Abstract not found

Lagrange multipliers used to be viewed as auxiliary variables introduced in a problem of constrained minimization in order to write first-order optimality conditions formally as a system of equations. Modern applications, with their emphasis on numerical methods and more complicated side conditions than equations, have demanded deeper understanding of the concept and how it fits into a larger theoretical picture. A major line of research has been the nonsmooth geometry of one-sided tangent and normal vectors to the set of points satisfying the given constraints. Another has been the game-theoretic role of multiplier vectors as solutions to a dual problem. Interpretations as generalized derivatives of the optimal value with respect to problem parameters have also been explored. Lagrange multipliers are now being seen as arising from a general rule for the subdifferentiation of a nonsmooth objective function which allows black-and-white constraints to be replaced by penalty expressions. This paper traces such themes in the current theory of Lagrange multipliers, providing along the way a freestanding exposition of basic nonsmooth analysis as motivated by and applied to this subject.

In multiagent systems, strategic settings are often analyzed under the assumption that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. However, this model is not always realistic. In many settings, one player is able to commit to a strategy before the other player makes a decision. Such models are synonymously referred to as leadership, commitment, or Stackelberg models, and optimal play in such models is often significantly different from optimal play in the model where strategies are selected simultaneously. The recent surge in interest in computing game-theoretic solutions has so far ignored leadership models (with the exception of the interest in mechanism design, where the designer is implicitly in a leadership position). In this paper, we study how to compute optimal strategies to commit to under both commitment to pure strategies and commitment to mixed strategies, in both normal-form and Bayesian games. We give both positive results (efficient algorithms) and negative results (NP-hardness results).

We construct a stream-cipher SC whose implementation is secure even if a bounded amount of arbitrary (adaptively, adversarially chosen) information about the internal state of SC is leaked during computation of each output block. This captures all possible side-channel attacks on SC where (1) the amount of information leaked in a given period is bounded, but overall can be arbitrary large and (2) “only computation leaks information”. The construction is based on alternating extraction (used in the intrusion-resilient secret-sharing scheme from FOCS’07). We move this concept to the computational setting by proving a lemma that states that the output of any pseudorandom generator (PRG) has high HILL pseudoentropy (i.e. is indistinguishable from some distribution with high min-entropy) even if arbitrary information about the seed is leaked. The amount of leakage λ that we can tolerate in each step depends on the strength of the underlying PRG, it is at least logarithmic, but can be as large as a constant fraction of the internal state of SC if the PRG is exponentially hard. 1.

We consider concurrent two-player games with reachability objectives. In such games, at each round, player 1 and player 2 independently and simultaneously choose moves, and the two choices determine the next state of the game. The objective of player 1 is to reach a set of target states; the objective of player 2 is to prevent this. These are zero-sum games, and the reachability objective is one of the most basic objectives: determining the set of states from which player 1 can win the game is a fundamental problem in control theory and system verification. There are three types of winning states, according to the degree of certainty with which player 1 can reach the target. From type-1 states, player 1 has a deterministic strategy to always reach the target. From type-2 states, player 1 has a randomized strategy to reach the target with probability 1. From type-3 states, player 1 has for every real ε> 0 a randomized strategy to reach the target with probability greater than 1 − ε. We show that for finite state spaces, all three sets of winning states can be computed in polynomial time: type-1 states in linear time, and type-2 and type-3 states in quadratic time. The algorithms to compute the three sets of winning states also enable the construction of the winning and spoiling strategies.

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). While not every two-person zero-sum finite game has an equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always an equilibrium at which each player follows a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy deviating from the equilibrium strategy cannot increase a player's expected payoff. We show by example, however, that a player who implements a quantum strategy can increase his expected payoff, and explain the relation to efficient quantum algorithms. 1998 Physics and Astronomy Classification Scheme: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Lx, 02.50.Le. American Mathematical Society Subject Classification: 81P15, 90D05. Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C72. Key Words: quantum computation; game theory. Quantum strategies David A. Meyer Attention to the physical representation of information underlies the recent t...

AdaBoost produces a linear combination of base hypotheses and predicts with the sign of this linear combination. It has been observed that the generalization error of the algorithm continues to improve even after all examples are classified correctly by the current signed linear combination, which can be viewed as hyperplane in feature space where the base hypotheses form the features.

We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. Our result, building upon the work of Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou on the complexity of four-player Nash equilibria [21], settles a long standing open problem in algorithmic game theory. It also serves as a starting point for a series of results concerning the complexity of two-player Nash equilibria. In particular, we prove the following theorems: • Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time. • The smoothed complexity of the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm and, in fact, of any algorithm for Bimatrix is not polynomial unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in randomized polynomial time. Our results also have a complexity implication in mathematical economics: • Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute.

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Rock–Scissors–Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.

John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context, to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory.