Analogy and similarity are often assumed to be distinct psychological processes. In contrast to this position, the authors suggest that both similarity and analogy involve a process of structural alignment and mapping, that is, that similarity is like analogy. In this article, the authors first describe the structure-mapping process as it has been worked out for analogy. Then, this view is extended to similarity, where it is used to generate new predictions. Finally, the authors explore broader implications of structural alignment for psychological processing.

this paper. We also thank the following for permission to reproduce images of their products: Consumer Value Stores, Disney Enterprises, Inc., International Home Foods, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Lehigh Valley Farms, Mott's Consumer Services, Neutrogena Corporation, Playtex Products Inc., The Procter & Gamble Company, Rite Aid Corporation, Rubber Maid Incorporated, Spring Tree Corporation, and Unilever United States, Inc. Address correspondence and reprint requests to either Barbara Malt, Department of Psychology, 17 Memorial Drive East, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015 (e-mail: bcm@lehigh.edu) or Steven Sloman, Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Box 1978, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912 (e-mail: Steven_Sloman@brown.edu)

Ahn and Lassaline [Ahn, W., Lassaline, M.E., 1995. Causal structure in categorization.

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An ongoing goal in the field of categorization has been to determine how objects ’ features provide evidence of membership in one category versus another. Well-known findings include that feature diagnosticity is a function of how often the feature appears in category members versus nonmembers, their perceptual salience, how features are used in support of inferences, and how observable features are related to other observable features. We tested how diagnosticity is affected by causal relations between observable and unobserved features. Consistent with our view of classification as diagnostic reasoning, we found that observable features are more diagnostic to the extent that they are caused by underlying features that define category membership, because the presence of the latter can be (causally) inferred from the former. Implications of these results for current views of conceptual structure and models of categorization are discussed. It is generally accepted that people’s concepts include not only the features and attributes of the entity being represented, but also the ways in which those features are related to one another. For example, we know that hormones can alter a person’s behavior, that chemical structure can affect a substance’s hardness, and that processor

single subject experimental design across participants and behaviors in 4 patients with fluent aphasia. Participants received a semantic feature treatment to improve naming of either typical or atypical items within semantic categories, while

Categorization is a primary application for conceptual knowledge stored in the human brain. Categorization is often based on similarity, involving apparent use of both prototypes and stored exemplars. Some human categorization appears to be rule or theory based rather than based on similarity. Attempts to model categorization often involve multiple subsystems to support the different observed approaches. Any system which must perform a large number of different but interdependent behaviours with limited information handling resources will tend to be constrained within a form called the recommendation architecture. Physiological structures in the brain resemble the forms of this recommendation architecture. The information recording and access mechanisms of the recommendation architecture result in all the different categorization phenomena and use only a single knowledge representation system. Categorization phenomena differ only in the ways in which information is accessed from the representation system. 1.

Categorization is a primary application for conceptual knowledge stored in the human brain. Categorization is often based on similarity, involving apparent use of both prototypes and stored exemplars. Some human categorization appears to be rule or theory based rather than based on similarity. Attempts to model categorization often involve multiple subsystems to support the different observed approaches. Any system which must perform a large number of different but interdependent behaviours with limited information handling resources will tend to be constrained within a form called the recommendation architecture. Physiological structures in the brain resemble the forms of this recommendation architecture. The information recording and access mechanisms of the recommendation architecture result in all the different categorization phenomena and use only a single knowledge representation system. Categorization phenomena differ only in the ways in which information is accessed from the representation system. 1.

Abstract—The abstraction of patterns from data and the formation of categories is a hallmark of human cognitive ability. As such, it has been studied from many different perspectives by researchers, and these studies have led to several explanatory models. In this paper, we consider the inference of categorical representations for the purpose of producing taskspecific responses. Task-relevant responses require a knowledge repertoire that is organized to allow efficient access to useful information. We present a neurodynamical system that infers functionally coherent categories from semantic inputs (or concepts) presented sequentially in different contexts, and encodes them as attractors in a two-dimensional topological feature space. The resulting category representations can then act as pointers in a larger system for semantic cognition. The system allows controlled hierarchical organization and functional segregation of the inferred categories. I.

We evaluate three theories of categorization in the domain of artifacts. Two theories are versions of psychological essentialism; they posit that artifact categorization is a matter of judging membership in a kind by appealing to a belief about the true, underlying nature of the object. The first version holds that the essence can be identified with the intended function of objects. The second holds that the essence can be identified with the creator's intended kind membership. The third theory is called "minimalism" (Strevens, 2001a). It states that judgments of kind membership are based on beliefs about causal laws, not beliefs about essences. We conclude that each theory makes unnecessary assumptions in explaining how people make everyday classifications and inductions with artifacts. Essentialist theories go wrong in assuming that the belief that artifacts have essences is critical to categorization. All theories go wrong in assuming that artifacts are treated as if they belong to stable, fixed kinds. Theories of artifact categorization must contend with the fact that artifact categories are not stable, but rather depend on the categorization task at hand. 3 Psychological essentialism is the hypothesis that object categorization is a matter of assigning kind membership on the basis of a belief about the true, underlying nature of the object. Most of the discussion of psychological essentialism has concerned judgments about naturally occurring entities and their classification into natural kinds. Strevens (2001a) and Rips (2001) both make convincing cases against an essentialist view of everyday categorization for naturally occurring entities. Strevens argues instead for a minimalist view. The minimalist view assumes that categorization is a matter of judging kind me...