this article. This paper has also benefited greatly from constructive feedback from Gordon Logan, Mike Stadler, and our other reviewers. We thank Joanie Sanchez for her assistance in running Experiment 1. This research was supported by a Social Science Faculty Research Award from Yale University. Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Research in Ophthalmology and Vision, Fort Lauderdale, FL, in May, 1997, and at the Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Philadelphia, PA, in November, 1997

This paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high-level skill learning that use a top-down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom-up approach toward low-level skill learning, where procedural knowledge develops first and declarative knowledge develops later. Our model is formed by integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic learning methods to perform on-line reactive learning. It adopts a two-level dual-representation framework (Sun, 1995), with a combination of localist and distributed representation. We compare the model with human data in a minefield navigation task, demonstrating some match between the model and human data in several respects.

This article explicates the interaction between implicit and explicit processes in skill learning, in contrast to the tendency of researchers to study each type in isolation. It highlights various effects of the interaction on learning (including synergy effects). The authors argue for an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes. Moreover, they argue for a bottom-up approach (first learning implicit knowledge and then explicit knowledge) in the integrated model. A variety of qualitative data can be accounted for by the approach. A computational model, CLARION, is then used to simulate a range of quantitative data. The results demonstrate the plausibility of the model, which provides a new perspective on skill learning. The role of implicit learning in skill acquisition and the distinction between implicit and explicit learning have been widely recognized in recent years (see, e.g., Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, &

Structural priming in language production is a tendency to recreate a recently uttered syntactic structure in different words. This tendency can be seen independent of specific lexical items, thematic roles, or word sequences. Two alternative proposals about the mechanism behind structural priming include (a) short-term activation from a memory representation of a priming structure and (b) longer term adaptation within the cognitive mechanisms for creating sentences, as a form of procedural learning. Two experiments evaluated these hypotheses, focusing on the persistence of structural priming. Both experiments yielded priming that endured beyond adjacent sentences, persisting over 2 intervening sentences in Experiment 1 and over 10 in Experiment 2. Although memory may have short-term consequences for some components of this kind of priming, the persisting effects are more compatible with a learning account than a transient memory account. Speakers repeat themselves. Sometimes their repetitions are intentional, made for emphasis or other stylistic and social purposes (Giles & Powesland, 1975; Tannen, 1987), and sometimes they are accidental. They may involve almost

This paper is an attempt at understanding the issue of consciousness through investigating its functional role, especially in learning, and through devising hybrid neural network models that (in a qualitative manner) approximate characteristics of human consciousness. In so doing, the paper examines explicit and implicit learning in a variety of psychological experiments and delineates the conscious/unconscious distinction in terms of the two types of learning and their respective products. The distinctions are captured in a two-level action-based model Clarion. Some fundamental theoretical issues are also clarified with the help of the model. Comparisons with existing models of consciousness are made to accentuate the present approach. KEYWORDS: Neural networks, hybrid systems, consciousness, implicit learning, reinforcement learning, procedural knowledge, rule extraction, dual representation 1 INTRODUCTION 3 1 Introduction Amidst the widespread enthusiasm of recent years concerning...

This review proposes that implicit learning processes are the cognitive substrate of social intuition. This hypothesis is supported by (a) the conceptual correspondence between implicit learning and social intuition (nonverbal communication) and (b) a review of relevant neuropsychological (Huntington's and Parkinson's disease), neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and neuroanatomical data. It is concluded that the caudate and putamen, in the basal ganglia, are central components of both intuition and implicit learning, supporting the proposed relationship. Parallel, but distinct, processes of judgment and action are demonstrated at each of the social, cognitive, and neural levels of analysis. Additionally, explicit attempts to learn a sequence can interfere with implicit learning. The possible relevance of the computations of the basal ganglia to emotional appraisal, automatic evaluation, script processing, and decision making are discussed. These "feelings " have an efficiency of operation which it is impossi-ble for thought to match. Even our most highly intellectualized operations depend upon them as a "fringe " by which to guide our inferential movements. They give us our sense of rightness and wrongness, of what to select and emphasize and follow up, and what

Psycholinguistic research has shown that the influence of abstract syntactic knowledge on performance is shaped by particular sentences that have been experienced. To explore this idea, the authors applied a connectionist model of sentence production to the development and use of abstract syntax. The model makes use of (a) error-based learning to acquire and adapt sequencing mechanisms and (b) meaning–form mappings to derive syntactic representations. The model is able to account for most of what is known about structural priming in adult speakers, as well as key findings in preferential looking and elicited production studies of language acquisition. The model suggests how abstract knowledge and concrete experience are balanced in the development and use of syntax.

This paper argues for an explanation of the mechanistic (computational) basis of consciousness that is based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation, the ideas of which have been put forth in the connectionist literature. A model is developed to substantiate and test this approach. The paper also explores the issue of the functional roles of consciousness, in relation to the proposed mechanistic explanation of consciousness. The model, embodying the representational difference, is able to account for the functional role of consciousness, in the form of the synergy between the conscious and the unconscious. The fit between the model and various cognitive phenomena and data (documented in the psychological literatures) is discussed to accentuate the plausibility of the model and its explanation of consciousness. Comparisons with existing models of consciousness are made in the end.

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The authors investigated the extent to which touch, vision, and audition mediate the processing of statistical regularities within sequential input. Few researchers have conducted rigorous comparisons across sensory modalities; in particular, the sense of touch has been virtually ignored. The current data reveal not only commonalities but also modality constraints affecting statistical learning across the senses. To be specific, the authors found that the auditory modality displayed a quantitative learning advantage compared with vision and touch. In addition, they discovered qualitative learning biases among the senses: Primarily, audition afforded better learning for the final part of input sequences. These findings are discussed in terms of whether statistical learning is likely to consist of a single, unitary mechanism or multiple, modality-constrained ones. The world is temporally bounded: Events do not occur all at once but rather are distributed in time. Therefore, it is crucial for organisms to be able to encode and represent temporal order information. One potential method for encoding temporal order is to learn the statistical relationships of elements within sequential input. This process appears to be important in a diverse set of learning situations, including speech segmentation (Saffran, Newport, & Aslin, 1996), learning orthographic regularities of written words (Pacton, Perruchet, Fayol, & Cleeremans, 2001), visual processing (Fiser & Aslin, 2002), visuomotor learning (e.g., serial reaction time tasks; Cleeremans, 1993) and nonlinguistic, auditory