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Logical Models of Argument
 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS
, 2000
"... Logical models of argument formalize commonsense reasoning while taking process and computation seriously. This survey discusses the main ideas which characterize different logical models of argument. It presents the formal features of a few main approaches to the modeling of argumentation. We trace ..."
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Cited by 144 (33 self)
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Logical models of argument formalize commonsense reasoning while taking process and computation seriously. This survey discusses the main ideas which characterize different logical models of argument. It presents the formal features of a few main approaches to the modeling of argumentation. We trace the
Uncertainty, Belief, and Probability
 Computational Intelligence
, 1989
"... : We introduce a new probabilistic approach to dealing with uncertainty, based on the observation that probability theory does not require that every event be assigned a probability. For a nonmeasurable event (one to which we do not assign a probability), we can talk about only the inner measure and ..."
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Cited by 46 (2 self)
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: We introduce a new probabilistic approach to dealing with uncertainty, based on the observation that probability theory does not require that every event be assigned a probability. For a nonmeasurable event (one to which we do not assign a probability), we can talk about only the inner measure and outer measure of the event. In addition to removing the requirement that every event be assigned a probability, our approach circumvents other criticisms of probabilitybased approaches to uncertainty. For example, the measure of belief in an event turns out to be represented by an interval (defined by the inner and outer measure), rather than by a single number. Further, this approach allows us to assign a belief (inner measure) to an event E without committing to a belief about its negation :E (since the inner measure of an event plus the inner measure of its negation is not necessarily one). Interestingly enough, inner measures induced by probability measures turn out to correspond in a ...
Statistical Foundations for Default Reasoning
, 1993
"... We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible worlds. We interpret default rules as extreme statistical statements, thus obtaining a knowledge base KB comprised of statistical and firstorder statements. We then assign equal probability to all w ..."
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Cited by 45 (8 self)
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We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indifference among possible worlds. We interpret default rules as extreme statistical statements, thus obtaining a knowledge base KB comprised of statistical and firstorder statements. We then assign equal probability to all worlds consistent with KB in order to assign a degree of belief to a statement '. The degree of belief can be used to decide whether to defeasibly conclude '. Various natural patterns of reasoning, such as a preference for more specific defaults, indifference to irrelevant information, and the ability to combine independent pieces of evidence, turn out to follow naturally from this technique. Furthermore, our approach is not restricted to default reasoning; it supports a spectrum of reasoning, from quantitative to qualitative. It is also related to other systems for default reasoning. In particular, we show that the work of [ Goldszmidt et al., 1990 ] , which applies maximum entropy ideas t...
From Statistics to Beliefs
, 1992
"... An intelligent agent uses known facts, including statistical knowledge, to assign degrees of belief to assertions it is uncertain about. We investigate three principled techniques for doing this. All three are applications of the principle of indifference, because they assign equal degree of belief ..."
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Cited by 43 (12 self)
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An intelligent agent uses known facts, including statistical knowledge, to assign degrees of belief to assertions it is uncertain about. We investigate three principled techniques for doing this. All three are applications of the principle of indifference, because they assign equal degree of belief to all basic "situations " consistent with the knowledge base. They differ because there are competing intuitions about what the basic situations are. Various natural patterns of reasoning, such as the preference for the most specific statistical data available, turn out to follow from some or all of the techniques. This is an improvement over earlier theories, such as work on direct inference and reference classes, which arbitrarily postulate these patterns without offering any deeper explanations or guarantees of consistency. The three methods we investigate have surprising characterizations: there are connections to the principle of maximum entropy, a principle of maximal independence, an...
Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability
 Int. J. Approx. Reasoning
, 2000
"... Belief functions, possibility measures and Choquet capacities of order 2, which are special kinds of coherent upper or lower probability, are amongst the most popular mathematical models for uncertainty and partial ignorance. I give examples to show that these models are not sufficiently general to ..."
