Abstract not found

dynamic task switching

Children often perseverate, repeating prior behaviors when inappropriate. This work tested the roles of verbal labels and stimulus novelty in such perseveration. Three-year-old children sorted cards by one rule and were then instructed to switch to a second rule. In a basic condition, cards had familiar shapes and colors and both rules were stated explicitly. In an uninformative-label condition, cards had familiar shapes and colors, but the first rule was not stated explicitly. In a novel-stimuli condition, both rules were stated explicitly but stimuli were novel on the first sorting dimension. More children switched to the second rule in the uninformative-label and novel-stimuli conditions than in the basic condition. Implications for theories of cognitive flexibility are discussed. At one time or another, everyone engages in perseverative behaviorFrepeating an old behavior when it is not appropriate. Some people may continue to look in their pockets for their keys, even though they have already searched there. Others may repeatedly generate the same incorrect word for an item in a crossword puzzle.

Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theories with domaingeneral statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, the authors presented preschoolers with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard 2 stories in which 2 candidate causes co-occurred with an effect. Evidence was presented in the

Young children sometimes act inappropriately despite appearing to know what to do. Dissociations of this kind raise important questions about the organization and development of knowledge and action systems. The present study investigated a knowledge– action dissociation in 6-year-olds performing a speech interpretation task and tested the hypothesis that knowledge–action dissociations stem from a general difficulty resolving conflicting cues. When knowledge and action measures were equated in terms of the amount of conflict that needed to be resolved for a correct response, children’s knowledge no longer appeared to outstrip their ability to act appropriately. Implications of the findings for competing views of knowledge representation and knowledge– action system organization are discussed.

ABSTRACT—People often perseverate, or repeat habitual behaviors when they are no longer appropriate. For example, after sorting cards by one rule, children will reliably perseverate with this rule even when they are clearly and repeatedly instructed to switch to a new rule. Such perseveration may result from limitations in working memory abilities for holding instructions actively in mind. If so, children may switch more readily to a new rule following experiences that are less demanding on working memory, such as guided practice with the new rule. In a study testing this prediction, 3-year-old children received direct instructions to switch to a new rule, guided practice with the new rule, or both. Providing children with guided practice was much more effective than telling them what to do. These findings support theories of perseveration based on competing memory systems, challenge alternative theories, and suggest effective methods for countering prepotent behaviors. People perseverate in many ways. Infants will repeatedly search for an object in a previous hiding location, even after seeing it hidden in a new location (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999; Piaget, 1954). Children will perseverate in sorting cards according to an old rule (e.g., according to their shape), even when they are told repeatedly that the rule has changed (e.g., the cards should be sorted according to color; Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996). Adults with prefrontal damage show similar behaviors (Milner, 1963; Stuss & Benson, 1984). And all adults engage in more subtle forms of perseveration, such as searching for keys in a location they have already checked, or driving a familiar route instead of stopping for an intended errand. Address correspondence to Yuko Munakata, Department of Psychology,

To test preschoolers ’ ability to flexibly switch between abstract rules differing in difficulty, nintythree 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were instructed to switch from an (easier) shape-sorting to a (harder) function-sorting rule, or vice versa. Children learned one rule, sorted four test sets, then learned the other rule, and sorted four more sets. In a control condition, seventy-two 3–5-year-old children learned one rule and were re-trained on that rule before the second test block. Half of each group received metacognitive reminders to “think about ” the current rule before each test trial. The shape rule was easier: many 3-year-olds failed to follow the function rule, confirming findings of Deák et al. (2002). Switching rules did not reduce overall rule-following. However, reminders facilitated rule-following when rules were switched, but not when a rule was repeated (i.e., control condition). Reminders actually reduced rule-following by control children who got the easier (shape) rule. The results show (1) 4-year-olds readily switch between abstract rules, even if the second rule requires ignoring obvious, conflicting perceptual information (i.e., shape); (2) some rule-switching tasks do not impose performance costs on children, and (3) children’s rule-following consistency and flexibility depend on the nature of available social support. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.