I propose a new theory of scalar implicatures: the speaker should be in the same epistemic status with respect to alternatives obtained via similar transformations (e.g., replacements of a scalar items with various stronger items). This theory extends naturally to explain presupposition projection. Cases where scalar items and presupposition triggers co-occur are also accounted for. The main focus is the unification between various phenomena: scalar implicatures, free choice effects and presupposition projection. Yet, the system can be split

Abstract. The article presents a formal analysis in the framework of bi-directional optimality theory of the free choice, ignorance and indifference implicatures conveyed by the use of indefinite expressions or disjunctions. Ignorance is expressed by standard means of epistemic logic. To express indifference we use Groenendijk and Stokhof’s question meanings. To derive implicature, Grice’s conversational maxims, and an additional principle expressing preferences for minimal models, are formulated as violable constraints used to select optimal candidates out of a set of alternative sentence-context pairs. The implicatures of an utterance of φ are then defined as the sentences which are entailed by any optimal context for φ (but not by φ itself). Entailment is defined in a version of update semantics where contextual updates are derived by competition among contexts. Free choice and other modal implicatures of disjunctions and indefinites will follow, but also scalar implicatures and exhaustification. Key words: free choice indefinites, disjunction, implicatures, bi-directional optimality theory. 1 Modal implications of indefinites and disjunction The article proposes a formal analysis of the ignorance, indifference and free choice effects conveyed by the use of disjunctions or indefinite pronouns. As an illustration consider the German prefixed indefiniteness marker irgend in examples (1) from Haspelmath, (2) from Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) and (3) from Kratzer (2005): 1 ⋆ Thanks to Katrin Schulz and Robert van Rooij for their inspiring work. I would also like to thank Paul Egre, Benjamin Spector, and the other participants to the PALMYR workshop for their insightful comments. Finally, I am also very grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their extremely valuable suggestions. This research has been financially supported by the NWO (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific

Abstract. This paper starts with an informal introduction to inquisitive semantics. After that, we present a formal definition of the semantics, and introduce the basic semantic notions of inquisitiveness and informativeness, in terms of wich we define the semantic categories of questions, assertions, and hybrid sentences. The focus of this paper will be on the logical pragmatical notions that the semantics gives rise to. We introduce and motivate inquisitive versions of principles of cooperation, which direct a conversation towards enhancement of the common ground. We define a notion of compliance, which judges relatedness of one utterance to another, and a notion of homogeneity, which enables quantitative comparison of compliant moves. We end the paper with an illustration of the cooperative way in which implicatures are established, or cancelled, in inquisitive pragmatics.

The article proposes an analysis of imperatives and possibility and necessity statements that (i) explains their differences with respect to the licensing of free choice any and (ii) accounts for the related phenomena of free choice disjunction in imperatives, permissions, and other possibility statements. Any and or are analyzed as operators introducing sets of alternative propositions. Free choice licensing operators are treated as quantifiers over these sets. In this way their interpretation can be sensitive to the alternatives any and or introduce in their scope.

This article proposes a new analysis of modal expressions which (i) explains the difference between necessity and possibility modals with respect to the licensing of Free Choice any and (ii) accounts for the related phenomena of Free Choice disjunction in permissions and other possibility statements. Any and or are analyzed as operators introducing sets of alternative propositions. Modals are treated as quantifiers over these sets of alternatives. In this way they can be sensitive to the alternatives any and or introduce in their scope. 1

The compositional, bottom-up computation of alternative sets was first introduced by Hamblin (1973) into Montague grammar to treat in-situ wh-questions. In the thirty years since then, alternative sets have found their way into theories of focus (Rooth 1985), indeterminate pronouns (Shimoyama 2001), and free-choice indefinites (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). These theories often position alternatives as a scope-taking mechanism that operates separately from Quantifier Raising (May 1977), Quantifying In (Montague 1974), or some other scope-taking mechanism for “genuine ” quantifiers like most. On these theories, then, it is not surprising that (say) in-situ who takes scope differently from most, as is empirically observed. In particular, if “genuine ” scope requires syntactic movement but alternative scope does not, then constraints on movement apply only to the former, and we predict— correctly—that the scope of most is more restricted than the scope of in-situ who. (1) Who denied that who left? ‘Which x and y are such that x denied that y left?’ (2) Who denied that most people left?

Extending the proposal made by Schulz (2003), we put forward a pragmatic account of the meaning of existential and universal FC items, where the ‘ignorance or indifference ’ inference triggered by the former and the ‘universal ’ inference triggered by the latter are treated as implicatures obtained by standard gricean reasoning formalized in terms of the two operations grice and competence. On this account, the implicatures of a sentence are generated with respect to a number of relevant alternatives. The difference between existential and universal FCs is due only to the choice of these alternatives. 1

This paper examines how intonation affects the interpretation of disjunctive questions. The semantic effect of a question is taken to be three-fold. First, it raises an issue. In the tradition of inquisitive semantics, we model this by assuming that a question proposes several possible updates of the common ground (several possibilities for short) and invites other participants to help establish at least one of these updates. But apart from raising an issue, a question may also highlight and/or suggest certain possibilities, and intonation determines to a large extent which possibilities are highlighted/suggested. We will introduce a compositional version of inquisitive semantics, and extend this framework in order to capture the highlighting- and suggestion potential of sentences. This will lead to a systematic account of the answerhood conditions and implications of disjunctive questions with different intonation patterns. 1 Preliminaries: basic assumptions and data Syntactic structure. Syntactically, we distinguish between two kinds of disjunctive interrogatives. On the one hand there are those that consist of a single interrogative clause containing a disjunction. On the other hand there are those that consist of two interrogative clauses, conjoined by disjunction. We will refer to the former as narrow-scope disjunctive interrogatives, and to the latter as wide-scope disjunctive interrogatives. Some examples are given in (1) and (2) below.

This paper explores the determiner corner of the ‘any ’ land in Romanian, taking Lee and Horn 1994 and Horn 2000a as tour guides. The immediate interest of the task lies in the fact that the work done in English by the over-employed determiner any is carried out in

Abstract The goal of this paper is to explain the meaning and distribution of indefinites in comparatives, focusing on the case of English some and any and German irgend-indefinites. We combine three competing theories of comparatives with an alternative semantics of some and any, and a novel account of stressed irgend-indefinites. One of the resulting theories, based on Heim’s (2006) analysis of comparatives, predicts all the relevant differences in quantificational force, and explains why free choice indefinites are licensed in comparatives.