In the 1940s, two different views of the brain and the computer were equally important. One was the analog technology and theory that had emerged before the war. The other was the digital technology and theory that was to become the main paradigm of computation. 1 The outcome of the contest between these two competing views derived from technological and epistemological arguments. While digital technology was improving dramatically, the technology of analog machines had already reached a significant level of development. In particular, digital technology offered a more effective way to control the precision of calculations. But the epistemological discussion was, at the time, equally relevant. For the supporters of the analog computer, the digital model — which can only process information transformed and coded in binary — wouldn’t be suitable to represent certain kinds of continuous variation that help determine brain functions. With analog machines, on the contrary, there would be few or no layers between natural objects and the work and structure of computation (cf. [4, 1]). The 1942–52 Macy Conferences in cybernetics helped to validate digital theory and logic as legitimate ways to think about the brain and the machine [4]. In particular, those conferences helped made McCulloch-Pitts ’ digital model