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Design and Analysis of Practical PublicKey Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2001
"... A new public key encryption scheme, along with several variants, is proposed and analyzed. The scheme and its variants are quite practical, and are proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. These appear to be the first publickey encryption sc ..."
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Cited by 189 (11 self)
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A new public key encryption scheme, along with several variants, is proposed and analyzed. The scheme and its variants are quite practical, and are proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. These appear to be the first publickey encryption schemes in the literature that are simultaneously practical and provably secure.
A Proposal for an ISO Standard for Public Key Encryption (version 2.0)
, 2001
"... This document should be viewed less as a first draft of a standard for publickey encryption, and more as a proposal for what such a draft standard should contain. It is hoped that this proposal will serve as a basis for discussion, from which a consensus for a standard may be formed. ..."
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Cited by 111 (3 self)
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This document should be viewed less as a first draft of a standard for publickey encryption, and more as a proposal for what such a draft standard should contain. It is hoped that this proposal will serve as a basis for discussion, from which a consensus for a standard may be formed.
Another Look at “Provable Security"
, 2004
"... We give an informal analysis and critique of several typical “provable security” results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal terminology and “proofs,” whereas in other cases the formalism seems to be consistent with common ..."
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Cited by 59 (12 self)
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We give an informal analysis and critique of several typical “provable security” results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal terminology and “proofs,” whereas in other cases the formalism seems to be consistent with common sense. We discuss the reasons why the search for mathematically convincing theoretical evidence to support the security of publickey systems has been an important theme of researchers. But we argue that the theoremproof paradigm of theoretical mathematics is often of limited relevance here and frequently leads to papers that are confusing and misleading. Because our paper is aimed at the general mathematical public, it is selfcontained and as jargonfree as possible.
Universal Padding Schemes for RSA
 Proc. Crypto’02, LNCS
, 2002
"... Abstract. A common practice to encrypt with RSA is to first apply a padding scheme to the message and then to exponentiate the result with the public exponent; an example of this is OAEP. Similarly, the usual way of signing with RSA is to apply some padding scheme and then to exponentiate the result ..."
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Cited by 21 (1 self)
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Abstract. A common practice to encrypt with RSA is to first apply a padding scheme to the message and then to exponentiate the result with the public exponent; an example of this is OAEP. Similarly, the usual way of signing with RSA is to apply some padding scheme and then to exponentiate the result with the private exponent, as for example in PSS. Usually, the RSA modulus used for encrypting is different from the one used for signing. The goal of this paper is to simplify this common setting. First, we show that PSS can also be used for encryption, and gives an encryption scheme semantically secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks, in the random oracle model. As a result, PSS can be used indifferently for encryption or signature. Moreover, we show that PSS allows to safely use the same RSA keypairs for both encryption and signature, in a concurrent manner. More generally, we show that using PSS the same set of keys can be used for both encryption and signature for any trapdoor partialdomain oneway permutation. The practical consequences of our result are important: PKIs and publickey implementations can be significantly simplified. Keywords: Probabilistic Signature Scheme, Provable Security. 1
A Computational Interpretation of DolevYao Adversaries
 in Proc. of 3rd Int. Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS’03
, 2003
"... The Dolev{Yao model is a simple and useful framework in which to analyze security protocols, but it assumes an extremely limited adversary. It is unclear if the results of this model would remain valid were the adversary to be given additional power. In this work, we show that there exist situat ..."
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Cited by 15 (1 self)
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The Dolev{Yao model is a simple and useful framework in which to analyze security protocols, but it assumes an extremely limited adversary. It is unclear if the results of this model would remain valid were the adversary to be given additional power. In this work, we show that there exist situations in which DolevYao adversary can be viewed as a valid abstraction of all realistic adversaries. We do this in two steps: 1. We translate the allowed behaviors of the DolevYao adversary into the computational model, an alternate framework with a very powerful adversary.
The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic Detection and Removal of ControlFlow Side Channel Attacks
 In Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/368
, 2005
"... Abstract. We introduce new methods for detecting controlflow side channel attacks, transforming C source code to eliminate such attacks, and checking that the transformed code is free of controlflow side channels. We model controlflow side channels with a program counter transcript, in which the ..."
