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Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions
"... Abstract. We develop a new generic long-message second preimage attack, based on combining the techniques in the second preimage attacks of Dean [8] and Kelsey and Schneier [16] with the herding attack of Kelsey and Kohno [15]. We show that these generic attacks apply to hash functions using the Mer ..."
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Abstract. We develop a new generic long-message second preimage attack, based on combining the techniques in the second preimage attacks of Dean [8] and Kelsey and Schneier [16] with the herding attack of Kelsey and Kohno [15]. We show that these generic attacks apply to hash functions using the Merkle-Damgård construction with only slightly more work than the previously known attack, but allow enormously more control of the contents of the second preimage found. Additionally, we show that our new attack applies to several hash function constructions which are not vulnerable to the previously known attack, including the dithered hash proposal of Rivest [25], Shoup’s UOWHF[26] and the ROX hash construction [2]. We analyze the properties of the dithering sequence used in [25], and develop a time-memory tradeoff which allows us to apply our second preimage attack to a wide range of dithering sequences, including sequences which are much stronger than those in Rivest’s proposals. Finally, we show that both the existing second preimage attacks [8,16] and our new attack can be applied even more efficiently to multiple target messages; in general, given a set of many target messages with a total of 2 R message blocks, these second preimage attacks can find a second preimage for one of those target messages with no more work than would be necessary to find a second preimage for a single target message of 2 R message blocks.
Blockcipher Based Hashing Revisited
- Fast Software Encryption – FSE ’09
, 2009
"... Abstract. We revisit the rate-1 blockcipher based hash functions as first studied by Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle (Crypto’93) and later extensively analysed by Black, Rogaway and Shrimpton (Crypto’02). We analyse a further generalization where any pre- and postprocessing is considered. This lead ..."
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Abstract. We revisit the rate-1 blockcipher based hash functions as first studied by Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle (Crypto’93) and later extensively analysed by Black, Rogaway and Shrimpton (Crypto’02). We analyse a further generalization where any pre- and postprocessing is considered. This leads to a clearer understanding of the current classification of rate-1 blockcipher based schemes as introduced by Preneel et al. and refined by Black et al. In addition, we also gain insight in chopped, overloaded and supercharged compression functions. In the latter category we propose two compression functions based on a single call to a blockcipher whose collision resistance exceeds the birthday bound on the cipher’s blocklength. 1
Y.: An Investigation of the Enhanced Target Collision Resistance Property for Hash Functions. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/506
, 2009
"... Abstract. We revisit the enhanced target collision resistance (eTCR) property as a newly emerged notion of security for dedicated-key hash functions, which has been put forth by Halevi and Krawczyk at CRYPTO’06, in conjunction with the Randomized Hashing mode to achieve this property. Our contributi ..."
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Abstract. We revisit the enhanced target collision resistance (eTCR) property as a newly emerged notion of security for dedicated-key hash functions, which has been put forth by Halevi and Krawczyk at CRYPTO’06, in conjunction with the Randomized Hashing mode to achieve this property. Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we provide a full picture of the relationships between eTCR and each of the seven security properties for a dedicatedkey hash function, considered by Rogaway and Shrimpton at FSE’04; namely, collision resistance (CR), the three variants of second-preimage resistance (Sec, aSec, eSec) and the three variants of preimage resistance (Pre, aPre, ePre). The results show that, for an arbitrary dedicated-key hash function, eTCR is not implied by any of these seven properties, and it can only imply three of the properties; namely, eSec (TCR), Sec, Pre. In the second part of the paper, we analyze the eTCR preservation capabilities of several domain extension transforms (a.k.a. modes of operation) for hash functions, including (Plain, Strengthened, and Prefix-free) Merkle-Damg˚ard, Randomized Hashing, Shoup, Enveloped Shoup, XOR Linear Hash (XLH), and Linear Hash (LH). From this analysis it turns out that, with the exception of a nested variant of LH, none of the investigated transforms can preserve the eTCR property.
A Modular Design for Hash Functions: Towards Making the Mix-Compress-Mix Approach Practical
"... Abstract. The design of cryptographic hash functions is a very complex and failure-prone process. For this reason, this paper puts forward a completely modular and fault-tolerant approach to the construction of a full-fledged hash function from an underlying simpler hash function H and a further pri ..."
