Results 1  10
of
92
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
, 1976
"... This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of ..."
Abstract

Cited by 898 (5 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.
Separation of ownership and control
 Journal of Finance
, 1983
"... This paper analyzes the survival of organizations in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the literature on large corporations calls separation of “ownership ” and “control.” Such separation of decision and risk bearing functions is a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 524 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper analyzes the survival of organizations in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the literature on large corporations calls separation of “ownership ” and “control.” Such separation of decision and risk bearing functions is also common to organizations like large professional partnerships, financial mutuals and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling the implied agency problems. In particular, the contract structures of all these organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from the initiation and implementation of the decisions.
Nonparametric Estimation of StatePrice Densities Implicit In Financial Asset Prices
 JOURNAL OF FINANCE
, 1997
"... Implicit in the prices of traded financial assets are ArrowDebreu prices or, with continuous states, the stateprice density (SPD). We construct a nonparametric estimator for the SPD implicit in option prices and derive its asymptotic sampling theory. This estimator provides an arbitragefree metho ..."
Abstract

Cited by 192 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Implicit in the prices of traded financial assets are ArrowDebreu prices or, with continuous states, the stateprice density (SPD). We construct a nonparametric estimator for the SPD implicit in option prices and derive its asymptotic sampling theory. This estimator provides an arbitragefree method of pricing new, complex, or illiquid securities while capturing those features of the data that are most relevant from an assetpricing perspective, e.g., negative skewness and excess kurtosis for asset returns, volatility "smiles" for option prices. We perform Monte Carlo experiments and extract the SPD from actual S&P 500 option prices.
Empirical pricing kernels
, 2001
"... This paper investigates the empirical characteristics of investor risk aversion over equity return states by estimating a timevarying pricing kernel, which we call the empirical pricing kernel (EPK). We estimate the EPK on a monthly basis from 1991 to 1995, using S&P 500 index option data and a sto ..."
Abstract

Cited by 70 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper investigates the empirical characteristics of investor risk aversion over equity return states by estimating a timevarying pricing kernel, which we call the empirical pricing kernel (EPK). We estimate the EPK on a monthly basis from 1991 to 1995, using S&P 500 index option data and a stochastic volatility model for the S&P 500 return process. We find that the EPK exhibits countercyclical risk aversion over S&P 500 return states. We also find that hedging performance is significantly improved when we use hedge ratios based the EPK rather than a timeinvariant pricing kernel.
LifeCycle Economies and Aggregate Fluctuations
, 1995
"... Do the implications for business cycle issues change when we switch from studying infinitely lived, representativeagent models to more sophisticated demographic structures with finitely lived agents? This article addresses that question by using a large, overlappinggenerations model that is cal ..."
Abstract

Cited by 57 (7 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Do the implications for business cycle issues change when we switch from studying infinitely lived, representativeagent models to more sophisticated demographic structures with finitely lived agents? This article addresses that question by using a large, overlappinggenerations model that is calibrated to U.S. demographic properties, microeconomic evidence, and National Income and Product Accounts. The finding is that the answers obtained are basically the same for the two kinds of models. The article also explores the relative volatility of hours across age groups, an issue that cannot be addressed by using the infinitely lived, representativeagent abstraction. P.O. Box 291, Minneapolis, MN 554800291, U.S.A. vr0j@tom.mpls.frb.fed.us. Parts of this research have been funded by the National Science Foundation. Some of the material in this article is from the second chapter of my dissertation. The help and patience of Ed Prescott and Finn Kydland are acknowledged. Thanks als...
Implicit Contracts: A Survey
 Journal of Economic Literature
, 1985
"... Implicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms. Incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets: otherwise, contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by co ..."
Abstract

Cited by 55 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Implicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms. Incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets: otherwise, contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction. There is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory. Contracts smooth consumption, but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances, because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks. This result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis. However, the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different. Contracts embody a nonlinear two—part pricing scheme. The lump sum part allocates the income—consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization. This implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects "flexible, " though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearance of rigidity. Furthermore, the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation. Indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work—sharing and layoffs. Contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context.
Betting BooleanStyle: A Framework for Trading in Securities Based on Logical Formulas
, 2003
"... We develop a framework for trading in compound securities: financial instruments that pay off contingent on the outcomes of arbitrary statements in propositional logic. Buying or selling securities  which can be thought of as betting on or against a particular future outcome  allows agents both ..."
Abstract

Cited by 30 (17 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We develop a framework for trading in compound securities: financial instruments that pay off contingent on the outcomes of arbitrary statements in propositional logic. Buying or selling securities  which can be thought of as betting on or against a particular future outcome  allows agents both to hedge risk and to profit (in expectation) on subjective predictions. A compound securities market allows agents to place bets on arbitrary boolean combinations of events, enabling them to more closely achieve their optimal risk exposure, and enabling the market as a whole to more closely achieve the social optimum. The tradeoff for allowing such expressivity is in the complexity of the agents' and auctioneer's optimization problems.
Betting on permutations
 In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
, 2007
"... We consider a permutation betting scenario, where people wager on the final ordering of n candidates: for example, the outcome of a horse race. We examine the auctioneer problem of risklessly matching up wagers or, equivalently, finding arbitrage opportunities among the proposed wagers. Requiring bi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 27 (19 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We consider a permutation betting scenario, where people wager on the final ordering of n candidates: for example, the outcome of a horse race. We examine the auctioneer problem of risklessly matching up wagers or, equivalently, finding arbitrage opportunities among the proposed wagers. Requiring bidders to explicitly list the orderings that they’d like to bet on is both unnatural and intractable, because the number of orderings is n! and the number of subsets of orderings is 2 n!. We propose two expressive betting languages that seem natural for bidders, and examine the computational complexity of the auctioneer problem in each case. Subset betting allows traders to bet either that a candidate will end up ranked among some subset of positions in the final ordering, for example, “horse A will finish in positions 4, 9, or 1321”, or that a position will be taken by some subset of candidates, for example “horse A, B, or D will finish in position 2”. For subset betting, we show that the auctioneer problem can be solved in polynomial time if orders are divisible. Pair betting allows traders to bet on whether one candidate will end up ranked higher than another candidate, for example “horse A will beat horse B”. We prove that the auctioneer problem becomes NPhard for pair betting. We identify a sufficient condition for the existence of a pair betting match that can be verified in polynomial time. We also show that a natural greedy algorithm gives a poor approximation for indivisible orders.
Computation in a Distributed Information Market
, 2003
"... According to economic theory, supported by empirical and laboratory evidence, the equilibrium price of a financial security reflects all of the information regarding the security's value. We investigate the dynamics of the computational process on the path toward equilibrium, where information dis ..."
Abstract

Cited by 21 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
According to economic theory, supported by empirical and laboratory evidence, the equilibrium price of a financial security reflects all of the information regarding the security's value. We investigate the dynamics of the computational process on the path toward equilibrium, where information distributed among traders is revealed stepby step over time and incorporated into the market price. We develop a simplified model of an information market, along with trading strategies, in order to formalize the computational properties of the process. We show that securities whose payoffs cannot be expressed as a weighted threshold function of distributed input bits are not guaranteed to converge to the proper equilibrium predicted by economic theory. On the other hand, securities whose payoffs are threshold functions are guaranteed to converge, for all prior probability distributions. Moreover, these threshold securities converge in at most n rounds, where n is the number of bits of distributed information. We also prove a lower bound, showing a type of threshold security that requires at least n/2 rounds to converge in the worst case.