an incomprehensible error message. It is now understood that a wide range of emotions plays a critical role in every computer-related, goal-directed activity, from developing a 3-D CAD model and running calculations on a spreadsheet, to searching the Web and sending an email, to making an online purchase and playing solitaire. Indeed, many psychologists now argue that it is

informs ® doi 10.1287/orsc.1050.0133 © 2005 INFORMS Sensemaking involves turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard into action. In this paper we take the position that the concept of sensemaking fills important gaps in organizational theory. The seemingly transient nature of sensemaking belies its central role in the determination of human behavior, whether people are acting in formal organizations or elsewhere. Sensemaking is central because it is the primary site where meanings materialize that inform and constrain identity and action. The purpose of this paper is to take stock of the concept of sensemaking. We do so by pinpointing central features of sensemaking, some of which have been explicated but neglected, some of which have been assumed but not made explicit, some of which have changed in significance over time, and some of which have been missing all along or have gone awry. We sense joint enthusiasm to restate sensemaking in ways that make it more future oriented, more action oriented, more macro, more closely tied to organizing, meshed more boldly with identity, more visible, more behaviorally defined, less sedentary and backward looking, more infused with emotion and with issues of sensegiving and persuasion. These key enhancements provide a foundation upon which to build future studies that can strengthen the sensemaking perspective.

This paper will attempt to define a new area of research: affective communication through the use of affective objects. An affective object may be defined as any physical object which has the ability to sense emotional data from a person, map that information to an abstract form of expression and communicate that information expressively, either back to the subject herself or to another person. This paper will also propose a theory of how to utilize existing knowledge (i.e. how humans interpret the expressive qualities of modalities such as color, sound, and light) to inform the invention process. 1

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The meaning people assign to physical sensations can have profound implications for their physical and psychological health. A predominant research question in somatic interpretation asks if it is more adaptive to distract one's attention away from a potentially unpleasant sensation or to focus one's attention on it. This question, however, has yielded equivocal answers. Many apparent ambiguities in this research can be traced to a failure to distinguish the content of a person's attention from its mere direction or degree. A model of somatic interpretation is discussed, incorporating not only perceptual focus but also the attributions, goals, coping strategies, and prior hypotheses of the perceiver, thus delineating the psychobiological conditions under which various attentional strategies should be adaptive. In contrast to the prevailing concern with when and why somatic distraction doesn't "work, " this conceptual analysis also considers when and why somatic attention does. Theoretical and methodological issues are discussed, as is the potential utility of somatic attention in cardiac rehabilitation and multiple sclerosis. He shivered repeatedly as he lay looking out through the wooden arch at the reeking, dripping damp outside, which seemed on the point of passing over into snow. It was strange that with all that

We propose that the experience of human desire involves intrusive thoughts and elaborated cognitions. Intrusive thoughts are triggered automatically by external cues, cognitive associates, negative emotion or physiological deficits. When they elicit significant pleasure or relief, cognitive elaboration usually ensues. Elaboration competes with concurrent cognitive tasks through retrieval of target-related information and its retention in working memory. It includes the construction of mental images that simulate the sensory and emotional qualities of the target of the desire. These images are momentarily rewarding but amplify awareness of somatic and emotional deficits. The impact of desires on related behaviors is moderated by competing incentives, target availability and skills. The theory accounts for existing data and suggests new directions for research and treatment. 120 words The imaginary relish is so sweet That it enchants my sense. (Shakespeare, Troilus & Cressida, Act 3, Scene 2). Here you are, innocently reading a psychology journal, and a paper suddenly mentions someone drinking coffee at a sidewalk caf on a sunny Sunday morning. Chances are that you can immediately imagine how good it would be to have a cup of fine coffee. Maybe you imagine the smell of the freshly ground coffee beans, the smell and taste of the coffee, the sound of the grinder and the bubble and steam of the espresso machine. If you do not especially enjoy coffee, or have just finished a cup, this image may have little appeal. But if you would really enjoy a cup right now, the image has a pleasurable piquancy --#a tantalizing enchantment that, like a tickle to your foot, moves easily to a sense of torture if the desire cannot be fulfilled. From its inception, the thought captures your att...

Studying the most extreme outcomes of intergroup hatred – murder, mass killings and genocides – has long been part of historical and social research. Neuroscientists and psychologists have also been interested in interpersonal and intergroup violence. This article considers the question of how atrocities arise from a neuroscientific perspective, focusing on war as the context in which they most often occur. It describes relevant aspects of brain function, relates them to social psychological research on intergroup hostility and applies the resulting framework to a case study: the US prison camp at Guantanamo Bay.

The term self-deception describes the puzzling situation in which a person appears both to know and not know one and the same thing. Consider as an example a cancer patient who maintains the expectation of recov-ery even while surrounded by the signs of an incurable malignancy. Presumably this patient knows unconsciously that the disease is incur-able, but manages to prevent that knowledge from becoming conscious. Interestingly, one uf the reasons for concluding that the patient uncon-sciously knows of the incurable malignancy is the very success of the defense. How could that defense be maintained so effectively without using knowledge of the unwelcome fact to anticipate the forms in which it might try to intrude into consciousness? THE PARADOX OF SELF-DECEPTION The sense in which this example is puzzling, or paradoxical, is shown in Fig. 3.1. Some encountered situation, or stimulus, is assumed to receive both unconscious and conscious analyses. The unconscious analysis, which is assumed to occur first, identifies a threatening, or anxiety-evoking, aspect of the stimulus. In Fig. 3.1, the anxiety-evoking stimulus is represented as some proposition, p-such as, "I have a terminal ma-lignancy. " Conscious analysis, however, fails to apprehend this proposi-tion. There are three puzzling aspects of this situation. First, how can the person manage unconsciously to reach the conclusion that proposition p is true while not also reaching that conclusion consciously? Second, what good does it do for the person not to know consciously that p is true? Should it not produce anxiety just to know unconsciously that p is