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86
The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science
 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
, 1997
"... The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternati ..."
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Cited by 129 (1 self)
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The dynamical hypothesis is the claim that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. It stands opposed to the dominant computational hypothesis, the claim that cognitive agents are digital computers. This target article articulates the dynamical hypothesis and defends it as an open empirical alternative to the computational hypothesis. Carrying out these objectives requires extensive clarification of the conceptual terrain, with particular focus on the relation of dynamical systems to computers. Key words cognition, systems, dynamical systems, computers, computational systems, computability, modeling, time. Long Abstract The heart of the dominant computational approach in cognitive science is the hypothesis that cognitive agents are digital computers; the heart of the alternative dynamical approach is the hypothesis that cognitive agents are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate the dynamical hypothesis and to defend it as an empirical alternative to the compu...
Accelerated Turing Machines
 Minds and Machines
, 2002
"... Abstract. Accelerating Turing machines are Turing machines of a sort able to perform tasks that are commonly regarded as impossible for Turing machines. For example, they can determine whether or not the decimal representation of π contains n consecutive 7s, for any n; solve the Turingmachine halti ..."
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Cited by 30 (2 self)
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Abstract. Accelerating Turing machines are Turing machines of a sort able to perform tasks that are commonly regarded as impossible for Turing machines. For example, they can determine whether or not the decimal representation of π contains n consecutive 7s, for any n; solve the Turingmachine halting problem; and decide the predicate calculus. Are accelerating Turing machines, then, logically impossible devices? I argue that they are not. There are implications concerning the nature of effective procedures and the theoretical limits of computability. Contrary to a recent paper by Bringsjord, Bello and Ferrucci, however, the concept of an accelerating Turing machine cannot be used to shove up Searle’s Chinese room argument.
What might we learn from Climate Forecasts?
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 99
, 2002
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Understanding Deutsch’s probability in a deterministic multiverse
 Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35B
, 2004
"... Difficulties over probability have often been considered fatal to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I argue that the Everettian can have everything she needs from ‘probability ’ without recourse to indeterminism, ignorance, primitive identity over time or subjective uncertainty: ..."
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Cited by 26 (3 self)
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Difficulties over probability have often been considered fatal to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I argue that the Everettian can have everything she needs from ‘probability ’ without recourse to indeterminism, ignorance, primitive identity over time or subjective uncertainty: all she needs is a particular rationality principle. The decisiontheoretic approach recently developed by Deutsch and Wallace claims to provide just such a principle. But, according to Wallace, decision theory is itself applicable only if the correct attitude to a future Everettian measurement outcome is subjective uncertainty. I argue that subjective uncertainty is not to be had, but I offer an alternative interpretation that enables the Everettian to live without uncertainty: we can justify Everettian decision theory on the basis that an Everettian should care about all her future branches. The probabilities appearing in the decisiontheoretic representation theorem can then be interpreted as the degrees to which the rational agent cares about each future branch. This reinterpretation, however, reduces the intuitive plausibility of one of the DeutschWallace axioms (Measurement Neutrality).
Between classical and quantum
, 2008
"... The relationship between classical and quantum theory is of central importance to the philosophy of physics, and any interpretation of quantum mechanics has to clarify it. Our discussion of this relationship is partly historical and conceptual, but mostly technical and mathematically rigorous, inclu ..."
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Cited by 18 (5 self)
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The relationship between classical and quantum theory is of central importance to the philosophy of physics, and any interpretation of quantum mechanics has to clarify it. Our discussion of this relationship is partly historical and conceptual, but mostly technical and mathematically rigorous, including over 500 references. For example, we sketch how certain intuitive ideas of the founders of quantum theory have fared in the light of current mathematical knowledge. One such idea that has certainly stood the test of time is Heisenberg’s ‘quantumtheoretical Umdeutung (reinterpretation) of classical observables’, which lies at the basis of quantization theory. Similarly, Bohr’s correspondence principle (in somewhat revised form) and Schrödinger’s wave packets (or coherent states) continue to be of great importance in understanding classical behaviour from quantum mechanics. On the other hand, no consensus has been reached on the Copenhagen Interpretation, but in view of the parodies of it one typically finds in the literature we describe it in detail. On the assumption that quantum mechanics is universal and complete, we discuss three ways in which classical physics has so far been believed to emerge from quantum physics, namely
Science of chaos or chaos of science?
, 1996
"... I try to clarify several confusions in the popular literature concerning chaos, determinism, the arrow of time, entropy and the role of probability in physics. Classical ideas going back to Laplace and Boltzmann are explained and defended while some recent views on irreversibility, due to Prigogine, ..."
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Cited by 16 (0 self)
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I try to clarify several confusions in the popular literature concerning chaos, determinism, the arrow of time, entropy and the role of probability in physics. Classical ideas going back to Laplace and Boltzmann are explained and defended while some recent views on irreversibility, due to Prigogine, are criticized.
No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories
 Philosophy of Science
, 2002
"... David Malament (1996) has recently argued that there can be no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles. We consider and rebut several objections that have been made against the soundness of Malament’s argument. We then consider some further objections that might be made against the ge ..."
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Cited by 15 (0 self)
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David Malament (1996) has recently argued that there can be no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles. We consider and rebut several objections that have been made against the soundness of Malament’s argument. We then consider some further objections that might be made against the generality of Malament’s conclusion, and we supply three nogo theorems to counter these objections. Finally, we dispel potential worries about the counterintuitive nature of these results by showing that relativistic quantum field theory itself explains the appearance of “particle detections.”
Physical Hypercomputation and the Church–Turing Thesis
, 2003
"... We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a ..."
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Cited by 13 (0 self)
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We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a function that is not Turing computable. Finally, we argue that the existence of the device does not refute the Church–Turing thesis, but nevertheless may be a counterexample to Gandy’s thesis.
Ontic and epistemic descriptions of chaotic systems
 Computing Anticipatory Systems
, 2000
"... Abstract. Traditional philosophical discourse draws a distinction between ontology and epistemology and generally enforces this distinction by keeping the two subject areas separated and unrelated. In addition, the relationship between the two areas is of central importance to physics and philosophy ..."
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Cited by 12 (7 self)
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Abstract. Traditional philosophical discourse draws a distinction between ontology and epistemology and generally enforces this distinction by keeping the two subject areas separated and unrelated. In addition, the relationship between the two areas is of central importance to physics and philosophy of physics. For instance, all kinds of measurementrelated problems force us to consider both our knowledge of the states and observables of a system (epistemic perspective) and its states and observables independent of such knowledge (ontic perspective). This applies to quantum systems in particular. In this contribution we present an example which shows the importance of distinguishing between ontic and epistemic levels of description even for classical systems. Corresponding conceptions of ontic and epistemic states and their evolution will be introduced and discussed with respect to aspects of stability and information ow. These aspects show whytheontic/epistemic distinction is particularly important for systems exhibiting deterministic chaos. Moreover, this distinction provides some understanding of the relationships between determinism, causation, predictability, randomness, and stochasticity inchaotic systems.