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Physical Hypercomputation and the Church–Turing Thesis
, 2003
"... We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a ..."
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We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a function that is not Turing computable. Finally, we argue that the existence of the device does not refute the Church–Turing thesis, but nevertheless may be a counterexample to Gandy’s thesis.
Quantum SpeedUp of Computations
 Philosophy of Science
, 2002
"... ChurchTuring Thesis as saying something about the scope and limitations of physical computing machines. Although this was not the intention of Church or Turing, the Physical Church Turing thesis is interesting in its own right. Consider, for example, Wolfram’s formulation: One can expect in fact th ..."
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ChurchTuring Thesis as saying something about the scope and limitations of physical computing machines. Although this was not the intention of Church or Turing, the Physical Church Turing thesis is interesting in its own right. Consider, for example, Wolfram’s formulation: One can expect in fact that universal computers are as powerful in their computational capabilities as any physically realizable system can be, that they can simulate any physical system...Nophysically implementable procedure could then shortcut a computationally irreducible process. (Wolfram 1985) Wolfram’s thesis consists of two parts: (a) Any physical system can be simulated (to any degree of approximation) by a universal Turing machine (b) Complexity bounds on Turing machine simulations have physical significance. For example, suppose that the computation of the minimum energy of some system of n particles takes at least exponentially (in n) many steps. Then the relaxation time of the actual physical system to its minimum energy state will also take exponential time. An even more extreme formulation of (more or less) the same thesis is due to Aharonov (1998): A probabilistic Turing machine can simulate any reasonable physical device in polynomial cost. She calls this The Modern Church Thesis. Aharonov refers here to probabilistic Turing machines that use random numbers in addition to the usual deterministic table of steps. It seems that such machines are capable to perform certain tasks faster than fully deterministic machines. The most famous randomized algorithm of that kind concerns the decision whether a given natural number is prime. A probabilistic algorithm that decides primality in a number of
Alan Turing and the Mathematical Objection
 Minds and Machines 13(1
, 2003
"... Abstract. This paper concerns Alan Turing’s ideas about machines, mathematical methods of proof, and intelligence. By the late 1930s, Kurt Gödel and other logicians, including Turing himself, had shown that no finite set of rules could be used to generate all true mathematical statements. Yet accord ..."
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Abstract. This paper concerns Alan Turing’s ideas about machines, mathematical methods of proof, and intelligence. By the late 1930s, Kurt Gödel and other logicians, including Turing himself, had shown that no finite set of rules could be used to generate all true mathematical statements. Yet according to Turing, there was no upper bound to the number of mathematical truths provable by intelligent human beings, for they could invent new rules and methods of proof. So, the output of a human mathematician, for Turing, was not a computable sequence (i.e., one that could be generated by a Turing machine). Since computers only contained a finite number of instructions (or programs), one might argue, they could not reproduce human intelligence. Turing called this the “mathematical objection ” to his view that machines can think. Logicomathematical reasons, stemming from his own work, helped to convince Turing that it should be possible to reproduce human intelligence, and eventually compete with it, by developing the appropriate kind of digital computer. He felt it should be possible to program a computer so that it could learn or discover new rules, overcoming the limitations imposed by the incompleteness and undecidability results in the same way that human mathematicians presumably do. Key words: artificial intelligence, ChurchTuring thesis, computability, effective procedure, incompleteness, machine, mathematical objection, ordinal logics, Turing, undecidability The ‘skin of an onion ’ analogy is also helpful. In considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find certain operations which we can express in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of skin which we must strip off if we are to find the real mind. But then in what remains, we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this way, do we ever come to the ‘real ’ mind, or do we eventually come to the skin which has nothing in it? In the latter case, the whole mind is mechanical (Turing, 1950, p. 454–455). 1.
1 Platonic model of mind as an approximation to neurodynamics
"... Abstract. One of the biggest challenges of science today is to outline connections between the subjective world of human experience, as studied by psychology, and the objective world of measurable brain events, as studied by neuroscience. In this paper a series of approximations to neural dynamics i ..."
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Abstract. One of the biggest challenges of science today is to outline connections between the subjective world of human experience, as studied by psychology, and the objective world of measurable brain events, as studied by neuroscience. In this paper a series of approximations to neural dynamics is outlined, leading to a phenomenological theory of mind based on concepts directly related to human cognition. Behaviorism is based on an engineering approach, treating the mind as a control system for the organism. This corresponds to an approximation of the recurrent neural dynamics (brain states) by finite state automata (behavioral states). Another approximations to neural dynamics is described, leading to a Platoniclike model of mind based on psychological spaces. Objects and events in these spaces correspond to quasistable states of brain dynamics and may be interpreted from psychological point of view. Platonic model bridges the gap between the neurophysiological brain events and higher cognitive functions realized by the mind. Categorization experiments with human subjects are presented as a challenge for mindbrain theories. Wider implications of this model as a basis for cognitive science are discussed and possible extensions outlined. 1 1.1
Quantum Principles and Mathematical Computability
, 2008
"... Taking the view that computation is after all physical, we argue that physics, particularly quantum physics, could help extend the notion of computability. Here, we list the important and unique features of quantum mechanics and then outline a quantum mechanical “algorithm” for one of the insoluble ..."
