We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route traffic such that the sum of all travel times—the total latency—is minimized. In many settings, it may be expensive or impossible to regulate network traffic so as to implement an optimal assignment of routes. In the absence of regulation by some central authority, we assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimum-latency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a “selfishly motivated ” assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance. In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed). We also consider the more general setting in which edge latency functions are assumed only to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion. Here, the total

Abstract—An information-theoretic analysis of information hiding is presented in this paper, forming the theoretical basis for design of information-hiding systems. Information hiding is an emerging research area which encompasses applications such as copyright protection for digital media, watermarking, fingerprinting, steganography, and data embedding. In these applications, information is hidden within a host data set and is to be reliably communicated to a receiver. The host data set is intentionally corrupted, but in a covert way, designed to be imperceptible to a casual analysis. Next, an attacker may seek to destroy this hidden information, and for this purpose, introduce additional distortion to the data set. Side information (in the form of cryptographic keys and/or information about the host signal) may be available to the information hider and to the decoder. We formalize these notions and evaluate the hiding capacity, which upper-bounds the rates of reliable transmission and quantifies the fundamental tradeoff between three quantities: the achievable information-hiding rates and the allowed distortion levels for the information hider and the attacker. The hiding capacity is the value of a game between the information hider and the attacker. The optimal attack strategy is the solution of a particular rate-distortion problem, and the optimal hiding strategy is the solution to a channel-coding problem. The hiding capacity is derived by extending the Gel’fand–Pinsker theory of communication with side information at the encoder. The extensions include the presence of distortion constraints, side information at the decoder, and unknown communication channel. Explicit formulas for capacity are given in several cases, including Bernoulli and Gaussian problems, as well as the important special case of small distortions. In some cases, including the last two above, the hiding capacity is the same whether or not the decoder knows the host data set. It is shown that many existing information-hiding systems in the literature operate far below capacity. Index Terms—Channel capacity, cryptography, fingerprinting, game theory, information hiding, network information theory,

this paper, which presents randomized, algorithmic techniques for path planning that are particular suited for problems that involve dierential constraints.

The problem of systematically synthesizing hybrid controllers which satisfy multiple control objectives is considered. We present a technique, based on the principles of optimal control, for determining the class of least restrictive controllers that satisfies the most important objective (which we refer to as safety). The system performance with respect to lower priority objectives (which we refer to as efficiency) can then be optimized within this class. We motivate our approach by showing how the proposed synthesis technique simplifies to well known results from supervisory control and pursuit evasion games when restricted to purely discrete and purely continuous systems respectively. We then illustrate the application of this technique to two examples, one hybrid (the steam boiler benchmark problem), and one primarily continuous (a flight vehicle management system with discrete flight modes). 1 Introduction Hybrid systems, or systems that involve the interaction of discrete and co...

AbstractWe study the problem of optimizing the performance of a system shared by selfish, noncooperative users. We consider the concrete setting of scheduling jobs on a set of shared machines with load-dependent latency functions specifying the length of time necessary to complete a job; we measure system performance by the total latency of the system. Assigning jobs according to the selfish interests of individual users (who wish to minimize only the latency that their own jobs experience) typically results in suboptimal system performance. However, in many systems of this type there is a mixture of "selfishly controlled " and "centrally controlled " jobs; as the assignment of centrally controlled jobs will influence the subsequent actions by selfish users, we aspire to contain the degradation in system performance due to selfish behavior by scheduling the centrally controlled jobs in the best possible way. We formulate this goal as an optimization problem via Stackelberg games, games in which one player acts a leader (here, the centralized authority interested in optimizing system performance) and the rest as followers (the selfish users). The problem is then to compute a strategy for the leader (a Stackelberg strategy) that induces the followers to react in a way that (at least approximately) minimizes the total latency in the system. In this paper, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute the optimal Stackelberg strategy and present simple strategies with provable performance guarantees. More precisely, we give a simple algorithm that computes a strategy inducing a job assignment with total latency no more than a constant times that of the optimal assignment of all of the jobs; in the absence of centrally controlled jobs and a Stackelberg strategy, no result of this type is possible. We also prove stronger performance guarantees in the special case where every machine latency function is linear in the machine load.

We present a game-theoretic treatment of distributed power control in CDMA wireless systems.

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We present a method to design controllers for safety specifications in hybrid systems. The hybrid system combines discrete event dynamics with nonlinear continuous dynamics: the discrete event dynamics model linguistic and qualitative information and naturally accommodate mode switching logic, and the continuous dynamics model the physical processes themselves, such as the continuous response of an aircraft to the forces of aileron and throttle. Input variables model both continuous and discrete control and disturbance parameters. We translate safety specifications into restrictions on the system’s reachable sets of states. Then, using analysis based on optimal control and game theory for automata and continuous dynamical systems, we derive Hamilton–Jacobi equations whose solutions describe the boundaries of reachable sets. These equations are the heart of our general controller synthesis technique for hybrid systems, in which we calculate feedback control laws for

This paper addresses the problem of planning the motion of one or more pursuers in a polygonal environment to eventually "see" an evader that is unpredictable, has unknown initial position, and is capable of moving arbitrarily fast. This problem was first introduced by Suzuki and Yamashita. Our study of this problem is motivated in part by robotics applications, such as surveillance with a mobile robot equipped with a camera that must find a moving target in a cluttered workspace. A few bounds are introduced, and a complete algorithm is presented for computing a successful motion strategy for a single pursuer. For simplyconnected free spaces, it is shown that the minimum number of pursuers required is \Theta(lg n). For multiply-connected free spaces, the bound is \Theta( p h + lg n) pursuers for a polygon that has n edges and h holes. A set of problems that are solvable by a single pursuer and require a linear number of recontaminations is shown. The complete algorithm searches a f...

This work makes two contributions to geometric motion planning for multiple robots: i) Motion plans are computed that simultaneously optimize an independent performance measure for each robot; ii) A general spectrum is defined between decoupled and centralized planning, in which we introduce coordination along independent roadmaps. By considering independent performance measures, we introduce a form of optimality that is consistent with concepts from multi-objective optimization and game theory literature. Previous multiple-robot motion planning approaches that consider optimality combine individual performance measures into a scalar criterion. As a result, these methods can fail to find many potentially useful motion plans. We present implemented, multiple-robot motion planning algorithms that are derived from the principle of optimality, for three problem classes along the spectrum between centralized and decoupled planning: i) coordination along fixed, independent paths; ii) coordin...