Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. In this paper, I want to explore another reaction to the explanatory gap. Those who react in this way agree that there is an explanatory gap, but they hold that it stems from the way we think about consciousness. In particular, this view locates the gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness themselves. Following Stoljar (2005), we can call this the phenomenal concept strategy. Proponents of this strategy argue that phenomenal concepts—our concepts of conscious states—have a certain special nature. Proponents suggest that given this special nature, it is predictable that we will find an explanatory gap between physical processes conceived under physical concepts, and conscious states conceived under phenomenal concepts. At the same time, they argue that our possession of concepts with this special nature can itself be explained in physical terms.

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