~ ROA Version, 8/2002. Essentially identical to the Tech Report, with new pagination (but the same footnote and example numbering); correction of typos, oversights & outright errors; improved typography; and occasional small-scale clarificatory rewordings. Citation should include reference to this version.

The rich person-to-person interaction afforded by shared physical workspaces allows people to maintain up-to-the minute knowledge about others ’ interaction with the workspace. This knowledge is workspace awareness, part of the glue that allows groups to collaborate effectively. In real-time groupware systems that provide a shared virtual workspace, the possibilities for interaction are impoverished when compared with physical workspaces, partly because support for workspace awareness has not generally been a priority in groupware design. In this paper, we present the concept of workspace awareness as one key to supporting the richness evident in face-to-face interaction. We construct a conceptual framework that describes the elements and mechanisms of workspace awareness, and then show several widgets that can be embedded in relaxed-WYSIWIS groupware systems to support the maintenance of workspace awareness.

Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the

This paper is an attempt at understanding the issue of consciousness through investigating its functional role, especially in learning, and through devising hybrid neural network models that (in a qualitative manner) approximate characteristics of human consciousness. In so doing, the paper examines explicit and implicit learning in a variety of psychological experiments and delineates the conscious/unconscious distinction in terms of the two types of learning and their respective products. The distinctions are captured in a two-level action-based model Clarion. Some fundamental theoretical issues are also clarified with the help of the model. Comparisons with existing models of consciousness are made to accentuate the present approach. KEYWORDS: Neural networks, hybrid systems, consciousness, implicit learning, reinforcement learning, procedural knowledge, rule extraction, dual representation 1 INTRODUCTION 3 1 Introduction Amidst the widespread enthusiasm of recent years concerning...

This paper draws on the generative literature in phonological acquisition, as well as on the work of phoneticians and psycholinguists, in an attempt to propose a unified view of the acquisition of phonological competence. We start with an examination of the Optimality Theoretic (OT) account of the well-known comprehension/production dilemma in child language presented in Smolensky (1996ab, henceforth S). We will argue that S's model encounters two serious difficulties --- the first concerning his proposed parsing algorithm and the second concerning the issue of the learnability of underlying forms. We offer alternative parsing algorithms and examine their implications for learnability and the initial ranking of OT constraints. Finally, we propose, based on evidence from a variety of sources, that the resolution of the comprehension /production dilemma lies not in phonological domain (linguistic competence), but rather in the domain of implementation of linguistic knowledge (performance). With a revision of certain aspects of the OT model for children's phonologies and of learnability theory in phonology, the paper attempts to contribute both to research on OT and to the study of phonological acquisition generally. It is not our aim here to argue for or against OT approaches to phonology. We will not hesitate, however, to point out flaws in the application of OT in the current literature. We hope that the improvements in the application of OT which we propose, as well as mention of points in which the theory seems to fare worse than alternative approaches, will lead to the kind of progress in the fields of phonology and acquisition that transcends the provinciality of particular frameworks.

Abstract (Long) When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in

A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there’s something it’s like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it’s like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren’t something it’s like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. The second argument uses what I call “minimal pair” experiences—sentences read without and with understanding—to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objects are considered and rebutted.

Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not—and should not be—absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others. Memory is a gift of nature, the ability of living organisms to retain and to utilize acquired information or knowledge.... Owners of biological memory systems are capable of behaving more appropriately at a later time because of their experiences at an earlier time, a feat not possible for organisms without memory. (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751) If there is one proposition on which all psychologists seem to

The article first addresses the importance of cognitive modeling, in terms of its value to cognitive science (as well as other social and behavioral sciences). In particular, it emphasizes the use of cognitive architectures in this undertaking. Based on this approach, the article addresses, in detail, the idea of a multi-level approach that ranges from social to neural levels. In physical sciences, a rigorous set of theories is a hierarchy of descriptions/explanations, in which causal relationships among entities at a high level can be reduced to causal relationships among simpler entities at a more detailed level. We argue that a similar hierarchy makes possible an equally productive approach toward cognitive modeling. The levels of models that we conceive in relation to cognition include, at the highest level, sociological/anthropological models of collective human behavior, behavioral models of individual performance, cognitive models involving detailed mechanisms, representations, and processes, as well as biological/physiological models of neural circuits, brain regions, and other detailed biological processes.

The automated understanding and generation of music is an area of research that raises problems that are central to the Artificial Intelligence enterprise. Recent work at Edinburgh has aimed to use a symbolic AI approach for this field. We indicate how a more abstract understanding of music representation unifies this approach, and how logical descriptions of hierarchical structures can be incorporated. We relate this work to alternative approaches, describe some projects carried out in this framework, and indicate planned future work. Keywords: Key; Knowledge Representation; Structured Hierarchy; Abstract Data Type. 1 Introduction : : : les calculs n'ont cess'e d'accompagner la musique tout au long de son histoire, et dans toutes les civilisations : : : ([Boulez 85, p 73]) Musicians have an intuitive awareness of the depth of possibilities of musical structure, and how these structures can be manipulated to create new forms of musical understanding. At first sight, compu...