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Cited by 40 (0 self)
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Belief functions, possibility measures and Choquet capacities of order 2, which are special kinds of coherent upper or lower probability, are amongst the most popular mathematical models for uncertainty and partial ignorance. I give examples to show that these models are not sufficiently general to represent some common types of uncertainty. Coherent lower previsions and sets of probability measures are considerably more general but they may not be sufficiently informative for some purposes. I discuss two other models for uncertainty, involving sets of desirable gambles and partial preference orderings. These are more informative and more general than the previous models, and they may provide a suitable mathematical setting for a unified theory of imprecise probability.
Dilation for sets of probabilities
 The Annals of Statictics
, 1993
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
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Cited by 28 (0 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
Theoretical Foundations for AbstractionBased Probabilistic Planning
 In Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
, 1996
"... ionBased Probabilistic Planning Vu Ha Peter Haddawy Department of EE & CS University of WisconsinMilwaukee fvu, haddawyg@cs.uwm.edu Abstract Modeling worlds and actions under uncertainty is one of the central problems in the framework of decisiontheoretic planning. The representation must be ..."
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Cited by 27 (3 self)
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ionBased Probabilistic Planning Vu Ha Peter Haddawy Department of EE & CS University of WisconsinMilwaukee fvu, haddawyg@cs.uwm.edu Abstract Modeling worlds and actions under uncertainty is one of the central problems in the framework of decisiontheoretic planning. The representation must be general enough to capture realworld problems but at the same time it must provide a basis upon which theoretical results can be derived. The central notion in the framework we propose here is that of the affineoperator, which serves as a tool for constructing (convex) sets of probability distributions, and which can be considered as a generalization of belief functions and interval mass assignments. Uncertainty in the state of the worlds is modeled with sets of probability distributions, represented by affinetrees, while actions are defined as treemanipulators. A small set of key properties of the affineoperator is presented, forming the basis for most existing operatorbased definitio...
Defeasible reasoning with variable degrees of justification
 Artificial Intelligence
, 2002
"... The question addressed in this paper is how the degree of justification of a belief is determined. A conclusion may be supported by several different arguments, the arguments typically being defeasible, and there may also be arguments of varying strengths for defeaters for some of the supporting arg ..."
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Cited by 23 (1 self)
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The question addressed in this paper is how the degree of justification of a belief is determined. A conclusion may be supported by several different arguments, the arguments typically being defeasible, and there may also be arguments of varying strengths for defeaters for some of the supporting arguments. What is sought is a way of computing the “on sum ” degree of justification of a conclusion in terms of the degrees of justification of all relevant premises and the strengths of all relevant reasons. I have in the past defended various principles pertaining to this problem. In this paper I reaffirm some of those principles but propose a significantly different final analysis. Specifically, I endorse the weakest link principle for the computation of argument strengths. According to this principle the degree of justification an argument confers on its conclusion in the absence of other relevant arguments is the minimum of the degrees of justification of its premises and the strengths of the reasons employed in the argument. I reaffirm my earlier rejection of the accrual of reasons, according to which two arguments for a conclusion can result in a higher degree of justification than either argument by itself. This paper diverges from my earlier theory mainly in its treatment of defeaters.
IntervalValued Probabilities
, 1998
"... 0 =h 0 in the diagram. The sawtooth line reflects the fact that even when the principle of indifference can be applied, there may be arguments whose strength can be bounded no more precisely than by an adjacent pair of indifference arguments. Note that a=h in the diagram is bounded numerically on ..."
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Cited by 21 (1 self)
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0 =h 0 in the diagram. The sawtooth line reflects the fact that even when the principle of indifference can be applied, there may be arguments whose strength can be bounded no more precisely than by an adjacent pair of indifference arguments. Note that a=h in the diagram is bounded numerically only by 0.0 and the strength of a 00 =h 00 . Keynes' ideas were taken up by B. O. Koopman [14, 15, 16], who provided an axiomatization for Keynes' probability values. The axioms are qualitative, and reflect what Keynes said about probability judgment. (It should be remembered that for Keynes probability judgment was intended to be objective in the sense that logic is objective. Although different people may accept different premises, whether or not a conclusion follows logically from a given set of premises is objective. Though Ramsey [26] attacked this aspect of Keynes' theory, it can be argued