Exchange rate regime optimality, as well as monetary policy effectiveness, depends on the tightness of the link between exchange rate movements and import prices. Recent debates hinge on whether producer-currency-pricing (PCP) or local currency pricing (LCP) of imports is more prevalent, and on whether exchange rate passthrough rates are endogenous to a country’s macroeconomic conditions. We provide cross-country and time series evidence on both of these issues for the imports of twenty-five OECD countries. Across the OECD and especially within manufacturing industries, there is compelling evidence of partial pass-through in the short-run– rejecting both PCP and LCP. Over the long run, PCP is more prevalent for many types of imported goods. Higher inflation and exchange rate volatility are weakly associated with higher pass-through of exchange rates into import prices. However, for OECD countries, the most important determinants of changes in pass-through over time are microeconomic and relate to the industry composition of a country’s import bundle.

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To update a famous old statistic: a political leader in a developing country is twice as likely to lose office in the 6 months following a currency crash as otherwise. This difference, which is highly significant statistically, holds regardless whether the devaluation takes place in the context of an IMF program. Why are devaluations so costly? Many of the currency crises of the last ten years have been associated with output loss. Is this, as alleged, because of excessive reliance on raising the interest rate as a policy response? More likely it is because of contractionary effects of devaluation. There are various possible contractionary effects of devaluation, but it is appropriate that the balance sheet effect receives the most emphasis. Passthrough from exchange rate changes to import prices in developing countries is not the problem: this coefficient fell in the 1990s, as a look at some narrowly defined products shows. Rather, balance sheets are the problem. How can countries mitigate the fall in output resulting from the balance sheet effect in crises? In the shorter term, adjusting promptly after inflows cease is better than procrastinating by shifting to short-term dollar debt, which raises the costliness of the devaluation when it finally comes. In the longer term, greater openness to trade reduces vulnerability to both sudden stops and currency crashes.

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For decades, the exchange rate was at the center of macroeconomic policy debates in emerging markets. Many countries used the nominal exchange rate to bring down inflation; –others—mostly in Latin America—used the exchange rate to implicitly tax the export sector. 1 Currency crises were common and usually resulted from acute real exchange rate overvaluation. In the 1990s, academics and policymakers debated the merits of alternative exchange rate regimes for emerging economies. Many authors drew on credibility-based theories to argue that developing and transition countries should have hard peg regimes, preferably currency boards or dollarization. One of the main arguments in favor of rigid exchange rate regimes was that emerging economies exhibited a fear of floating. 2 After the currency crashes of the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, a growing number of emerging economies moved away from exchange rate rigidity and adopted a combination of flexible exchange rates and inflation targeting. Because of this move, the exchange rate I benefited from discussions with John Taylor and Ed Leamer. I thank Roberto Álvarez for his help and support. I am grateful to Andrea Tokman and Edi Hochreiter for helpful comments. 1. Argentina is perhaps the best example of a country that has used the nominal exchange rate to achieve alternative policy objectives. In the 1960s and 1970s, the real exchange rate was deliberately kept at an overvalued level to implicitly tax the agriculture sector (Díaz-Alejandro, 1970). In the early 1980s, the exchange rate was devalued at a slow, predefined rate to bring down inflation; this was the so-called tablita episode. In the 1990s, Argentina had a fixed exchange rate and a currency board. For a historical view of Argentina’s exchange rate policies, see Della Paolera

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Exchange rate fluctuations remain remarkably large, despite the steady decline in the volatility of the trade-weighted dollar since the late 1980s. Yet large fluctuations in the value of the dollar do not translate into similarly large swings in the domestic production of traded goods relative to foreign. The reason lies mainly in the fact that the prices of imported goods do not usually respond one-for-one to changes in the exchange rate. The extent and pervasiveness of such a phenomenon, often labeled as incomplete “pass-through ” of exchange rates to import prices, has long been debated in academic and policy circles. From a macroeconomic standpoint, knowing how much of a change in the exchange rate is passed through to import prices is important for assessing the effects of changes in currency value on both the balance of payments and domestic inflation. Of particular interest is whether the devaluation of a nation’s currency would improve its external balance. From an imports perspective, this amounts to asking what portion of the

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. iii