Abstract. Ever since Alan Turing gave us a machine model of algorithmic computation, there have been questions about how widely it is applicable (some asked by Turing himself). Although the computer on our desk can be viewed in isolation as a Universal Turing Machine, there are many examples in nature of what looks like computation, but for which there is no well-understood model. In many areas, we have to come to terms with emergence not being clearly algorithmic. The positive side of this is the growth of new computational paradigms based on metaphors for natural phenomena, and the devising of very informative computer simulations got from copying nature. This talk is concerned with general questions such as: • Can natural computation, in its various forms, provide us with genuinely new ways of computing? • To what extent can natural processes be captured computationally? • Is there a universal model underlying these new paradigms?

In dealing with emergent phenomena, a common task is to identify useful descriptions of them in terms of the underlying atomic processes, and to extract enough computational content from these descriptions to enable predictions to be made. Generally, the underlying atomic processes are quite well understood, and (with important exceptions) captured by mathematics from which it is relatively easy to extract algorithmic content. A widespread view is that the difficulty in describing transitions from algorithmic activity to the emergence associated with chaotic situations is a simple case of complexity outstripping computational resources and human ingenuity. Or, on the other hand, that phenomena transcending the standard Turing model of computation, if they exist, must necessarily lie outside the domain of classical computability theory. In this talk we suggest that much of the current confusion arises from conceptual gaps and the lack of a suitably fundamental model within which to situate emergence. We examine the potential for placing emergent relations in a familiar context based on Turing’s 1939 model for interactive computation over structures described in terms of reals. The explanatory power of this model is explored, formalising informal descriptions in terms of mathematical definability and invariance, and relating a range of basic scientific puzzles to results and intractable problems in computability theory. In this talk