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We study the strategy of bundling a large number of information goods, such as those increasingly available on the Internet, and selling them for a fixed price. We analyze the optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist, and we find that bundling very large numbers of unrelated information goods can be surprisingly profitable. The reason is that the law of large numbers makes it much easier to predict consumers ’ valuations for a bundle of goods than their valuations for the individual goods when sold separately. As a result, this “predictive value of bundling ” makes it possible to achieve greater sales, greater economic efficiency, and greater profits per good from a bundle of information goods than can be attained when the same goods are sold separately. Our main results do not extend to most physical goods, as the marginal costs of production for goods not used by the buyer typically negate any benefits from the predictive value of large-scale bundling. While determining optimal bundling strategies for more than two goods is a notoriously difficult problem, we use statistical techniques to provide strong asymptotic results and bounds on profits for bundles of any arbitrary size. We show how our model can be used to analyze the bundling of complements and substitutes, bundling in the presence of budget

Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board ”. Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and enduser surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner. 1

Information goods have negligible marginal costs, and this will create possibilities for novel distribution and pricing methods. The main concern of this paper is with pricing of goods that are likely to be consumed in large quantities by individuals. For example, will software continue to be sold at a fixed price for each unit, or will it be paid for on the basis of usage? There is substantial evidence both from observing marketplace evolution and from surveys that customers overwhelmingly prefer subscription pricing. It turns out that even if we ignore this factor, peruse pricing is not a clear winner, and therefore when the preference effect is taken into account, subscription pricing is likely to dominate. We model competitive pricing between two companies that supply essentially equivalent services (such as movies or word processing software). One company charges a fixed fee per unit, while the other charges on a per-use basis. Each is interested in maximizing its revenue. We cons...

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We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents ’ information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner’s “revenue ” among all efficient mechanisms. This result is then used to study multiple object auctions in situations where bidders have privately known “demand curves” and extended to include situations with complementarities across objects or externalities across bidders. We also illustrate how the main result may be used to analyze the possibility of allocating both private and public goods ef-Þciently when budget balance considerations are important. The generalized VCG mechanism, therefore, serves to unify many results in mechansim design theory. 1

This paper presents estimates of the customer-level demand for electricity by industrial and commercial customers purchasing electricity according to the half-hourly energy prices from the England and Wales (E&W) electricity market. These customers also face the possibility of a demand charge on its electricity consumption during the three half-hour periods that are coincident with E&W system peaks. Although energy charges are largely known by 4 PM the day prior to consumption, a fraction of the energy charge and the identity of the half-hour periods when demand charges occur are only known with certainty ex post of consumption. Four years of data from a Regional Electricity Company (REC) in the United Kingdom is used to quantify the half-hourly customer-level demands under this real-time pricing program. The econometric model developed and estimated here quantifies the extent of intertemporal substitution in electricity consumption across pricing periods within the day due to changes ...

this paper.

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible. For a general set of customer characteristics, it is shown that in the presence of contract administration costs, offering fixed-fee pricing in addition to a non-linear usage-based pricing scheme is always profit- improving, and there may be markets in which a pure fixed-fee is optimal. Moreover, it is proved that the optimal usage-based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed- fee. These results imply that the optimal pricing strategy is never fully revealing. A procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed-fee and non-linear usage-based contracts is presented.

Firms that practice second-degree price discrimination may intentionally distort product characteristics away from their efficient levels (e.g., the small version of a product is “too small.”) This paper offers the first empirical study of this product design issue. Using data from a specialty coffee market, I estimate a structural utility model that allows for consumer screening under vertical preference heterogeneity. Comparisons of cost data and the estimated benefits from changing product characteristics suggest that some of the central predictions of nonlinear pricing theory are realized in the observed market. Product design distortions are relatively large for drinks that are not the most pro…table but over which the firms hold market power. The estimated distortions decrease toward zero for the products with the highest price-cost margins; this result provides empirical support for the “no distortion at the top” prediction from theory.