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Abstract. The design of cryptographic hash functions is a very complex and failure-prone process. For this reason, this paper puts forward a completely modular and fault-tolerant approach to the construction of a full-fledged hash function from an underlying simpler hash function H and a further primitive F (such as a block cipher), with the property that collision resistance of the construction only relies on H, whereas indifferentiability from a random oracle follows from F being ideal. In particular, the failure of one of the two components must not affect the security property implied by the other component. The Mix-Compress-Mix (MCM) approach by Ristenpart and Shrimpton (ASIACRYPT 2007) envelops the hash function H between two injective mixing steps, and can be interpreted as a first attempt at such a design. However, the proposed instantiation of the mixing steps, based on block ciphers, makes the resulting hash function impractical: First, it cannot be evaluated online, and second, it produces larger hash values than H, while only inheriting the collision-resistance guarantees for the shorter output. Additionally, it relies on a trapdoor one-way permutation, which seriously compromises the use of the resulting hash function for random oracle instantiation in certain scenarios. This paper presents the first efficient modular hash function with online evaluation and short output length. The core of our approach are novel block-cipher based designs for the mixing steps of the MCM approach which rely on significantly weaker assumptions: The first mixing step is realized without any computational assumptions (besides the underlying cipher being ideal), whereas the second mixing step only requires a oneway permutation without a trapdoor, which we prove to be the minimal assumption for the construction of injective random oracles. 1
New Second Preimage Attacks on Hash Functions ⋆
"... Abstract. In this work we present new generic second preimage attacks on hash functions. Our rst attack is based on the herding attack, and applies to various Merkle-Damgård-based iterative hash functions. Compared to the previously known long-message second preimage attacks, our attack adds only a ..."
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Abstract. In this work we present new generic second preimage attacks on hash functions. Our rst attack is based on the herding attack, and applies to various Merkle-Damgård-based iterative hash functions. Compared to the previously known long-message second preimage attacks, our attack adds only a small computational overhead. In exchange, our attack gives the adversary a much greater control over the contents of the second message and in particular allows all the di erence to be concentrated in a few message blocks. As a result, the new second preimage attack is applicable to hash function constructions such as the dithered hash proposal of Rivest, Shoup's UOWHF, and the ROX hash construction, which were thought to be immune to the earlier known second preimage attacks. We also suggest a few time-memory-data tradeo variants for this type of attacks, allowing for faster online computations, and attacking signi cantly shorter messages. Furthermore, we analyze the properties of the dithering sequence used in Rivest's hash function proposal, and develop a time-memory tradeo which allows us to apply our second preimage attack to a much stronger than those in Rivest's proposals. Parts of our results rely on the kite generator, a new time-memory tradeo tool. We also exhibit a time-memory-data tradeo attack on tree hashes for second preimages. Finally, we show how both the existing second preimage attacks and our new attacks can be applied even more e ciently when given multiple short target messages rather than a single long target message.
Analysis of Property-Preservation Capabilities of the ROX and ESh Hash Domain Extenders
"... Abstract. Two of the most recent and powerful multi-property-preserving (MPP) hash domain extension transforms are the Ramdom-Oracle-XOR (ROX) transform and the Enveloped Shoup (ESh) transform. The former was proposed by Andreeva et al. at ASIACRYPT 2007 and the latter was proposed by Bellare and Ri ..."
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Abstract. Two of the most recent and powerful multi-property-preserving (MPP) hash domain extension transforms are the Ramdom-Oracle-XOR (ROX) transform and the Enveloped Shoup (ESh) transform. The former was proposed by Andreeva et al. at ASIACRYPT 2007 and the latter was proposed by Bellare and Ristenpart at ICALP 2007. In the existing literature, ten notions of security for hash functions have been considered in analysis of MPP capabilities of domain extension transforms, namely CR, Sec, aSec, eSec (TCR), Pre, aPre, ePre, MAC, PRF, PRO. Andreeva et al. showed that ROX is able to preserve seven properties; namely collision resistance (CR), three flavors of second preimage resistance (Sec, aSec, eSec) and three variants of preimage resistance (Pre, aPre, ePre). Bellare and Ristenpart showed that ESh is capable of preserving five important security notions; namely CR, message authentication code (MAC), pseudorandom function (PRF), pseudorandom oracle (PRO), and target collision resistance (TCR). Nonetheless, there is no further study on these two MPP hash domain extension transforms with regard to the other properties. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Firstly, we show that ROX does not preserve two other widely-used and important security notions, namely MAC and PRO. We also show a positive result about ROX, namely that it also preserves PRF. Secondly, we show that ESh does not preserve other four properties, namely Sec, aSec, Pre, and aPre. On the positive side we show that ESh can preserve ePre property. Our results in this paper provide a full picture of the MPP capabilities of both ROX and ESh transforms by completing the property-preservation analysis of these transforms in regard to all ten security
full version. Hash Functions from Sigma Protocols and Improvements to VSH
, 2008
"... We present a general way to get a provably collision-resistant hash function from any (suitable) Σ-protocol. This enables us to both get new designs and to unify and improve previous work. In the first category, we obtain, via a modified version of the Fiat-Shamir protocol, the fastest known hash fu ..."
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We present a general way to get a provably collision-resistant hash function from any (suitable) Σ-protocol. This enables us to both get new designs and to unify and improve previous work. In the first category, we obtain, via a modified version of the Fiat-Shamir protocol, the fastest known hash function that is provably collision-resistant based on the standard factoring assumption. In the second category, we provide a modified version VSH * of VSH which is faster when hashing short messages. (Most Internet packets are short.) We also show that Σ-hash functions are chameleon, thereby obtaining several new and efficient chameleon hash functions with applications to online/off-line

