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93
An efficient ascendingbid auction for multiple objects
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 1997
"... In multipleobject environments where individual bidders may demand more than one object, standard methods of auction generally result in allocative inefficiency. This paper proposes a new ascendingbid method for auctioning homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or communications spectrum. The a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 196 (26 self)
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In multipleobject environments where individual bidders may demand more than one object, standard methods of auction generally result in allocative inefficiency. This paper proposes a new ascendingbid method for auctioning homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or communications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders report back the quantity demanded at that price, and the auctioneer raises the price. Objects are awarded to bidders at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the process continues until the market clears. With pure private values, the proposed (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealedbid) Vickrey auction, but may be simpler for bidders to understand and has the advantage of assuring the privacy of the upper portions of bidders ’ demand curves. With interdependent values, the proposed auction may still yield efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction fails due to a problem which could be described as the “Generalized Winner’s Curse.”
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
 in: Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2000
"... Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple levels, with important interdependencies among inputs and outputs at each level. Combinatorial auctions address this problem ..."
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Cited by 51 (2 self)
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Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple levels, with important interdependencies among inputs and outputs at each level. Combinatorial auctions address this problem by global optimization over expressed offers to engage in compound exchanges. Optimizing with respect to offers results in optimal allocations if the offers reflect true values and costs. But autonomous selfinterested agents have an incentive to bid strategically in an attempt to gain
Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
 In SODA
, 2004
"... In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a ..."
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Cited by 49 (6 self)
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In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a scheduling problem, and an economic application is the allocation of transportation tickets.
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
, 2001
"... This paper analyzes individuallyrational ex post equilibrium in the VC (VickreyClarke) combinatorial auctions. If \Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in \Sigma. The \SigmaVC combinatorial aucti ..."
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Cited by 45 (8 self)
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This paper analyzes individuallyrational ex post equilibrium in the VC (VickreyClarke) combinatorial auctions. If \Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in \Sigma. The \SigmaVC combinatorial auctions (multigood auctions) obtained in this way are known to be individuallyrational truthtelling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with nonrestricted VC auctions, in which the buyers restrict themselves to bids on bundles in \Sigma, because it is rational for them to do so. That is, it may be that when the buyers report their valuation of the bundles in \Sigma, they are in an equilibrium. We fully characterize those \Sigma that induce individually rational equilibrium in every VC auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The number of bundles in \Sigma represents the communication complexity of the equilibrium. A special case of bundling equilibrium is partitionbased equilibrium, in which \Sigma is a field, that is, it is generated by a partition. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium, focusing in particular on partitionbased equilibrium.
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
 Journal of Machine Learning Research
, 2004
"... In this paper we explore the relationship between "preference elicitation", a learningstyle problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the problem of learning via queries studied in computational learning theory. Preference elicitation is the process of asking questions about the preferen ..."
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Cited by 37 (5 self)
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In this paper we explore the relationship between "preference elicitation", a learningstyle problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the problem of learning via queries studied in computational learning theory. Preference elicitation is the process of asking questions about the preferences of bidders so as to best divide some set of goods. As a learning problem, it can be thought of as a setting in which there are multiple target concepts that can each be queried separately, but where the goal is not so much to learn each concept as it is to produce an "optimal example". In this work, we prove a number of similarities and differences between twobidder preference elicitation and query learning, giving both separation results and proving some connections between these problems.
Decentralized supply chain formation: A market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis
 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
, 2003
"... Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource conten ..."
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Cited by 30 (4 self)
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Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. To decentralize the formation process, we introduce a market price system over the resources produced along the chain. In a competitive equilibrium for this system, agents choose locally optimal allocations with respect to prices, and outcomes are optimal overall. To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, nonstrategic agent bidding policies. In the presence of resource contention, this protocol produces better solutions than the greedy protocols common in the artificial intelligence and multiagent systems literature. The protocol often converges to highvalue supply chains, and when competitive equilibria exist, typically to approximate competitive equilibria. However, complementarities in agent production technologies can cause the protocol to wastefully allocate inputs to agents that do not produce their outputs. A subsequent decommitment phase recovers a significant fraction of the lost surplus. 1.
Combinatorial auctions with kwise dependent valuations
 In Proc. 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI05
, 2005
"... We analyze the computational and communication complexity of combinatorial auctions from a new perspective: the degree of interdependency between the items for sale in the bidders’ preferences. Denoting by Gk the class of valuations displaying up to kwise dependencies, we consider the hierarchy G1 ..."
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Cited by 26 (7 self)
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We analyze the computational and communication complexity of combinatorial auctions from a new perspective: the degree of interdependency between the items for sale in the bidders’ preferences. Denoting by Gk the class of valuations displaying up to kwise dependencies, we consider the hierarchy G1 ⊂ G2 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ Gm, where m is the number of items for sale. We show that the minimum nontrivial degree of interdependency (2wise dependency) is sufficient to render NPhard the problem of computing the optimal allocation (but we also exhibit a restricted class of such valuations for which computing the optimal allocation is easy). On the other hand, bidders ’ preferences can be communicated efficiently (i.e., exchanging a polynomial amount of information) as long as the interdependencies between items are limited to sets of cardinality up to k, where k is an arbitrary constant. The amount of communication required to transmit the bidders ’ preferences becomes superpolynomial (under the assumption that only value queries are allowed) when interdependencies occur between sets of cardinality g(m), where g(m) is an arbitrary function such that g(m) →∞ as m → ∞. We also consider approximate elicitation, in which the auctioneer learns, asking polynomially many value queries, an approximation of the bidders ’ actual preferences.
Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts
 Journal of Economic Theory
"... We consider the matching problem with contracts of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that bilateral substitutes is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable a ..."
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Cited by 26 (3 self)
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We consider the matching problem with contracts of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that bilateral substitutes is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctoroptimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substitutes, the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors ’ preferences, but there does exist a doctoroptimal stable allocation, and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D44.