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Taking the view that computation is after all physical, we argue that physics, particularly quantum physics, could help extend the notion of computability. Here, we list the important and unique features of quantum mechanics and then outline a quantum mechanical “algorithm” for one of the insoluble problems of mathematics, the Hilbert’s tenth and equivalently the Turing halting problem. The key element of this algorithm is the computability and measurability of both the values of physical observables and of the quantummechanical probability distributions for these values. The fact is that quantum computers can prove theorems by methods that neither a human brain nor any other Turingcomputational arbiter will ever be able to reproduce. What if a quantum algorithm delivered a theorem that it was infeasible to prove classically. No such algorithm is yet known, but nor is anything known to rule out such a possibility, and this raises a question of principle: should we still accept such a theorem as undoubtedly proved? We believe that the rational answer ot this question is yes, for our confidence in quantum proofs rests upon the same foundation as our confidence in classical proofs: our acceptance of the physical laws underlying the computing operations. D. Deustch, A. Ekert and R. Lupacchini [1] 1
The Expressive Power of Analog Recurrent Neural Networks on Infinite Input Streams
, 2012
"... We consider analog recurrent neural networks working on infinite input streams, provide a complete topological characterization of their expressive power, and compare it to the expressive power of classical infinite word reading abstract machines. More precisely, we consider analog recurrent neural ..."
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We consider analog recurrent neural networks working on infinite input streams, provide a complete topological characterization of their expressive power, and compare it to the expressive power of classical infinite word reading abstract machines. More precisely, we consider analog recurrent neural networks as language recognizers over the Cantor space, and prove that the classes of ωlanguages recognized by deterministic and nondeterministic analog networks correspond precisely to the respective classes of Π 0 2sets and Σ 1 1sets of the Cantor space. Furthermore, we show that the result can be generalized to more expressive analog networks equipped with any kind of Borel accepting condition. Therefore, in the deterministic case, the expressive power of analog neural nets turns out to be comparable to the expressive power of any kind of Büchi abstract machine, whereas in the nondeterministic case, analog recurrent networks turn out to machine, including the main cases of classical automata, 1counter automata, kcounter automata, pushdown automata, and Turing machines.
unknown title
"... Abstract. There is an intensive discussion nowadays about the meaning of effective computability, with implications to the status and provability of the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT). I begin by reviewing what has become the dominant account of the way Turing and Church viewed, in 1936, effective compu ..."
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Abstract. There is an intensive discussion nowadays about the meaning of effective computability, with implications to the status and provability of the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT). I begin by reviewing what has become the dominant account of the way Turing and Church viewed, in 1936, effective computability. According to this account, to which I refer as the Gandy–Sieg account, Turing and Church aimed to characterize the functions that can be computed by a human computer. In addition, Turing provided a highly convincing argument for CTT by analyzing the processes carried out by a human computer. I then contend that if the Gandy–Sieg account is correct, then the notion of effective computability has changed after 1936. Today computer scientists view effective computability in terms of finite machine computation. My contention is supported by the current formulations of CTT, which always refer to machine computation, and by the current argumentation for CTT, which is different from the main arguments advanced by Turing and Church. I finally turn to discuss Robin Gandy’s characterization of machine computation. I suggest that there is an ambiguity regarding the types of machines Gandy was postulating. I offer three interpretations, which differ in their scope and limitations, and conclude that none provides the basis for claiming that Gandy characterized finite machine computation.
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs Toward a theoryof intelligence
, 2003
"... In 1950, Turing suggested that intelligent behavior might require “a departure from the completelydisciplined behavior involved in computation”, but nothing that a digital computer could not do. In this paper, I want to explore Turing’s suggestion byasking what it is, beyond computation, that intell ..."
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In 1950, Turing suggested that intelligent behavior might require “a departure from the completelydisciplined behavior involved in computation”, but nothing that a digital computer could not do. In this paper, I want to explore Turing’s suggestion byasking what it is, beyond computation, that intelligence might require, whyit might require it and what knowing the answers to the rst two questions might do to help us understand arti cial and natural intelligence. c ○ 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs The concept of computability
, 2003
"... I explore the conceptual foundations of Alan Turing’s analysis of computability, which still dominates thinking about computability today. I argue that Turing’s account represents a last vestige of a famous but unsuccessful program in pure mathematics, viz., Hilbert’s formalist program. It is my con ..."
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I explore the conceptual foundations of Alan Turing’s analysis of computability, which still dominates thinking about computability today. I argue that Turing’s account represents a last vestige of a famous but unsuccessful program in pure mathematics, viz., Hilbert’s formalist program. It is my contention that the plausibility of Turing’s account as an analysis of the computational capacities of physical machines rests upon a number of highly problematic assumptions whose plausibility in turn is grounded in the formalist stance towards mathematics. More speci cally, the Turing account con ates concepts that are crucial for understanding the computational capacities of physical machines. These concepts include the idea of an “operation ” or “action ” that is “formal, ” “mechanical, ” “wellde ned, ” and “precisely described, ” and the idea of a “symbol” that is “formal, ” “uninterpreted, ” and “shaped”. When these concepts are disentangled, the intuitive appeal of Turing’s account is signi cantly undermined. This opens the way for exploring models of hypercomputability that are fundamentally di erent from those currently entertained in the literature. c ○ 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.