This paper proposes an operational semantics for value recursion in the context of monadic metalanguages. Our technique for combining value recursion with computational effects works uniformly for all monads. The operational nature of our approach is related to the implementation of recursion in Scheme and its monadic version proposed by Friedman and Sabry, but it defines a different semantics and does not rely on assignments. When contrasted to the axiomatic approach proposed by Erkök and Launchbury, our semantics for the continuation monad invalidates one of the axioms, adding to the evidence that this axiom is problematic in the presence of continuations. 1

Monads are by now well-established as programming construct in functional languages. Recently, the notion of “Arrow ” was introduced by Hughes as an extension, not with one, but with two type parameters. At first, these Arrows may look somewhat arbitrary. Here we show that they are categorically fairly civilised, by showing that they correspond to monoids in suitable subcategories of bifunctors C op ×C → C. This shows that, at a suitable level of abstraction, arrows are like monads — which are monoids in categories of functors C → C. Freyd categories have been introduced by Power and Robinson to model computational effects, well before Hughes ’ Arrows appeared. It is often claimed (informally) that Arrows are simply Freyd categories. We shall make this claim precise by showing how monoids in categories of bifunctors exactly correspond to Freyd categories.

”An equilibrium does not appear because agents are rational, but rather agents appear to be rational because an equilibrium has been reached.[...] The task for game theory is to formulate a notion of rationality.” Larry Samuelson [20, p. 3] Abstract. Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and with the environment. Rational behaviors are achieved not only through conscious reasoning, but also through spontaneous stabilization at equilibrium points. Formal theories of rationality are usually guided by informal intuitions, which are acquired by observing some concrete economic, biological, or network processes. Treating such processes as instances of computation, we reconstruct and refine some basic notions of equilibrium and rationality from the some basic structures of computation. It is, of course, well known that equilibria arise as fixed points; the point is that semantics of computation of fixed points seems to be providing novel methods, algebraic and coalgebraic, for reasoning about them. 1