The authors investigated whether effects of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) are influenced by salience asymmetries, independent of associations. Two series of experiments analyzed unique effects of salience by using nonassociated, neutral categories that differed in salience. In a 3rd series, salience asymmetries were manipulated experimentally while holding associations between categories constant. In a 4th series, valent associations of the target categories were manipulated experimentally while holding salience asymmetries constant. Throughout, IAT effects were found to depend on salience asymmetries. Additionally, salience asymmetries between categories were assessed directly with a visual search task to provide an independent criterion of salience asymmetries. Salience asymmetries corresponded to IAT effects and also accounted for common variance in IAT effects and explicit measures of attitudes or the self-concept.

In the present research, the authors examined contextual variations in automatic attitudes. Using 2 measures of automatic attitudes, the authors demonstrated that evaluative responses differ qualitatively as perceivers focus on different aspects of a target’s social group membership (e.g., race or gender). Contextual variations in automatic attitudes were obtained when the manipulation involved overt categorization (Experiments 1–3) as well as more subtle contextual cues, such as category distinctiveness (Experiments 4–5). Furthermore, participants were shown to be unable to predict such contextual influences on automatic attitudes (Experiment 3). Taken together, these experiments support the idea of automatic attitudes being continuous, online constructions that are inherently flexible and contextually appropriate, despite being outside conscious control.

Theoretically, low correlations between implicit and explicit measures can be due to (a) motivational biases in explicit selfreports, (b) lack of introspective access to implicitly assessed representations, (c) factors influencing the retrieval of information from memory, (d) method-related characteristics of the two measures, or (e) complete independence of the underlying constructs. The present study addressed these questions from a meta-analytic perspective, investigating the correlation between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit self-report measures. Based on a sample of 126 studies, the mean effect size was.24, with approximately half of the variability across correlations attributable to moderator variables. Correlations systematically increased as a function of (a) increasing spontaneity of self-reports and (b) increasing conceptual correspondence between measures. These results suggest that implicit and explicit measures are generally related but that higher order inferences and lack of conceptual correspondence can reduce the influence of automatic associations on explicit self-reports.

2 This meta-analytic review of 61 studies (86 independent samples, 6,282 subjects), found that Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures significantly predicted criterion measures, such as judgments, choices, physiological responses, and behaviors (average r =.27). Explicit (i.e., self-report) measures were also effective predictors (average r =.35). IAT measures outperformed self-report measures in the domain of stereotyping and prejudice (average rs of.25 and.13, respectively). Self-report measures outperformed IAT measures in predicting brand-related choices (rs =.71 vs..40) and political preferences (rs =.67 vs..41). The predictive validity of explicit measures, but not IAT measures, weakened in socially sensitive outcome domains and for responses that are difficult to consciously control. When IAT and explicit measures were strongly correlated, both predicted criterion measures more effectively than when implicit-explicit correspondence was low.

Explicitly, humans can distinguish their own attitudes from evaluations possessed by others. Implicitly, the viability of a distinction between attitudes and evaluative knowledge is less clear. We investigated relations between explicit attitudes, cultural knowledge and the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In seven studies (158 samples, N 107,709), the IAT was reliably and variably related to explicit attitudes, and explicit attitudes accounted for the relationship between the IAT and cultural knowledge. We suggest that people do not have introspective access to the associations formed via experience in a culture. Ownership of mental associations is established by presence in mind and influence on thinking, feeling and doing. Regardless of origin, associations are influential depending on their availability, accessibility, salience, and applicability. Distinguishing associations as ‘‘not mine’ ’ is a self-regulatory act and contributes to the distinction between explicit evaluation, where such acts are routine, and implicit evaluation, where they are not. There is little debate over the source of intentional thoughts and actions. Intended acts are products of the self via psychological mechanisms like

Implicit stereotyping and prejudice often appear as a single process in behavior, yet functional neuroanatomy suggests that they arise from fundamentally distinct substrates associated with semantic versus affective memory systems. On the basis of this research, the authors propose that implicit stereotyping reflects cognitive processes and should predict instrumental behaviors such as judgments and impression formation, whereas implicit evaluation reflects affective processes and should predict consummatory behaviors, such as interpersonal preferences and social distance. Study 1 showed the independence of participants ’ levels of implicit stereotyping and evaluation. Studies 2 and 3 showed the unique effects of implicit stereotyping and evaluation on self-reported and behavioral responses to African Americans using double-dissociation designs. Implications for construct validity, theory development, and research design are discussed.

Abstract. A. Karpinski (2004) recently criticized Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures of self-esteem, arguing that their measurements of self-associations are compromised by their contrasting self with a putatively extremely negative second

Somebody once asked “Why is it that when people say ‘that’s a good question ’ they never have a good answer?” In response to the query of how we came to do this work, “good question ” was indeed our own response, and as such we cannot promise to have a good answer. In spite of the irony that this exercise poses for us, who insist on a healthy distrust of introspective analysis, in this article we hope to communicate the many pleasures of our collaborative effort, the degree to which we are indebted to our critics, and the recognition that the larger understanding of implicit social cognition involves many others who constitute an integral part of this discovery. A Brief History The origins of the work chosen for this issue lie in

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) requires responding to category contrasts such as young versus old, male versus female, and pleasant versus unpleasant. In introducing the IAT, A. G. Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, and J. L. K. Schwartz (1998) proposed that IAT measures reflect mental structures involving the nominal features of the IAT’s categories (e.g., age, gender, or valence features). In contrast, K. Rothermund and D. Wentura (2004) proposed that IAT performance is dominated by salience asymmetries of the IAT’s pairs of contrasted categories. To assess relative contributions of nominal feature contrasts versus salience asymmetries, the authors (a) briefly summarize the extensive evidence now available to support construct validity of the IAT as a measure based on nominal category features and (b) present 2 new experiments that yielded results problematic for the salience asymmetry interpretation.

Briefly studying names of four members of a hypothetical group produces identification with and attraction to that group, a finding labeled implicit partisanship (IP; Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002). The original demonstration of IP used human groups in a competitive context. Experiments 1 and 2 varied these procedures by using, respectively, a cooperative intergroup context and non-human group members (fictitious car brands). Neither of these variations eliminated the IP effect, indicating unanticipated robustness. Experiment 3 revealed a substantial reduction of the IP effect’s magnitude when the studied names represented a rival university. The reduction of IP through identity opposition supports the interpretation that spontaneous group identification effects carry psychological significance that is comparable to that of more ordinary group identifications. keywords group attraction, group identification, Implicit Association Test, implicit partisanship Please take a minute to memorize the following names