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14
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
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Cited by 150 (4 self)
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In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments. We use our characterization to design polynomial time truthful mechanisms for several problems in combinatorial optimization to which the celebrated VCG mechanism does not apply. For scheduling related parallel machines (QjjCmax), we give a 3-approximation mechanism based on randomized rounding of the optimal fractional solution. This problem is NP-complete, and the standard approximation algorithms (greedy load-balancing or the PTAS) cannot be used in truthful mechanisms. We show our mechanism to be frugal, in that the total payment needed is only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs incurred by the machines, unless one machine dominates the total processing power. We also give truthful mechanisms for maximum flow, Qjj P Cj (scheduling related machines to minimize the sum of completion times), optimizing an affine function over a fixed set, and special cases of uncapacitated facility location. In addition, for Qjj P wjCj (minimizing the weighted sum of completion times), we prove a lower bound of 2 p 3 for the best approximation ratio achievable by a truthful mechanism.
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
- In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2007
"... For allocation problems with one or more items, the wellknown Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents ’ payments will sum to more than ..."
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Cited by 36 (14 self)
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For allocation problems with one or more items, the wellknown Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents ’ payments will sum to more than 0. If there is an auctioneer who is selling the items, this may be desirable, because the surplus payment corresponds to revenue for the auctioneer. However, if the items do not have an owner and the agents are merely interested in allocating the items efficiently among themselves, any surplus payment is undesirable, because it will have to flow out of the system of agents. In 2006, Cavallo [3] proposed a mechanism that redistributes some of the VCG payment back to the agents, while maintaining efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and the
Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
- In Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 02
, 2002
"... We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenuemaximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction an ..."
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Cited by 33 (6 self)
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We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and revenuemaximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g. that discrete prices are informationally ecient, as well as some surprising properties, e.g. that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones.
Self-interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions
, 2004
"... Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key di#culty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to themselves. game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences trut ..."
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Cited by 23 (11 self)
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Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key di#culty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to themselves. game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully, and a desirable outcome is chosen. In a recently proposed approach---called automated mechanism design---a mechanism is computed for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Unlike the earlier work on automated mechanism design that studied a benevolent designer, in this paper we study automated mechanism design problems where the designer is self-interested. In this case, the center cares only about which outcome is chosen and what payments are made to it. The reason that the agents' preferences are relevant is that the center is constrained to making each agent at least as well o# as the agent would have been had it not participated in the mechanism. In this setting, we show that designing optimal deterministic mechanisms is in two important special cases: when the center is interested only in the payments made to it, and when payments are not possible and the center is interested only in the outcome chosen. We then show how allowing for randomization in the mechanism makes problems in this setting computationally easy. Finally, we show that the payment-maximizing AMD problem is closely related to an interesting variant of the optimal (revenuemaximizing) combinatorial auction design problem, where the bidders have "best-only" preferences. We show that here, too, designing an optimal deterministic auction is NPcomplete, but designin...
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS
, 2008
"... Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources to multiple agents. If agents are selfinterested, they will lie about their valuations for the resources if they perceive this to be in their interest. The well-known VCG mechanism allocates the items efficien ..."
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Cited by 20 (7 self)
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Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources to multiple agents. If agents are selfinterested, they will lie about their valuations for the resources if they perceive this to be in their interest. The well-known VCG mechanism allocates the items efficiently, is incentive compatible (agents have no incentive to lie), and never runs a deficit. Nevertheless, the agents may have to make large payments to a party outside the system of agents, leading to decreased utility for the agents. Recent work has investigated the possibility of redistributing some of the payments back to the agents, without violating the other desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. We study multi-unit auctions with unit demand, for which previously a mechanism has been found that maximizes the worst-case redistribution percentage. In contrast, we assume that a prior distribution over the agents ’ valuations is available, and try to maximize
Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting
- IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (ICEC-03
, 2003
"... The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfu ..."
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Cited by 20 (8 self)
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The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Hence the computational complexity of mechanism design becomes a key issue. In this paper we analyze the single-agent mechanism design problem, whose simplicity allows for elegant and generally applicable results. We show
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
- In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2008
"... For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG payments, w ..."
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Cited by 17 (6 self)
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For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG payments, which reduces the agents ’ utilities. In many settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the agents’ utilities (taking payments into account). For this purpose, several VCG redistribution mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a large fraction of the VCG payments back to the agents, in a way that maintains strategy-proofness and the non-deficit property. Unfortunately, sometimes even the best VCG redistribution mechanism fails to redistribute a substantial fraction of the VCG payments. This results in a low total utility for the agents, even though the items
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
- In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS
, 2008
"... Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) bud ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents ’ payments will sum to more than 0. Very recently, several mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a significant percentage of the VCG payments back to the agents while maintaining the other properties. This increases the agents ’ utilities. One redistribution mechanism dominates another if it always redistributes at least as much to each agent (and sometimes more). In this paper, we provide a characterization of undominated redistribution mechanisms. We also propose several techniques that take a dominated redistribution mechanism as input, and produce as output another redistribution mechanism that dominates the original. One technique immediately produces an undominated redistribution mechanism that is not necessarily anonymous. Another technique preserves anonymity, and repeated application results in an undominated redistribution mechanism in the limit. We show experimentally that these techniques improve the known redistribution mechanisms.
Replica Management Should Be A Game
"... We believe that large-scale replica management solutions should be based on an economic model. In this paper, we discuss the benefits provided by an economic approach and outline important directions for future research. ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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We believe that large-scale replica management solutions should be based on an economic model. In this paper, we discuss the benefits provided by an economic approach and outline important directions for future research.
On-line End-to-End Congestion Control
- IEEE Foundations of Computer Science
, 2002
"... Congestion control in the current Internet is accomplished mainly by TCP/IP. To understand the macroscopic network behavior that results from TCP/IP and similar endto-end protocols, one main analytic technique is to show that the the protocol maximizes some global objective function of the network t ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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Congestion control in the current Internet is accomplished mainly by TCP/IP. To understand the macroscopic network behavior that results from TCP/IP and similar endto-end protocols, one main analytic technique is to show that the the protocol maximizes some global objective function of the network traffic. Here we analyze a particular end-to-end, MIMD (multiplicative-increase, multiplicative-decrease) protocol. We show that if all users of the network use the protocol, and all connections last for at least logarithmically many rounds, then the total weighted throughput (value of all packets received) is near the maximum possible. Our analysis includes round-trip-times, and (in contrast to most previous analyses) gives explicit convergence rates, allows connections to start and stop, and allows capacities to change. 1. Congestion control and optimization Congestion control in the current Internet is accomplished mainly by TCP/IP — 90 % of Internet traffic is TCP-based [41]. Meanwhile the design and analysis of TCP and other end-to-end congestion-control protocols are only partially understood and are becoming the subject of increasing attention [25, 28]. One main analytic technique is to interpret the protocol as solving some underlying combinatorial optimization problem on the network — to show that the protocol causes the traffic distribution, over time, to optimize some global objective function