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Cited by 15 (0 self)
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Abstract. We introduce new methods for detecting controlflow side channel attacks, transforming C source code to eliminate such attacks, and checking that the transformed code is free of controlflow side channels. We model controlflow side channels with a program counter transcript, in which the value of the program counter at each step is leaked to an adversary. The program counter transcript model captures a class of side channel attacks that includes timing attacks and error disclosure attacks. Further, we propose a generic sourcetosource transformation that produces programs provably secure against controlflow side channel attacks. We implemented this transform for C together with a static checker that conservatively checks x86 assembly for violations of program counter security; our checker allows us to compile with optimizations while retaining assurance the resulting code is secure. We then measured our technique’s effect on the performance of binary modular exponentiation and realworld implementations in C of RC5 and IDEA: we found it has a performance overhead of at most 5 × and a stack space overhead of at most 2×. Our approach to side channel security is practical, generally applicable, and provably secure against an interesting class of side channel attacks. 1
Can we trust cryptographic software? cryptographic flaws
 in GNU Privacy Guard v1.2.3. In EUROCRYPT 2004, LNCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. More and more software use cryptography. But how can one know if what is implemented is good cryptography? For proprietary software, one cannot say much unless one proceeds to reverseengineering, and history tends to show that bad cryptography is much more frequent than good cryptography ..."
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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Abstract. More and more software use cryptography. But how can one know if what is implemented is good cryptography? For proprietary software, one cannot say much unless one proceeds to reverseengineering, and history tends to show that bad cryptography is much more frequent than good cryptography there. Open source software thus sounds like a good solution, but the fact that a source code can be read does not imply that it is actually read, especially by cryptography experts. In this paper, we illustrate this point by examining the case of a basic Internet application of cryptography: secure email. We analyze parts of thesourcecodeofthelatestversionofGNUPrivacyGuard(GnuPGor GPG), a free open source alternative to the famous PGP software, compliant with the OpenPGP standard, and included in most GNU/Linux distributions such as Debian, MandrakeSoft, Red Hat and SuSE. We observe several cryptographic flaws in GPG v1.2.3. The most serious flaw has been present in GPG for almost four years: we show that as soon as one (GPGgenerated) ElGamal signature of an arbitrary message is released, one can recover the signer’s private key in less than a second on a PC. As a consequence, ElGamal signatures and the socalled ElGamal sign+encrypt keys have recently been removed from GPG. Fortunately, ElGamal was not GPG’s default option for signing keys.
Computational Soundness of Formal Adversaries
, 2002
"... The DolevYao model is a useful and widespread framework in which to analyze security protocols. However, it models the messages of the protocol at a very high level and makes extremely strong assumptions about the power of the adversary. The computational model of cryptography and cryptographic pro ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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The DolevYao model is a useful and widespread framework in which to analyze security protocols. However, it models the messages of the protocol at a very high level and makes extremely strong assumptions about the power of the adversary. The computational model of cryptography and cryptographic protocols takes a much more lowlevel view of messages and uses much weaker assumptions. A major result of this work will be the demonstration that certain kinds of computational cryptography can result in an equivalence of sorts between the formal and computational adversary. Specifically, we give an interpretation to the messages of the DolevYao model in terms of computational cryptography. We then define a computational security condition on the powers of the computational adversary, and show that this condition limits the computational adversary to the operations of the DolevYao adversary. Lastly, we show that this security condition is achievable using standard computational cryptographic constructs.
Cryptography in Theory and Practice: The Case of Encryption in IPsec
 Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2006, LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. This paper studies the gaps that exist between cryptography as studied in theory, as defined in standards, as implemented by software engineers, and as actually consumed by users. Our focus is on IPsec, an important and widelyused suite of protocols providing security at the IP layer of n ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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Abstract. This paper studies the gaps that exist between cryptography as studied in theory, as defined in standards, as implemented by software engineers, and as actually consumed by users. Our focus is on IPsec, an important and widelyused suite of protocols providing security at the IP layer of network communications. Despite wellknown results in theoretical cryptography highlighting the vulnerabilities of unauthenticated encryption, the IPsec standards currently mandate its support. We present evidence that such “encryptiononly” configurations are in fact still often selected by users in practice, even with strong warnings advising against this in the IPsec standards. We then describe a variety of attacks against such configurations and report on their successful implementation in the case of the Linux kernel implementation of IPsec. Our attacks are realistic in their requirements, highly efficient, and recover the complete contents of IPsecprotected datagrams. Our attacks still apply when integrity protection is provided by a higher layer protocol, and in some cases even when it is supplied by IPsec itself. Finally in this paper, we reflect on the reasons why this unsatisfactory situation persists, and make some recommendations for the future development of IPsec and cryptographic software in general. Keywords: IPsec, integrity, encryption, ESP. 1
OAEP 3round: A generic and secure asymmetric encryption padding
 In Asiacrypt ’04, LNCS 3329
, 2004
"... ..."